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A

TREATISE ON JUSTIFICATION.

BY

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Ἐν τουτῷ πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων δικαιοῦται.



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PREFACE.

THE history of these few leaves is soon told. During a ministry of more than twenty-five years, it has frequently become the author's duty publicly to vindicate the Arminian doctrine of justification. The notes and other materials which have accumulated under these circumstances form the greater portion of this little volume. Under the influence of oft repeated suggestions from various persons, they are now offered to the world in book-form. As a matter of course, so small a treatise on so great a subject must be very far from being an exhaustive one. It is a contribution toward the defense of this part of Methodist theology against the attacks which have been made upon it during the author's ministry. The discussion is neither experimental nor practical, but doctrinal. It is written, not for ripe scholars, nor

for theologians of extensive reading, but for young preachers and undergraduates in divinity. Little or no attention has been paid to beauty or ornament in style; but it has been the constant desire to state the argument in a clear, forcible, courteous manner. It is now published in the hope that it may exert some little influence in leading men into "the oneness of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God."

R. N. DAVIES.

MATTOON, ILL., June 13, 1878.

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JUSTIFICATION.

I.

MEANING OF THE TERMS "JUSTIFY" AND "JUSTIFICATION."

THE word "*justify*" is used in the Bible with a wide range of meaning. But all the instances in which it is used to denote an act of God toward man may be reduced to two classes: First. Those in which the man is acquitted from a charge of guilt, and his innocence vindicated. Thus, "I will not justify the wicked," Ex. xxiii, 7; that is, I will not acquit or vindicate the wicked. "How then can a man be justified with God" (Job xxv, 4); "In thy sight shall no man living be justified" (Psalms cxliii, 2). The second class embraces those texts which speak of God's dealing with believing penitents; thus, "All that believe are justified;" "Justified freely by his grace;" "Justified by faith," and "Justifieth the ungodly." What is the meaning of the term "justify" in this class of Scriptures?" To this question

three distinct answers are given. Firstly. That to "*justify*," δικαιοῦν, means to make just or righteous. Secondly. That it means to declare to be just or righteous, and that this is its only meaning when used by God concerning man. Thirdly. That in the class of texts above referred to, it means simply to pardon or forgive sin.

Let us now review these definitions.

First. That to "justify" means to make just or righteous. This is the definition given to it by the majority of Unitarian writers, and also, recently, by John Young and Horace Bushnell. This definition confounds justification with sanctification. It attaches the same meaning to "justify," which properly belongs to "sanctify" and "cleanse." Mr. Young, of Edinburgh, contends that we should substitute the word "righten" for "justify." But to this there are some formidable objections. 1. Nothing would be gained by it. The word "righten" has no history, and would be more ambiguous than the old term "justify." It (righten) might be applied to the heart, and thus designate the radical change of the new birth; or it might be applied to the conduct, and thus designate a change wholly exterior of the man. 2. If it was limited to express a change of the heart, then it would be an unwarranted novelty, for "justify" is never used

to designate the purification of the heart. We might safely call for any text, either in the Old Testament or in the New, in which "justify" is used in the sense of making righteous, cleansing, or sanctifying. 3. It would leave us without a term to express fully what God does with the believing penitent in regard to his past sins.

Divine pardon is not an arbitrary act of sovereign power; but it is an act of mercy, exercised in accordance with and through the provision of a law of pardon. The sinner's pardon is both gracious and judicial; and no word so perfectly expresses the nature of this act as the word "justify." It is cheerfully granted that sanctification always accompanies justification; and that, although in the natural order of events it is subsequent to justification, yet in point of time it is coetaneous with it. Still sanctification is distinct from justification, and not to be confounded with it. In 1. Cor. vi, 11, Paul presents these as distinct blessings: "But ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus." If justification is identical with sanctification, then the language of the apostle is tautological.

Dr. Bushnell objects: "It is another fault of this legally grounded justification that it consents by definition to a really appalling fiction,

proposing to justify or pass the subject, not as being just, but as if he were just, when confessedly he is not." ("Forgiveness and Law," p. 185.) Is not this true in every instance of forgiveness, either human or divine? The offender is not pronounced innocent or just; on the contrary, he is pronounced guilty. But he is treated as if he were not guilty, treated the same as if he had been right; that is, all idea of punishment is dismissed. He is not the object of judicial anger, but of compassion. We do not seek his hurt, but show him kindness. This is the sum and substance of forgiveness. What is there in it that is inconsistent with either truth or reason? Bushnell quotes Isa. liii, 11, "By his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many," in connection with Dan. xii, 3, "They that turn many to righteousness," and adds: "Plainly enough there is no thought here of the many being judicially acquitted, but in both cases of their being made or caused to be righteous." The two texts have little or no connection with each other. The text in Daniel refers to human agency in the salvation of men; while that in Isaiah predicts the success of the Messiah in redeeming men, and is the only text of the two which is pertinent to this question. The context both preceding and succeeding deals not

with the purification of men, but with their deliverance from punishment through Christ's sacrificial death. This is the theme of the chapter. He is set forth as having "borne our griefs and carried our sorrows;" "He was wounded for our transgressions, bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him: and with his stripes we are healed." This context shows that the justification spoken of was forensic and not moral. But the meaning of the words "justify many" is settled by the very next clause, "for he shall bear their iniquities." There would be no force in the proposition that he should make many righteous because he should bear their iniquities; that is, bear the punishment of their sins. There is no necessary connection between bearing the chastisement of another and making him righteous; but there is a very natural and close connection between Christ suffering in our stead and our receiving the pardon of sin through faith in his blood.

"The error of the Romish Church confounds justification and sanctification. So the Council of Trent declares that 'justification is not only by the remission of sins, but also the sanctification of the inner man; and that the only formal cause of justification is the righteousness of God, not that whereby he is just, but that by

which he makes us just;' that is, inherently so. That justification and sanctification go together we have seen; but this is not what is meant by the Council. Their doctrine is that man is made just or holy, and then justified. The answer to this has been already given. God 'justifieth the ungodly;' and the Scriptures plainly mean by justification not sanctification, but simply the remission of sin. . . . The sanctification which constitutes a man inherently righteous is concomitant with justification, but does not precede it. Before 'condemnation' is taken away, he cries out, 'O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death;' when 'there is now no condemnation' he 'walks not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.' In the nature of things, too, justification and sanctification are distinct. The active sanctification of the Spirit, taken in itself, either habitually or actually, and as inherent in us, can in no wise be justification, for justification is the remission of sins. God gave this Spirit to angels; he gave it to Adam in the day of creation, and this Spirit did sanctify, and now doth sanctify the blessed angels, yet this sanctification is not remission." (Watson.)

The second definition of "justify," and that which now claims our attention, is the definition

given to it by the advocates of Calvinism, in which it is affirmed that justify means "to pronounce or declare righteous," and that this is its only meaning where it is applied by God to the sinner. We can not accept this definition, and offer as a better one the following: "*Δικαιοῦν*, when applied by God to the sinner, means simply to pardon, or forgive sin." This is the definition of justify given by Arminians generally. Let us examine the Calvinistic definition, "to declare righteous," and the Arminian definition, "to pardon," together. Calvinists claim that "mere pardon is the act of a sovereign waiving the claims of the law and discharging the penalty." This is doubtless true of mere human pardon, for it does not seem possible for a redemptive principle to be introduced into mere human law. But the statement is not correct when applied to the pardon granted by God to a believing penitent. God does not pardon by waiving the claims of the law; the pardon is granted under the provisions of a law of remedial mercy. An atonement has been made for the sins of the offender, and by his faith he stands entitled to pardon, through the provisions of the law of pardon. Hence, when God pardons sin, he does it, not as a sovereign in the exercise of royal prerogative, but as the "judge of all the earth," giving to

a believing penitent the pardon guaranteed him by the law of atonement. The argument of Richard Watson on this point is very clear and forcible: "We are taught that pardon of sin is not an act of prerogative, done above law; but a judicial process, done consistently with law. For in this process there are three parties. God as sovereign: 'Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth, who is he that condemneth? Christ as advocate; not defending the guilty, but interceding for them: 'It is Christ that died, yea, rather, that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us.' (Rom. viii, 33, 34.) 'And if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father.' (1 John, ii, 1.) The third party is man, who is, by his own confession, 'guilty,' 'a sinner,' 'ungodly;' for repentance in all cases precedes this remission of sins, and it both supposes and confesses offense and desert of punishment. God is judge in this process; not, however, as it has been well expressed, 'by the law of creation and of works, but by the law of redemption and grace; not as merely just, though just, but as merciful; not as merciful in general, and *ex nuda voluntate*, without any respect had to satisfaction, but as propitiated by the blood of Christ, and having

accepted the propitiation made by his blood; not merely propitiated by his blood, but moved by his intercession, which he makes as our advocate in heaven; not only pleading the propitiation made and accepted, but the repentance and faith of the sinner, and the promise of the judge before whom he pleads.' (Lawson's 'Theo-Politica.') Thus as pardon or justification does not take place but upon propitiation, the mediation and intercession of a third party, and on the condition on the part of the guilty, not only of repentance, but of 'faith' in Christ's 'blood,' which, as before established, means faith in his sacrificial death, it is not an act of mere mercy, or of prerogative, but one which consists with a righteous government, and proceeds on grounds which secure the honor of the divine justice."

Dr. Hodge, of Princeton, in his Systematic Theology, Vol. III, page 121, writes: "It would be a perfect solecism to say of a criminal whom the executive had pardoned that he was justified; or that a reformed drunkard or thief was justified. The word always expresses a judgment—whether of the mind, as when one man justifies another for his conduct, or officially of a judge. If such be the established meaning of the word, it ought to settle all controversy as to the nature of justification. We are bound to take the words of

Scripture in their true established sense; and, therefore, when the Bible says 'God justifies the believer,' we are not at liberty to say that it means that he pardons or that he sanctifies him. It means, and can mean only, that he pronounces him just." It certainly would not be correct to say of a criminal, pardoned by a human governor, that he had been justified. "Pardoned" is the only suitable word to apply to him. But there is very little analogy between the pardon of a criminal by the arbitrary act of a sovereign and the pardon of a believing penitent by God under the provisions of a law of atonement made for that purpose. When a human governor pardons a criminal there is no satisfaction made to justice, either by the criminal or by any third party. The pardon is entirely arbitrary and above all law. Not so in the case of the pardon of a sinner by God. The divine pardon is granted in accordance with a law made for that purpose. Let us look at the application of this law. A believing penitent is seeking reconciliation with God. Tried by the strict requirements of the moral law, he can not be justified, for he has broken it. In his repentance and faith he is led by the Holy Spirit, hence is not under the moral law: "If ye be led of the Spirit ye are not under the law" (Gal. v, 18); "Ye are not under the law, but under

grace" (Rom. vi, 14). He comes seeking justification by the law of faith. (Rom. iii, 27.) He confesses his sins and seeks forgiveness through faith in Christ. He complies with the terms of "the law of faith" and God pardons him. His pardon is the judicial award of the great Judge; hence he is properly said to be justified, and his justification is simple pardon.

Dr. Hodge further argues that "Condemnation is not the opposite of either pardon or reformation. To condemn is to pronounce guilty or worthy of punishment. To justify is to declare not guilty, or that justice does not demand punishment, or that the person condemned can not be justly condemned." In human law pardon is not the opposite of condemnation, but in the New Testament law of pardon it is. A man is condemned for unbelief: "He that believeth not is condemned already" (John iii, 18); "He that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him" (John iii, 36). When a man turns from his unbelief and believes in Christ, then God pardons, or justifies, him: "Through this man is preached unto you the forgiveness of sins, and by him all that believe are justified from all things, from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses." (Acts xiii, 38, 39.)

Dr. Hodge writes: "For the same reason justification can not be mere pardon. Pardon does not proceed on the ground of satisfaction. A prisoner delivered by a ransom is not pardoned. A debtor whose obligations have been canceled by a friend becomes entitled to freedom from the claims of his creditor. When a sovereign pardons a criminal it is not an act of justice, it is not on the ground of satisfaction to the law. The Bible, therefore, in teaching that justification is on the ground of an atonement or satisfaction; that the sinner's guilt is expiated; that he is redeemed by the precious blood of Christ; and that judgment is pronounced upon him as righteous, does thereby teach that justification is neither pardon nor infusion of righteousness." (Theol. Vol. III, 125.) Let us review this paragraph by items. 1st. "A prisoner delivered by ransom is not pardoned." Concerning the ransom of prisoners among men, the foregoing statement may, or may not, be true. When made concerning the ransom of a sinner by the blood of Christ, it is utterly untrue, as the following texts and comments will show: "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past." (Rom. iii, 24, 25.)

Here the remission of our sins is attributed direct to our "redemption" or ransom by Christ. Again, "In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins." (Eph. i, 7.) Here the "forgiveness of sins" is set forth as the great result of "redemption." The same language is used in Colossians i, 14. Dr. Hodge will not deny that the believer is "ransomed" by the blood of Christ. (See the foregoing texts; also, "Christ hath redeemed us," Gal. iii, 13; "Ye are bought with a price," 1 Cor. vi, 20; "Redeemed . . . with the precious blood of Christ," 1 Peter i, 18, 19). Neither will he deny that the believing penitent is pardoned. Will he deny that the penitent owes his pardon directly to the blood of Christ? (See the foregoing texts.) Dr. Hodge here joins a copartnership with the Socinians. They object to the vicarious sacrifice of Christ on the ground that it conflicts with the offer of pardon through mercy. Dr. Hodge objects to the idea of pardon being the result of our ransom by Christ's death. Both he and the Socinians are overthrown by the fact that justification or pardon is conditioned on the sinner's repentance and faith. If the sinner's being ransomed by the blood of Christ gives him such a legal right to an acquittal from sin that he is not pardoned, then that same redemption must also

exonerate him from the duty of repentance and faith. But the fact that his ransom does not excuse him from repentance and faith, proves that he is a proper subject of pardon. 2d. "A debtor whose obligations have been canceled by a friend, becomes entitled to freedom from the claims of his creditor." The whole force and relevancy of this objection lies in the assumption that Christ's active righteousness is imputed to us, and thus cancels our obligations to that law. But the notion of Christ's active righteousness canceling our obligations to the law is unscriptural and absurd. "We have no such office ascribed in Scripture to the active righteousness of Christ, which is only spoken of there in connection with his atonement as rendering him a fit victim, or sacrifice, for sin—'he died, the just for the unjust.'" (Watson.) 3d. "When a sovereign pardons a criminal it is not an act of justice." When the sovereign is a mere man, pardon may or may not be an act of justice. If the latter, it is because the man had been unjustly condemned. The character of the act will be settled according to the nature of the case. In the case of pardon by the Divine Sovereign, the pardon is an act of mercy and justice combined. It will be an act of mercy because the pardon is entirely unmerited by the man, and is the work of God's

pure love; it is an act of justice because man, having been ransomed by Christ's blood, and having repented and believed in Christ in compliance with the terms of pardon, it is just that God pardon him. 4th. "The Bible, therefore, in teaching that justification is on the ground of an atonement or satisfaction; that the sinner's guilt is expiated; that he is redeemed by the precious blood of Christ; and that judgment is pronounced upon him as righteous, does thereby teach that justification is neither pardon nor infusion of righteousness." What does Dr. Hodge mean by the clause "judgment is pronounced upon him as righteous?" If he means that the sinner is pronounced absolutely without sin, we may safely challenge him to produce a single text of Scripture which sustains a proposition so self-contradictory and absurd. If he means that the penitent, though known to be guilty, is, in consideration of the blood of Christ, dealt with as though he were innocent, that is Scriptural justification, and it is simply pardon.

Dr. Hodge argues that "the doctrine that justification consists simply in pardon and consequent restoration, assumes that the divine law is imperfect and mutable." (Theol., Vol. III, 125.) It is somewhat difficult to see how the proposition that "New Testament justification is simply

pardon" should imply that the divine law is imperfect and mutable. By what process Dr. Hodge arrives at so strange a conclusion passes our comprehension. If the divine pardon was granted without any reference to a vicarious expiation of sin, and without any reference to a moral change on the part of the offender, then, indeed, it might be said that the pardon implied an imperfection of law. But it is utterly impossible to entertain such a notion when the New Testament doctrine of pardon is fairly stated and understood. The person seeking pardon is required to repent of sin and to come to God with an humble faith in Christ, confessing his sins and resting his prayer for pardon on the fact that Christ has died in his stead. In what way could the majesty of the divine law be better sustained than by such a plan? But does Dr. Hodge's theory of justification mend the matter? Is the sanctity and perfection of a law requiring perfect truthfulness sustained by the falsity of attributing to the sinner a righteousness which he never had, and which no principle of truth or justice can ever make his?

Dr. Hodge contends that "justification includes or conveys a title to eternal life. Pardon is purely negative. It simply removes a penalty. It confers no title to benefits not previously

enjoyed. Eternal life, however, is suspended on the positive condition of perfect obedience. The merely pardoned sinner has no such obedience. He is destitute of what, by the immutable principles of the divine government, is the indispensable condition of eternal life. He has no title to the inheritance promised to the righteous. This is not the condition of the believer. The merit of Christ is entitled to the reward. And the believer, being partaker of that merit, shares in that title." (Theol., Vol. III, p. 129.) Justification, of itself, does not include or convey any title to eternal life whatever; it simply removes any legal impediment to the bestowment of it which might arise on the score of personal guilt. Pardon does the same. In pardon there is a remission of the penalty, hence a removal of any legal impediment to life. Along with justification or pardon there come the concomitant blessings of heart-purification, adoption, and the witness of the Spirit. Dr. Hodge says: "Eternal life, however, is suspended on the positive condition of perfect obedience. The merely pardoned sinner has no such obedience. He is destitute," etc. The proposition that eternal life "is suspended on the positive condition of perfect obedience," is of more than doubtful truthfulness, and its only strength is in its ambiguity. Is Dr. Hodge talk-

ing about eternal life as perfected in heaven or as begun on earth? If he means eternal life in heaven, then his proposition is not relevant to the subject-matter of discussion, which is the justification of the sinner upon earth, and not his final salvation in heaven. If Dr. Hodge refers to the sinner's entering into eternal life in the moment of his justification, then the proposition is not true; for the condition of eternal life in that period of the man's career is not obedience but faith: "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life." (John iii, 36; v, 24; vi, 47.) Dr. Hodge says: "The merely pardoned sinner has no such obedience." Neither has any other mere man. "The merit of Christ is entitled to the reward." What proof has Dr. Hodge that Christ has eternal life as the reward of his active righteousness? If it were true that Christ has his eternal life by virtue of his perfect obedience, could his obedience be more than perfect? If a perfect obedience were demanded of each one as the condition of eternal life, how could the obedience of Christ (seeing that it could not be more than perfect) merit eternal life for any but himself? If the law of God demands of each man a perfect merit, and Christ's merit can not be more than perfect, how can any one else share those merits with him? On what principle

of truth or philosophy can one man be said to share in actions which belong wholly to another? The sinner comes to God confessing his sin, not daring to claim any righteousness of his own, much less does he dare to make a fictitious claim to the righteousness of another, but casts himself wholly on the mercy of God, pleads the name of Christ; God imputes his faith to him for righteousness, pardons his sins, and this pardon is a Scriptural justification.

But let us examine these conflicting definitions in the light of Scriptural usage:

"I, even I, am he that blotteth out thy transgressions for mine own sake, and will not remember thy sins. Put me in remembrance: let us plead together: declare thou that thou mayest be justified." (Isa. xliii, 25, 26.) Here, unquestionably, "justified" has the same meaning with the clauses "blotteth out thy transgressions" and "will not remember thy sins." God did not call on them to show their good works in order that they might be vindicated, but to confess their sins in order that they might be pardoned. There would be no pertinence in God proclaiming his willingness to blot out their transgressions, etc., if he meant that they should vindicate themselves from all guilt. But these assurances of pardoning mercy were very appropriate if he meant that

they should confess their sins in order that he might pardon them. This conclusion is sustained by the Septuagint, which reads, "λέγε οὐ τὰς ἀνομίας συυ πρῶτος ἵνα δικαιωθῇς," "declare (confess) thou thy sins first, that thou mayest be justified." Here "justified" can have no other meaning but pardoned.

"Surely shall one say, In the Lord have I righteousness and strength: even to him shall men come; and all that are incensed against him shall be ashamed. In the Lord shall all the seed of Israel be justified, and shall glory." (Isa. xlv, 24, 25. I can not do better here than give the notes of Mr. Barnes on this text. "Be regarded and treated as righteous. Their sins shall be pardoned, and they shall be acknowledged and treated as the children of God. (See notes on Rom. iii, 24, 25.) To justify here is not to pronounce them innocent, or to regard them as deserving of his favors; but it is to receive them into favor, and to resolve to treat them as if they had not sinned; that is, to treat them as if they were righteous. All this by the mere mercy and grace of God, and is through the merits of the Redeemer who died in their place."

"And the publican, standing afar off, would not lift up so much as his eyes unto heaven, but smote upon his breast, saying, God be mer-

ciful to me a sinner. I tell you, this man went down to his house justified rather than the other." (Luke xviii, 13, 14.) The publican unquestionably makes his prayer to God as to his judge. He asks and receives pardoning mercy, and Christ says he was justified. It would seem impossible to doubt that the pardon craved and the justification granted were one and the same thing. "We can not say that he obtained righteousness by any merit of works. The meaning therefore is, that after he had obtained the pardon of his sins he was considered as righteous in the sight of God. He was righteous, therefore, not through any approbation of his works, but through God's gracious absolution. Wherefore Ambrose beautifully styles confession of sins a legitimate justification." (Calvin.) "Confess thy sins first, that thou mayest be justified." Such was the exhortation given by Isaiah; the publican came confessing his sins, and his sins were forgiven him. "Not merely was he justified in the secret, unsearchable counsels of God, but he 'went down to his house justified,' with a sweet sense of a received forgiveness shed abroad upon his heart; for God's justification of the sinner is indeed a transitive act, and passes from him to its object." (Trench.)

"Be it known unto you therefore, men and

brethren, that through this man is preached unto you the forgiveness of sins: and by him all that believe are justified from all things, from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses." (Acts xiii, 38, 39.) "The apostle thus connects 'forgiveness of sins' with 'justification,' to show that they are identically the same." (Calvin iii, 12, 22.) Further comment is useless.

"But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness. Even as David also describeth the blessedness of the man, unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works, saying, Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin." (Rom. iv, 5–8.) "The quotation from David, introduced by the apostle, by way of illustrating his doctrine of the justification of the ungodly, by 'counting his faith for righteousness,' shows clearly that he considered 'justification' 'the imputing of righteousness,' 'the forgiveness of iniquities,' the 'covering of sin,' the 'non-imputation of sin, as of the same import; acts substantially equivalent the one to another, though under somewhat different views, and therefore expressed by terms respectively convertible,—this variety of phrase being adopted,

probably, to preserve the idea which runs throughout the whole Scripture, that in the remission or pardon of sin, Almighty God acts in his character of Ruler and Judge, showing mercy upon terms satisfactory to his justice, when he might in rigid justice have punished our transgressions to the utmost." (Watson.) "By these words we are taught that justification with Paul is nothing else but pardon of sin." (Calvin; see Barnes *in loco*.)

The fifth verse forbids any other definition of "justify" than that of simple pardon. The person or character to be justified is the "ungodly;" in the very nature of the case, he can not be declared either just or godly, he can only be pardoned. It will not mend the matter to say that the sinner is invested with "the righteousness of Christ." For if this is imputed to him in such a manner as to make him truly righteous in God's sight, then he has no need for pardon; if the imputation does not make him truly righteous, then he is still "ungodly," and can not possibly be pronounced "righteous." All that can be done for him (with regard to his past sins) is to pardon him, and this pardon the apostle calls "justification."

Having looked at the usage of δικαιοῦν in the preceding texts, and which, though few in num-

ber, are nevertheless a fair index to its usage when employed to designate what God does for the penitent sinner, let us now examine some of the texts in which the noun δικαιοσύνη, "righteousness" occurs. That δικαιοσύνη is often used in the Septuagint to designate that righteousness, or moral purity, which the Holy Spirit works out in man, is cheerfully admitted. But it is just as certain that both in the Septuagint and in the New Testament it is used to designate, not only the attribute of mercy in God, but also the active exhibition of mercy to men in the pardon of sins. Let a few instances be examined.

"Thy servant hath found grace in thy sight, and thou hast magnified thy mercy which thou hast shewed unto me in saving my life." (Gen. xix, 19.) The term "mercy" of the text is "chesed," in the Hebrew, and δικαιοσύνην, in the Septuagint. In this instance it can not mean any declaration of righteousness made concerning Lot, nor can it mean the attribute of mercy in God; but certainly means the favor or compassion shown to Lot in saving him and his family from the destruction of Sodom.

"Deliver me from blood-guiltiness, O God, thou God of my salvation: and my tongue shall sing aloud of thy righteousness." (Psalms li,

14.) Here the 'righteousness' of the last clause is evidently the pardoning mercy of God, by which the writer hoped to escape from his "blood-guiltiness." "The allusion is to the guilt of shedding blood, or taking life (Comp. Gen. ix, 5, 6), and the reference is undoubtedly to his guilt in causing Uriah, the husband of Bathsheba, to be slain. (2 Sam. xi, 14–17.) It was this which weighed upon his conscience, and filled him with alarm. The guilt of this he prayed might be taken away, that he might have peace. The fact of the shedding of that blood could never be changed; the real criminality of that fact would always remain the same; the crime itself could never be declared to be innocence; his own personal ill desert for having shed that blood would always remain; but the sin might be pardoned, and his soul could thus find peace." It is plain that the "righteousness" which he would celebrate in song must be related to his deliverance from "blood-guiltiness." In asking to be delivered from "blood-guiltiness," he unquestionably asks for pardon. There would be no pertinence in the prayer, "pardon my sin, and I will praise thy holiness," or "I will praise thy justice," or "thy truth." There would be no necessary connection or harmony between these ideas; but the prayer, "pardon my blood-

guiltiness, and I will sing aloud of thy pardoning mercy," is harmonious in all its parts.

"Add iniquity unto their iniquity: and let them not come into thy righteousness." (Psalm lxix, 27.) It matters not whether we interpret the first clause of this text as a prayer that these persons be delivered over unto a reprobate mind because of their iniquity, or whether we adopt the marginal reading of it thus, "Add punishment to their iniquity," in either case the words "add iniquity," etc., mean punishment, and from the complement of the last clause of the text, the whole verse may be correctly paraphrased thus: "Punish their iniquity, and grant them no pardon."

"The Lord hath made known his salvation: his righteousness hath he openly shewed in the sight of the heathen." (Psalm xcviii, 2.) Here, also, "righteousness" is evidently synonymous with salvation, or pardoning mercy. "But the mercy of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear him, and his righteousness unto children's children." "Mine eyes fail for thy salvation, and for the word of thy righteousness." (Psalms ciii, 17, and cxix, 123.) In both of these texts the meaning of *δικαιοσύνη* is fixed by the preceding terms "mercy" and "salvation." "Hear my prayer, O Lord, give

ear to my supplications: in thy faithfulness answer me, and in thy righteousness. And enter not into judgment with thy servant: for in thy sight shall no man living be justified." (Psalm cxliii, 1, 2.) The term "righteousness," in the first verse, must mean either God's justice as a judge, or his pardoning mercy exercised through a law of redemption. It can not mean the first, for the author deprecates the idea of being tried by a law of simple justice, "enter not into judgment," etc., and pleads that such is the guilt of man that none can vindicate himself before God; hence, in praying that God would hear in "righteousness," he prays not for justice, but for mercy. "My righteousness is near: my salvation is gone forth; . . . my salvation shall be forever, and my righteousness shall not be abolished. . . . My righteousness shall be forever, and my salvation from generation to generation." (Isa. li, 5–8.) Here "righteousness" and "salvation" are used interchangeably, and thus fix the meaning of "righteousness." "For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith: as it is written, The just shall live by faith. For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men." (Rom. i, 17, 18.) Here "righteousness," or pardon of sin, is put

in antithesis with the "wrath," or punishment to be inflicted, thus showing clearly its nature as pardon. "Them that have obtained like precious faith with us, through the righteousness of God." (2 Peter, i, 1.) "How does it appear that 'the righteousness of God' here means any thing more or less than his mercy?" (Wesley.)

Dr. Alexander Hodge states the distinction between pardon and justification thus: "The essence of pardon is that a man is forgiven without righteousness. The essence of justification is pronounced to be possessed of a righteousness which fulfills the law." After the foregoing examination of the terms justify and justification, we feel compelled to modify his statement thus: "The essence of pardon is that a man is forgiven without righteousness. The essence of the justification of a sinner is that a man without righteousness is forgiven and dealt with as though he had not sinned, because Christ had borne the penalty for him, and thus enabled God to be just and yet the justifier of those who believe in Christ."

Dr. Charles Hodge objects to the defining of justification as simple pardon, that "'Being justified by faith,' says the apostle, 'we have peace with God.' (Rom. v, 1.) But pardon does not produce peace. It leaves the conscience unsat-

isfied. A pardoned criminal is not only just as much a criminal as he was before, but his sense of guilt and remorse are in no degree lessened. Pardon can remove only the outward and arbitrary penalty. The sting of sin remains. There can be no satisfaction of the mind until there is a satisfaction of justice. Justification secures peace not merely because it includes pardon, but because that pardon is dispensed on the ground of a full satisfaction of justice." (Theol., Vol. III, p. 128.) The error in the foregoing reasoning is that of limiting the efficiency of the divine pardon to the defective power of pardon by a merely human ruler. The human pardon can only affect the external relations of the man, it can not affect the condition of the soul. Surely this is not true of the divine pardon. Dr. Hodge argues that pardon can not deliver from remorse, but that an imputation of righteousness can. It is not easy to understand how the imputation of righteousness to a criminal can relieve him from remorse of conscience. A man is guilty of murder, and has remorse of conscience. Now, no matter how perfect the righteousness with which he is invested, it can not take away the sense of condemnation, which is the very essence of remorse. If all the righteousness of Christ were imputed to him, still he

is a murderer, and feels condemned. Remorse of conscience has reference to past sins, and no present righteousness imputed to the sinner can take away from him the shame and distress connected with his past offense. On the other hand, it is equally evident that the divine pardon can take that remorse away and give peace. The divine pardon remits all the penalty of sin. Remorse of conscience is part of that penalty, and is taken away when the man is pardoned. Remorse being gone, the pardoned man has peace. Justification gives peace, so does pardon, hence pardon and justification are synonymous terms.

II.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN, AND OF THE FORGIVENESS OF SIN, AS HELD BY UNITARIANS AND UNIVERSALISTS.

HAVING shown that the justification of a penitent believer is simply the forgiveness of his sins, it becomes necessary now to examine the notion of forgiveness held by Unitarians and Universalists. These two sects deny that there is in forgiveness any remission of a judicial penalty. According to their theory, justification does not consist in remitting the penalty, but in taking away the propensity to sin. It furnishes no relief for past sin, but simply saves in the future. In order to sustain this notion they are forced to deny the existence of any punishment of sin, except such consequences as naturally result from the sinful action. Let us hear their own statement of the notion. Our first quotation will be from J. F. Clarke: "It would seem, at first sight, that the Deity can not be expected to forgive the sinner in either of these ways. Not by ceasing to be angry, for he never was angry;

not by remitting the penalty, for the penalty is not an arbitrary infliction, but the natural and necessary consequence of the offense. When God is said to be angry, when his wrath is spoken of, whatever it means it can not mean any thing like human passion. Such passion is inconsistent with the essential attributes of Deity, for it implies weakness, suffering, and selfish irritation." "If, then, forgiveness, means either the cessation of God's holy indignation against sin, or the remission of the penalty of sin which is its natural attendant, it would seem that the one kind of forgiveness is forbidden by the nature of God and the other by the nature of man, and that, therefore, forgiveness of sin is an impossibility." Before adducing further quotations, we will stop and make a few reflections.

Mr. Clarke says that God "never was angry." This assertion unblushingly contradicts a host of Scripture texts. Thus: "The Lord was very angry with Israel." (2 Kings, xvii, 18.) We are warned to "kiss the Son lest he be angry." (Psalm ii, 12.) "God is angry with the wicked every day." "The anger of the Lord is fierce." That "he will execute his vengeance in anger." (Num. v, 24; Micah v, 15.) A host of similar texts might be quoted, but these are sufficient for the purpose. Let any person desirous of

investigating this subject more thoroughly take Cruden's Concordance, and turn to the words "anger," "hate," and "vengeance," and their modifications, and he will be astonished to see the prominence which the Bible gives to this subject. "Anger is not evil *per se*. The mind is formed to be angry as well as to love. Both are original susceptibilities of our nature. If anger were in itself sinful, how could God himself be angry? How could he, who was separate from sin and sinners, have looked around upon men with anger? An essentially immoral character can not attach to it if it be the mere emotion of displeasure on the infliction of any evil upon us. Anger may be sinful when it arises too soon without reflection; when the injury which awakens it is only apparent and was designed to do good. The disposition which becomes speedily angry we call passionate. When it is disproportionate to the offense; when it is transferred from the guilty to the innocent; when it is too long protracted, it then becomes revengeful. (Eph. iv. 26; Matt. v. 22; Col. iii, 8.) When anger, hatred, wrath are ascribed to God they denote his holy and just displeasure with sin and sinners. In him they are principles arising out of his holy and just nature, and are, therefore, steady and uniform, and more terrible

than if mere emotions or passions." (M'Clintock and Strong.) To this I add the following from Knapp: "There may be a righteous anger, as is often said in common life, when one expresses his deep and lively displeasure in such a way as to be perfectly conformable to the subject, the end, and the circumstances. Nor can a good moral being exist, or even be conceived to exist, without such anger. God, as the most perfect and holy moral being, has certainly the greatest displeasure against sin; and as he is the supreme moral Governor of the world, he expresses it in a very impressive manner. He, therefore, is said to burn with anger, but his anger is always just."

Mr. Clarke insists upon it that anger in God "can not mean any thing like human passion." Why not? If God's anger is not like human passion, then we can not have any proper conception of the meaning of the term when applied to him, and God's effort to reveal his nature to us is a failure. But we will proceed to further quotations: "The New Testament plainly teaches a fixed and certain retribution for all—penitent and impenitent, believers and unbelievers, those who are forgiven and those who are not. We read that 'we shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he

hath done, whether it be good or bad.' (2 Cor. v, 10; Rom. xiv, 10–12.) We read that God 'will render to every man according to his deeds,' and that 'every one of us shall give an account of himself to God.' We are also taught in one parable (Luke xix, 13) the principle of retribution, and in another (Matt. xxv, 14) the principle of accountability. According to the first, we are rewarded hereafter according to the exact degree in which we have improved the talents, means, opportunities, faculties, of which we are the stewards; according to the other, we are to account according to the different amount and quality of these talents. To whom much has been given, of him much will be required. This retribution is not arbitrary, but is compared to the most certain and inflexible operations of nature. 'Be not deceived; God is not mocked: whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap. He who soweth to the flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the Spirit, from the Spirit shall reap eternal life.' (Gal. vi, 8.) In the Book of Revelation (xx, 12, 13) we read that the books were opened and every man judged out of the things written in the books, according to their works. It seems, therefore, that Scripture plainly teaches what we have already seen to be reasonable — that every action, good or

evil, brings after it an inevitable consequence. The consequence in the one case is eternal life; that is, as I suppose, an elevation and strengthening of the immortal principle. The good action reacts upon the character by a fixed law to make it better. It brings an access of faith and love which qualifies us for higher action and deeper enjoyment. We 'sow to the Spirit, and of the Spirit reap' spiritual or eternal life. The consequence in the other case is as unerring. The bad action also reacts upon the character. He who sows to the flesh reaps corruption. Every higher faculty decays; the power of insight is dulled; love is frozen in the heart; faith in God, in things unseen, in universal ideas, in the right, the good, the beautiful, dies out of the soul. The retribution is sure and certain—certain as the law of gravitation. Forgiveness can not remit this penalty, for what remission of penalty will change the character?" "They have taught that repentance and faith in the atoning sacrifice of Christ will, at any time, procure for sinner or saint, a forgiveness which obliterates all the penalties of evil-doing. But such a forgiveness as this is evidently inconsistent with retribution, and the effect of such a view is dangerous and pernicious." (Forgiveness of Sin, pp. 22, 23, 27–30, 35.)

Mr. Clarke's reference in this last quotation to the two parables, in Luke xix, 13, and Matt. xxv, 14, is most unfortunate for his theory. Turn and read the two passages, and then note the following points: 1st. The reward of the faithful servants is no natural result or consequence of their conduct, but arises directly from the sovereign will and pleasure of the masters. 2d. The punishment of the unfaithful servants has no natural connection with their offenses, but is caused by the will and determination of the angry masters. "Weeping and gnashing of teeth" in "outer darkness" is surely no "natural result" of unfaithful stewardship. 3d. Is it "certain as the laws of gravitation" that the enemies of kings will all be slain? (Luke xix, 27.) Is death the "inevitable consequence" of such an act, according to the "most certain and inflexible operations of nature?"

We will next quote from Dr. Thayer:

"The Scriptural doctrine of forgiveness is not remission of punishment, but of the sin which brings punishment. We are punished for sins already committed, but are forgiven the evil heart, the wicked passions which lead to the commission of them." "The simple meaning, therefore, of the term 'forgiveness,' is putting or sending away, removal or deliverance from; and 'for-

giveness of sins' is removal of sin or deliverance from sin. From this point the subject becomes intelligible. The sin is punished and forgiven; the penalty of transgression is inflicted; and then the sinner is forgiven or delivered from his sinful course—his evil heart of wickedness. And the very punishment itself is conducive to this forgiveness, or this putting away of sin. Subdued and humbled by the just judgment of God, he reflects upon his ways, is brought to repentance, abandons his wicked life, and thus his sins are dismissed, put away, forgiven; he is set at liberty, or delivered from them; or, in other words, he is saved—not from punishment, but from sin." "No repentance can save from the just penalty of the violated law. The hand thrust into the fire is burned, and no regret, no sorrow however sincere, can save from the pain; but it may save from a repetition of the act, and so save from a repetition of the pain. The repentance of the drunkard does not save him from the past shame and degradation and torment of his transgressions; he has not been a drunkard all these years without suffering the loss of honor and place, of the respect of his neighbors, of his own respect, without humiliation, disgrace, and remorse. He can not be forgiven these, but his repentance will save him from the sin of drunken-

ness, and thus, the sin being forgiven, from a continuation of the punishment." (Thayer's Theol. Universal., pp. 315–318.)

It would seem to be almost a work of supererogation to point out the fallacy of the foregoing reasoning. The pain in the burned hand is just as great to the innocent party, where the burning is purely accidental, as it is to the guilty one, whose burning is the punishment of crime. According to this theory, the righteous person who takes unintentionally a portion of arsenic, mistaking it for some other medicine, is just as certainly punished as the guilty wretch who takes it for the purpose of self-murder. Dr. Thayer's illustrations are faulty in another respect. They are based on a supposition that a discontinuance of the sin will effect a discontinuance of the punishment. But this is not true. Murder once committed fills the soul with remorse, and no future abstaining from murder will take that remorse away. A man by drunkenness and debauchery has subjected himself to a loathsome disease, and the discontinuance of the sins will not heal his body. It requires something more than the taking away of sin to deliver man from either the consequences or penalties of past sin. But we will proceed with our quotations: "We also reject the opinion that forgiveness is the remission

of punishment. The consequences of sin, as they are meted out under the divine government, are not arbitrary inflictions, but the natural results of fixed and uniform laws operating in every department of our being. These laws, being perfectly wise, just, and beneficent, can not be set aside in their operations; they are immutable as the principles that govern the material universe." (*Universalist Quarterly*, 1866, page 332.) We will add yet two other quotations: "And so it is, that in the divine government punishment is not arbitrary, or something that comes apart from, or over and above, the legitimate consequences involved in the act of transgression; but it flows out from the nature and condition of things as God has made them, on the principle that 'whatsoever a man sows that shall he also reap.'" "We have before seen that the pain or suffering that ensues from the violation of the laws of nature is incurred in and by, rather than for, the act of transgression. It is obvious, at first thought, that the nature and character of the punishment in any given instance depends always upon the nature and character of the law that is violated." (Williamson's Theol. and Moral Science, pp. 260, 263.)

Quotations similar to the foregoing might easily be multiplied; but these are sufficient to

represent fairly the views of the parties making them. These quotations set forth the following points: 1st. That there is no judicial punishment of sin; the only punishment being the natural consequences of the sinful act. 2d. That in the forgiveness of sin there is no remission of the penalty. In opposition to these two points we will endeavor to prove, 1st. That distinct from, and in addition to, the natural consequence of the sinful act, there is a judicial punishment of sin; and, 2d. When sin is pardoned there is a remission of this punishment.

This notion that there is no punishment of sin other than the natural consequence of the sinful act is part of that system of skepticism which at the present day seeks to create a conflict between the doctrines of Christianity and the uniformity of natural laws. This system of infidelity in its later developments belongs to Germany, but perhaps is best known to American and English readers as it is served out by Huxley, Tyndall, and other kindred spirits. An outline statement of the theory is thus made by Dr. Hodge:

"Others, again, while they admit personality in God, make it a personality which precludes all willing and all acting, except in the form of law or general efficiency. Justice in God, therefore, is only a name for one form, or one mode,

of the manifestation of the power of God. As it is to be referred to his ordination, or to his nature, that fire burns and acids corrode, so it is to be referred to his general efficiency that sin produces misery. There is no special intervention of God when fire burns, and there is no special decision or judgment on his part when a sinner is punished. Punishment is not the execution of a sentence pronounced by an intelligent being on the merits of the case, but the operation of a general law. Bruch, Professor of Theology in the Theological Seminary in Strasburg, is a representative of this mode of thinking. He professes Theism, or faith in a personal God; but he teaches that the attributes of God are nothing else 'than modes of his constant efficiency.' Since among men justice is exercised in a succession of special acts, it is erroneously inferred that there is a like succession of acts of the will of God by which he approves or condemns. The great difficulty, he says, arises from judging of God after the analogy of our own nature. He admits that the Bible does this: that it constantly speaks of God as a righteous judge, administering justice according to his will. In this case, however, he adds, it is important to separate real truth from the imperfection of its Scriptural form. Penalties are not

evils inflicted by a special act of the divine will, but the natural consequences of sin, which can not fail to manifest themselves. There is an organic connection between sin and evil. All the activity or agency of God is in form of laws having their foundation in his nature. Thus, justice is simply that law, or uniform mode of divine operation, by which sin is made its own punishment. Hence there is no distinction between natural and positive inflictions; the deluge was either no punishment, or it was the natural consequence of the sins of the antediluvians. Hence, there is no such thing as forgiveness. The only possible way to remove the suffering is to remove the sin. But how is the sin of theft or murder to be removed? We can understand how pride or envy may be subdued and the suffering they occasion be escaped, but how can a past act be removed? A man hardened in sin suffers little or nothing for a special offense; the morally refined suffer indescribably. Thus, according to this theory, the better a man is, the more severely he is punished for his sin." (Theology, Vol. I, pp. 425, 426.)

But let us proceed to the examination of the first proposition: "That there is no judicial punishment of sin; the only punishment being the natural consequence of the sinful act." We

will examine his proposition in connection with its opposite; namely, "That distinct from, and in addition to, the natural consequences of the sinful act, there is a judicial punishment of sin."

It is cheerfully admitted, that to every transgression of the moral law of God there are certain natural consequences of a painful nature. Thus it is written, sin is "a root that beareth gall and wormwood." (Deut. xxix, 18.) "They that plow iniquity and sow wickedness, reap the same." (Job iv, 8.) "His bones are full of the sin of his youth, which shall lie down with him in the dust." (Job xx, 11.) "Therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way." (Prov. i, 31.) "He that soweth iniquity shall reap vanity." (Prov. xxii, 8.) "Every man that eateth the sour grape, his teeth shall be set on edge." (Jer. xxxi, 30.) "Ye have eaten the fruit of lies." (Hosea x, 13.) "When we were in the flesh, the motions of sins, which were by the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death. (Rom. vii, 5.) "He that soweth to his flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption." (Gal. vi, 8.) But these fruits, or consequences of sin, do not constitute its penalty. One consideration which would go far toward proving this is, that a large part of the painful consequences of many actions are felt by those

innocent of the sin. Thus, a man murders another, and a large share of the consequences of this crime fall upon the guiltless. The State loses a citizen, the feelings of society are outraged, a wife and children lose their natural protector. All these parties are innocent, and yet share most deeply and painfully the consequences of the crime; surely they are not suffering the penalty of murder. The Bible speaks of penalties which are not the natural result or consequences of the sin, but which come direct from God. Consider the following texts: "Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book." (Ex. xxxii, 33.) "I will bring seven times more plagues upon you according to your sins." (Lev. xxvi, 21.) In these two texts, the punishments threatened are not traceable to the action of any violated law; but they are to be referred directly to the volition of Almighty God, as an expression of his anger at their sins.

"That soul shall utterly be cut off, his iniquity shall be upon him." (Num. xv, 31.) "Saul died for his transgression which he committed against the Lord." (1 Chron. x, 13.) "I will do a thing in Israel, at which both the ears of every one that heareth it shall tingle." (1 Sam. iii, 11.) "Upon the wicked he shall rain snares, fire and

brimstone, and an horrible tempest: this shall be the portion of their cup." (Psalm xi, 6.) It is of no avail to plead that this language is figurative; be it figurative or literal, it clearly sets forth a punishment for sin which could not be the mere natural consequence of that sin. "In the hand of the Lord there is a cup, and the wine is red; it is full of mixture; and he poureth out of the same: but the dregs thereof, all the wicked of the earth shall wring them out, and drink them." (Psalm lxxv, 8.) "He cast upon them the fierceness of his anger, wrath, and indignation, and trouble, by sending evil angels among them. (Psalm lxxviii, 49.) "I will visit their transgression with the rod, and their iniquities with stripes." (Psalm lxxxix, 32.) "God overthroweth the wicked for their wickedness." (Prov. xxi, 12.) "The candle of the wicked shall be put out." (Prov. xxiv, 20.) "I will ease me of mine adversaries, and avenge me of mine enemies." "They that forsake the Lord shall be consumed." (Isa. i, 24, 28.) "They shall be driven to darkness." "With the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked." "The Lord cometh out of his place to punish the inhabitants of the earth for their iniquity." (Isa. viii, 22; xi, 4; xxvi, 21.) "I will cause my fury to rest upon them." (Ezek. v, 13.) "Every tree which

bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire." (Matt. iii, 10.) "Depart from me, ye that work iniquity." (Matt. vii, 23.) "Woe to that man by whom the offense cometh." "Shall cut him asunder, and appoint him his portion with the hypocrites: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth." "These shall go away into everlasting punishment." "If any man defile the temple of God, him shall God destroy." (Matt. xviii, 7; xxiv, 51; xxv, 46; 1 Cor. 3, 17.) If these texts do not teach a punishment of sin by the direct act of Almighty God, then it is difficult to see how such a doctrine could be taught. But let us test this notion (that punishment is simply the natural result of sin) by some of the well-known instances of punishment. Was the deluge "an inevitable consequence" of the sins of the antediluvians, according to the "most certain and inflexible operations of nature?" Will Messrs. Thayer, Clarke, and Williamson tell us what kind of sins it is that produces deluges? Or is this one of the lost arts? Soberly. Was not the deluge a punishment of sin, originating in the will of God?

"The Lord rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven." (Gen. xix, 24.) God assesses this punishment upon them because their sin was

"very grievous." (Gen. xviii, 20.) It is distinctly called "the punishment of the sin of Sodom." (Lam. iv, 6.) Peter speaks of it as God's condemnation of these cities. Jude calls it the "vengeance" of God. Surely the most fertile imagination can not confound this act of divine punishment with the natural sequences of the crimes of the Sodomites. Like causes produce like effects; and if this punishment was the natural consequence of their sin, how is it that we have no instances in the present age of crime bringing "brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven" upon the heads of the guilty criminals? This was a fearful act of retribution coming direct from "the Judge of all the earth." Was the opening of the earth and the swallowing up of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram the natural result of their action? These men had rebelled against the divinely constituted government of the Church. Was the yawning of the earth and the swallowing up of those guilty of this sin one of those "most certain and inflexible operations of nature?" Is this peculiar sin followed by this terrible retribution "as certain as the law of gravitation?" Did Nadab and Abihu offering strange fire cause the fire naturally to shoot out and consume them? Or was it not the vengeance of the Almighty? Uzziah invaded the

rights and duties of the priesthood, and was smitten with leprosy. Is such a sin the natural cause of leprosy? Gehazi was smitten with leprosy for covetousness and lying. Is leprosy the natural result of covetousness and lying according to "the most certain and inflexible operations of nature?" If so, why is it of so rare occurrence in this age of the world? Herod was eaten up of worms. Was this a natural result of his refusing to give proper glory to God? Are we not explicitly told that the angel of the Lord smote him? (Acts xii, 20–23.) Elymas, the sorcerer, was struck with physical blindness. Was this the natural result of his opposition to the apostle? Was the death of Ananias and Sapphira the natural result of their lying? This sin does not seem to affect people in this manner now. Is expulsion into outer darkness, with weeping and gnashing of teeth, the natural result of rejecting Christ? Is a portion in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone the natural result of unbelief? Is the Anathema Maranatha the natural consequence of a failure to love Christ? Is the everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power the natural result of not knowing the Lord? Is it necessary to add any further proof of the absurdity and falsity of the notion that

there is no punishment of sin, except the natural consequences of the sinful act? The consequences of sin are ruinous to the last degree; but over and above these, there is the direct punishment threatened by the law of God.

To this array of testimony Dr. Williamson replies that many of these cases occur under the "civil and municipal law of Israel," and that others of them grew "out of peculiar circumstances" and were "intended as temporary expedients." But this does not affect the question at issue. Suppose that we grant the truth of Dr. Williamson's statements (although they are far from being true), still the cases referred to are instances of the punishment of sin which have either taken place or have been threatened by the Almighty. They are cases in which the punishment was not the natural consequence of the broken law, but was a direct visitation from the Almighty.

A reference to some of the passages which have been examined—such as Psa. xi, 6; lxxv, 8; Prov. xxi, 12; xxiv, 20; Isa. i, 20, 28; viii, 22; xi, 4; xxvi, 31; Matt. iii, 10; xviii, 17; 1 Cor. iii, 17; xvi, 22—will show that the punishments referred to in those texts did not take place under any civil law of Israel, nor were they mere temporary expedients; but that they were

dread punishments of sin, caused by a special volition of God.

We are now ready to examine the second proposition, namely, "that in the forgiveness of sins there is no remission of the penalty." Before bringing up proof of the falsity of the proposition, let us spend a little while in the examination of those arguments and texts usually adduced in its support. I will examine those texts quoted on this subject by Mr. Thayer in his "Theology of Universalism." Mr. Thayer quotes several passages which speak of the forgiveness of sin, and introduces them with the remark that "forgiveness, as taught in the Bible, is forgiveness of sin, never of the punishment of sin." This distinction is strained and unnatural. The phrases "forgiveness of sin," and "forgiveness of the penalty," and "forgiveness of the punishment of sin," are all of synonymous import. The terms *forgive* and *pardon* are thus defined by Webster:

"FORGIVE—1. To give away; to make over; to resign. (*Obs. and rare.*)

2. To give up resentment or claim to requittal on account of, as an offense or wrong; to cease to impute; to remit; to pardon; said in reference to the act forgiven.

'I *forgive* and quite forget old faults.'—*Shakespeare.*

'He *forgave* injuries so readily that he might be said to invite them.'—*Macaulay.*

3. To cease to feel resentment against on account of wrong committed; to give up claim to requital from, as an offender; to absolve; to pardon; said of the person offending.

'I *forgive* you as I would be *forgiven*.'—*Shak.*"

"PARDON—1. To remit as the consequences of a fault or a crime; to refrain from exacting as a penalty.

'I *pardon* thee thy life before thou ask it.'—*Shak.*

2. To remit the penalty of; to suffer to pass without punishment; applied to the offense and the offender; to discharge from liability to reproof or penalty; to forgive; applied to offenses.

'I pray thee, *pardon* my sin.'—1 *Sam. xv*, 25."

These terms are defined by Crabbe in his work on Synonyms, thus: "Both signify not to give the punishment that is due; to relax from the rigor of justice in demanding retribution." . . . "God forgives the sins of his creatures as a father pitying his children; he pardons their sins as a judge extending mercy to criminals as far as is consistent with justice." . . . "The pardon of sin obliterates that which is past and restores the sinner to the divine favor. It is promised throughout the Scripture to all men on the condition of faith and repentance."

In support of the notion that forgiveness does not secure the remission of the penalty, Thayer quotes: "The Lord God, merciful and gracious, longsuffering, and abundant in goodness and

truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty." (Ex. xxxiv, 6, 7.) On this text he makes the following comment: "Nothing can be more directly to the point than this declaration that the guilty are both punished and forgiven; that it is iniquity, transgression, and sin which are forgiven, and not the consequences or penalty of these." In this comment there is the same confounding of the natural consequence with the penalty which has been previously pointed out. The clause, "and that will by no means clear the guilty," is one which all commentators and critics know to be obscure and difficult of exegesis. In the first place, the word "guilty" is not in the text in the original. A literal translation of the Hebrew is, "Clearing, he will not clear." Perhaps Bush has cast as much light upon this text as any other writer. He says: "This is a clause of exceedingly difficult interpretation, as will be evident from the diversity of ancient renderings which we give before attempting to settle the genuine sense: *Chal.*, 'Sparing those who are converted to his law, and not justifying those who are not converted.' *Gr.*, 'And will not purify the guilty.' *Arab.*, 'Who justifies and is not justified.' *Sam.*, 'With whom the innocent shall [not?] be innocent.' *Vulg.*,

'And no person is innocent by or of himself before thee,' which gives a sound theological sense, namely, that no man can make an atonement for his own sins, or purify his own heart, inasmuch as all have sinned and come short of the glory of God. But whether this is the idea intended to be conveyed in this passage is another question." . . . "From comparing this form of expression with the *usus loquendi* in other cases, we are satisfied that the true rendering is, 'who will not wholly, entirely, altogether clear;' that is, who, although merciful and gracious in his dispositions, strongly inclined to forgive, and actually forgiving in countless cases and abundant measure, is not yet unmindful of the claims of justice. He will not always suffer even the pardoned sinner to escape with entire impunity. He will mingle so much of the penal in his dealings as to evince that his clemency is not to be presumed upon." A similar exegesis is given by Gesenius in his Hebrew Lexicon (p. 692) thus: "Who forgiveth iniquity and transgression and sin, but will by no means always leave unpunished." The doctrine of the text is not that the penalty is not remitted in forgiveness, but that while God in mercy remits the penalty of eternal death, he still administers such disciplinary chastisements as he sees necessary for the salvation of the soul.

The next text quoted by Mr. Thayer is Isa. xl, 2: "Her iniquity is pardoned; for she hath received of the Lord's hand double for all her sins." A close examination of this text will show that it has no connection with the subject-matter under discussion. In the first place it has no reference to either the punishment or pardon of the sins of individual persons, but to the city of Jerusalem as a body politic. In the second place, the text has no reference to the forgiveness of sins. The term "*nirtza*" does not properly mean pardon; it here means "expiated." Barnes comments thus: "Here it means not strictly to pardon, but it means they had endured the national punishment which God saw to be necessary; they had served out the long and painful enlistment which he had appointed, and now he was satisfied and took delight in restoring them to their own land." Dr. Alexander comments in a similar strain. In the third place, we do not think the clause, "hath received of the Lord's hand double for all her sins," has any reference to the amount of punishment received, nor even to punishment at all. We will give Lowth's translation of the text and his note upon it: "The expiation of her iniquity is accepted; that she shall receive at the hand of Jehovah (blessings) double to the punishment of all her sins."

"It does not seem reconcilable to our notions of the divine justice, which always punishes less than our iniquities deserve, to suppose that God had punished the sins of the Jews in double proportion; and it is more agreeable to the tenor of this consolatory message to understand it as a promise of ample recompense for the effects of the past displeasure on the reconciliation of God to his returning people. To express this sense of the passage—which the words of the original will very well bear—it was necessary to add a word or two in the version to supply the elliptical expression of the Hebrew."

Let us now proceed to the examination of some texts which prove that "in the forgiveness of sins there is a gracious remission of the penalty."

"Thou art a God ready to pardon, gracious and merciful, slow to anger and of great kindness, and forsookest them not." "Nevertheless for thy great mercies' sake thou didst not utterly consume them, nor forsake them; for thou art a gracious and merciful God." (Neh. ix, 17, 31.) Here the term "pardon" is supplemented and explained by the words "gracious" and "merciful." Let us examine these words separarately. 1st. "Gracious." Webster defines it, "Abounding in grace or mercy; kind to the ill-

deserving." This definition of the term is well suited to the context. The prophet had just spoken of their forefathers as dealing proudly, refusing to obey, and hardening their necks; and the only reason why God did not punish them was that he abounded in grace and was kind to the ill deserving. God was free to deal with their rebellious fathers in either of two ways. He could punish them by forsaking them and destroying them; but as he was a God "ready to pardon, gracious," he forgave them by remitting these penalties. 2d. "Merciful." Webster defines it, "Full of mercy; having or exercising mercy; disposed to pity offenders and forgive their offenses; unwilling to punish for injuries." Crabbe, in his Synonyms, says: "God is merciful to the vilest of sinners, and lends an ear to the smallest breath of repentance. In the moment of executing vengeance he stops his arm at the voice of supplication." God's readiness to pardon was associated with an unwillingness to punish injuries and a willingness to overlook them. It was identical with a readiness or disposition to remit the punishment of their sins. Because of this he did pardon them, and the penalty of their sins (their being forsaken and destroyed) was remitted. This conclusion is corroborated by the statement that he is "slow to anger." We

have already seen, in a preceding part of this investigation, that God's anger is his displeasure at sin; and that the term "anger" often designates the punishment which he visits upon sin. It follows, then, that his slowness to anger is an unwillingness to punish sin; hence his readiness to pardon is his willingness to remit the punishment of sin.

"But he, being full of compassion, forgave their iniquity and destroyed them not; yea, many a time turned he his anger away, and did not stir up all his wrath." (Psalm lxxviii, 38.) Here the following items present themselves: 1st. God's compassion. 2d. This compassion moves him to forgive the iniquity of the people. 3d. Because he forgave them they were not punished with destruction. 4th. The thought is intensified; many a time he turned his anger, or meditated punishment, away. The great difficulty in commenting on these texts lies in the impossibility of distinguishing between the "pardon of sin" and the "remission of the punishment," the two phrases meaning one and the same thing. 1 Kings viii, 34: "Forgive the sin of thy people Israel, and bring them again unto the land which thou gavest unto their fathers." Banishment from their native land was the punishment of their sins, and their pardon consisted in their restoration from

banishment. Lamentations iii, 42, 43: "We have transgressed and have rebelled; thou hast not pardoned. Thou hast covered with anger and persecuted us; thou hast slain, thou hast not pitied." Here the being covered with his anger, being persecuted, and being slain, are set forth as the punishment of their sins, and as being suffered by them because God refused to forgive them, clearly teaching that if God had forgiven them they would have been spared the suffering of the penalty. The verb rendered "pardon" in the preceding passages is rendered "spare" in Deut. xxix, 20: "The Lord will not spare him, but then the anger of the Lord and his jealousy shall smoke against that man, and all the curses that are written in this book shall lie upon him, and the Lord shall blot out his name from under heaven." A literal translation of the first clause would be, "The Lord will not pardon him." (Bible Commentary.) "The anger of the Lord," "the curses of this book," and the "blotting out of the offender's name," constituted the punishment of his sin, and which came upon him because God did not "spare" or pardon him. If God had pardoned him this punishment would not have come upon him—it would have been remitted.

"Let all bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and

clamor, and evil speaking, be put away from you, with all malice; and be ye kind one to another, tender hearted, forgiving one another, even as God, for Christ's sake hath forgiven you." (Eph. iv, 31, 32.) In this text the term "tender-hearted" is the antithesis of "bitterness," "wrath," "anger," and "clamor;" while "forgiving" stands in opposition to "malice." Webster defines malice, "Enmity of heart; malevolence; ill-will; a spirit desiring harm or misfortune to another; a disposition to injure others." Then when Paul desired these brethren to put aside all malice and forgive each other, he asked them to put away all desire or intention of injuring or harming each other. And this manner of forgiveness he represents as being the same which they had received at the hand of God. Then God, in forgiving their sins, had remitted or put aside the harm or injury which was due to them as a punishment. "Forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any; even as Christ forgave you, so also do ye." (Col. iii, 13.) If men quarrel and can be induced mutually to forgive, it is understood that they remit, or put away, the punishment they meant to inflict on each other. The apostle urges the duty of doing this because God has forgiven us. If God did not remit the punishment of our sins when he

forgave us, then how does his forgiving us form a reason for our remitting the punishment of those who have wronged us? We can not change the hearts of those who sin against us; we can not prevent them doing wrong in the future; we can only release them from the penalty or punishment due to their offenses; and as our forgiveness of them is modeled after God's forgiveness of us, it follows that his forgiveness of us was a releasing us from the penalty due our past sins.

"When ye stand praying, forgive if ye have aught against any, that your Father also which is in heaven may forgive you your trespasses." (Mark xi, 25.) The first thing to do in the examination of this text is to settle the meaning of the words "your trespasses." 1st. These words do not mean the sinful nature of the heart. The words do not indicate condition, but acts or deeds by which the law of God has been transgressed. Again, they can not refer to any future transgression, but to acts or deeds already purposed or committed. No sin or trespass is ours until it has at least been determined upon; so that forgiving "our trespasses" can not have any reference to any future sins. The phrase "our trespasses," then, is restricted to our sinful purposes and actions of the past. It is these past trespasses which God proposes to forgive. What

does God do when he forgives "our trespasses?" He can not put those trespasses away from us so that they shall cease to be ours; it will ever be true that we committed them, and they must remain ours forever. God can purify the heart. This will save us from trespassing in the future, and so save us from the consequences and punishment of sin in the future. But this does not reach the past. "Our trespasses" of the past are yet undisposed of. It is now evident, we think, that God can do but one of two things with these past trespasses. He must either punish them or forgive them by remitting the punishment due them. He promises, if we forgive our brother the punishment due to his offenses against us, he will forgive the punishment due to our offenses. It is on this principle he has taught us to pray, "Forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors;" which has been well paraphrased,

> "That mercy I to others show,
> That mercy show to me."

In the parable of "the unmerciful servant," (Matt. xviii, 25–35), the king had a servant who owed him ten thousand talents and was unable to pay. The king commanded him and his wife and children to be sold; but when the debtor begged for mercy the king graciously forgave him

the debt and the penalty which was attached to the non-payment of it. This selling of a debtor was provided for by Roman law as a means of liquidating the debt and of punishing dishonest debtors. When the king forgave the debt he remitted this punishment of slavery. This pardoned servant meets a fellow-servant owing him a hundred pence. He demands payment, and when his fellow-servant, who is unable to pay, asks for mercy, he refuses to forgive him, and enforces the penalty of the law upon him. This act of his coming to the ear of the king, he causes the ungrateful servant to be re-arrested; he revokes his pardon, and consigns him to remediless punishment. Christ tells us that God will treat us in the same manner if we do not forgive those who trespass against us. The lessons of this text are to the point. If we punish an offending brother without mercy, God will do the same by us; if we release our brother from punishment, God will release us from it. Christ calls this remission of the penalty forgiveness. It would be difficult to see how the proof that forgiveness involves the remission of the penalty could be plainer or stronger.

III.

IMPUTATION OF THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF CHRIST.

IT is claimed by Calvinists that in the justification of the sinner, in addition to the pardon of sin, God imputes or reckons to the sinner the active righteousness or obedience of Christ. They do not mean that the benefit of Christ's righteousness is given to the sinner, but that the righteousness of Christ itself is given to him, and that in such a sense as to reckon or account it his own. Read the following quotations from their standard authorities:

"Those whom God effectually calleth, he also freely justifieth; not by infusing righteousness into them, but by pardoning their sins, and by accounting and accepting their persons as righteous, not for any thing wrought in them, or done by them, but for Christ's sake alone; not by imputing faith itself, the act of believing, or any other evangelical obedience to them, as their righteousness, but by imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ unto them, they receiv-

ing and resting on him and his righteousness by faith." (Presbyterian Confession of Faith, chap. 11, sec. 1.)

"This imputation is an act of God *ex mera gratia*, of his mere love and grace, whereby on the consideration of the mediation of Christ, he makes an effectual grant and donation of a true, real, perfect righteousness, even that of Christ himself to all that believe, and accounting it as theirs, on his own gracious act, both absolves them from sin and grants them right and title to eternal life. Hence, in this imputation, the thing itself is first imputed to us, and not any of the effects of it, but they are made ours by virtue of imputation. To say that the righteousness of Christ—that is, his obedience and sufferings—are imputed to us only as to their effects, is to say that we have the benefit of them, and no more; but imputation itself is denied." (Owen on Justification, pp. 195, 196.) Notice in the foregoing quotation these points: First. Christ's obedience itself is imputed. Second. It is not an imputation of the effects; to teach an imputation of effects only is to destroy the doctrine of imputation.

"Sometimes the expression is taken by our divines in a larger sense, for the imputation of all that Christ did and suffered for our redemption,

whereby we are free from guilt, and stand righteous in the sight of God; and so implies the imputation of both Christ's satisfaction and obedience. But here I intend it in a stricter sense for the imputation of that righteousness, or moral goodness, that consists in the obedience to Christ. And by that righteousness being imputed to us, is meant no other than this, that that righteousness of Christ is accepted for us, and admitted instead of that perfect inherent righteousness that ought to be in ourselves: Christ's perfect obedience shall be reckoned to our account, so that we shall have the benefit of it, as though we had performed it ourselves." (Edwards's Works, Vol. IV, p. 91.)

"It is, therefore, the righteousness of Christ, his perfect obedience in doing and suffering the will of God, which is imputed to the believer, and on the ground of which the believer, although in himself ungodly, is pronounced righteous, and, therefore, free from the curse of the law, and entitled to eternal life." (Hodge's Theol., Vol. III, p. 151.)

It will be seen by the foregoing quotations that Calvinists are divided among themselves about the imputation to us of Christ's passive obedience; but they are a unit on the question of the imputation of his active righteousness.

The idea of imputing the effects of his righteousness to us, is rejected as being no imputation at all. They insist upon the imputation of his personal righteousness itself, and this in such a manner as to make it ours. This doctrine is the counterpart of that of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity; and like it, involves the absurdity of supposing that God could and does confound the moral demerit or merit of one person with that of another. To this objection Jonathan Edwards answers: "Why can not that righteousness [of Christ] be reckoned to our account and accepted for us without any such absurdity? Why is there any more absurdity in it than in a merchant's transferring debt or credit from one man's account to another, so that it shall be accepted as if that other had paid it? Why is there any more absurdity in supposing that Christ's obedience is imputed to us, than that his satisfaction is imputed? If Christ suffered the penalty of the law for us, and in our stead, then it will follow that his suffering that penalty is imputed to us, that is, that it is accepted for us, and in our stead, and is reckoned to our account, as though we had suffered it. But why may not his obeying the law of God be as rationally reckoned to our account, as his suffering the penalty of the law?" (Works, Vol.

IV, p. 92.) The case referred to by Edwards bears no analogy to the Calvinistic idea of imputed righteousness. The payment of a debt by another than the original debtor may be accomplished in two widely different ways: First. Two or more men may be mutually indebted to each other, and may cancel each other's debts by simple transfer of claims. It will not be claimed by Calvinists that this presents any analogy to their dogma of imputation. Secondly. Where the debtor is unable to pay his debt, another may do it for him. In this case it can not truthfully be said that the debtor paid his debt. Truth would require the statement that it had been paid not by him but for him. The payment of the debt could not be imputed to the debtor; but the legal benefits of such payment might, and of right ought, to be imputed to him. Christ's righteousness neither active nor passive is imputed to us, but the consequences of both are. Edwards asks, "Is there any more absurdity in supposing that Christ's obedience is imputed to us, than that his satisfaction is imputed?" I answer, none whatever; both ideas are alike unscriptural and absurd. Neither his obedience nor suffering is imputed to us, in the sense of being done by us. We are saved, not by the imputation of these things to us; but by being

made partakers of the benefits resulting therefrom. "Nor is there any weight in the argument that as our sins were accounted his, so his righteousness is accounted ours. Our sins were never so accounted Christ's as that he did them, and so justly suffered for them. This is a monstrous notion which has been sometimes pushed to the verge of blasphemy. Our transgressions are never said to have been imputed to him in the fact, but only that they were laid upon him in the penalty. To be God's 'beloved Son in whom he was always well pleased,' and to be reckoned, imputed, counted, a sinner, *de facto*, are manifest contradictions. This whole doctrine of the imputation of Christ's personal moral obedience to believers, as their own personal moral obedience, involves a fiction and impossibility inconsistent with the divine attributes. The judgment of the all-wise God is always according to truth; neither can it ever consist with his unerring wisdom to think that I am innocent, to judge that I am righteous or holy because another is so. He can no more confound me with Christ than with David or Abraham. But a contradiction is involved in another view. If what our Lord was and did is to be accounted to us in the sense just given, then we must be accounted never to have sinned, because Christ

never sinned, and yet we must ask for pardon, though we are accounted from birth to death to have fulfilled God's law in Christ, or if they should say that when we ask for pardon we ask only for a revelation to us of our eternal pardon or justification, the matter is not altered, for what need is there of pardon in time or eternity if we are accounted to have perfectly kept God's holy law? and why should we be accounted also to have suffered in Christ the penalty of sins which we are accounted never to have committed?" (Watson's Inst., Vol. II, pp. 216, 217.) The imputation of Christ's righteousness to man is a work of supererogation. If it be said that it is done to prepare the man for pardon, then he needs no pardon, for that righteousness supersedes all necessity of pardon. If he is invested with the righteousness of Christ in such a sense that it is regarded as his own, then he must be considered as never having sinned, for Christ never sinned, and he needs no pardon. If it be said that it is a result of pardon, then it is uncalled for; the pardon of sin wipes out all the past, and the sanctification of the Holy Spirit cleanses from sin both present and future. In both cases either pardon or imputation of righteousness is superfluous; but as pardon is a blessed reality, imputed righteousness can be only a fiction.

Dr. Hodge writes: "Imputation never changes the inward subjective state of the person to whom the imputation is made. When sin is imputed to a man he is not made sinful; when the zeal of Phinehas was imputed to him he was not made zealous. When you impute theft to a man you do not make him a thief. When you impute goodness to a man you do not make him good. So when righteousness is imputed to the believer, he does not thereby become subjectively righteous. If the righteousness be adequate, and if the imputation be made on adequate grounds and by competent authority, the person to whom the imputation is made has the right to be treated as righteous." (Theol., Vol. III, p. 145.) True, "imputation does not change the inward subjective state of the person," but in Scriptural usage it declares his condition, or charges him with certain character or conduct. Hodge says "when sin is imputed to a man he is not made sinful." No; but he is declared to be sinful; and if he is not such in his own thought and actions, then the imputation is false. "When you impute theft to a man you do not make him a thief." No; but you declare him to be one; and if the man has not stolen then the imputation is false. "So when righteousness is imputed to the believer he does not thereby become subjec-

tively righteous." No; but the imputation declares him to be righteous, and if he be not subjectively and really such, then the imputation is false. Righteousness is an attribute of a moral being, and no fiction can invest a man with such an attribute if it is not really his. "If the righteousness be adequate, and if the imputation be made on adequate grounds and by competent authority, the person to whom the imputation is made has the right to be treated as righteous." This category of suppositions might be accepted if Dr. Hodge would be so kind as to point out to the world the "competent authority." Is there any authority known to man competent to sustain a false presentation of facts? Is there any authority competent to invest a person with a moral character which never belonged to him? We doubt the existence of any authority competent to a task so self-contradictory in its nature.

Let us now examine those texts which are quoted in support of the dogma:

"Surely shall one say, In the Lord have I righteousness and strength." (Isa. xlv, 24.) This text says nothing about the imputation of righteousness to any one. It simply represents a person as saying, or confessing, that God was the author of both his righteousness and strength. Calvin states the force of the verse briefly and

well: "Because righteousness and strength are the two main points of our salvation, the faithful acknowledge God to be the author of both." "This is his name whereby he shall be called, The Lord our Righteousness." (Jer. xxiii. 6.) "This passage also proves nothing to the point, for it is neither said that the righteousness of the Lord shall be our righteousness, nor that it shall be imputed to us for righteousness, but simply that the name by which he shall be called or acknowledged shall be The Lord our Righteousness—that is, the Author and Procurer of our righteousness or justification before God. So he is said to be 'the Resurrection,' 'our Life,' 'our Peace,' etc., as the author of these blessings; for whoever dreamt that Christ is 'the life,' 'the resurrection,' 'the peace' of his people by imputation? or that we live by being accounted to live in him, or are raised from the dead by being accounted to have risen in him?" (Watson.)

"To them that have obtained like precious faith with us through the righteousness of God and our Savior Jesus Christ." (2 Peter i, 1.) Here, again, nothing is said about imputation, nor any thing that could be tortured into such an idea. The text is a declaration that our faith comes to us through the "righteousness," or redeeming mercy, of Christ. Some render the

text, "Faith in the righteousness," etc.; that is, faith in the redeeming mercy of Christ.

"But now the righteousness of God, without the law, is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets, even the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe." (Rom. iii, 21, 22.) "'The righteousness of God' here is, by some, taken to signify the righteousness of Christ imputed to them that believe. But the very text makes it evident that by the 'righteousness of God' the righteousness of the Father is meant, for he is distinguished from 'Jesus Christ,' mentioned immediately afterwards; and by the righteousness of God it is also plain that his rectoral justice in the administration of pardon is meant, which, of course, is not thought capable of imputation. This is made indubitable by the verse which follows—'To declare at this time his righteousness, that he might be just and the justifier of him that believeth on Jesus.'" (Watson.)

The advocates of imputed righteousness place great reliance on Romans v, 18, 19. I will give the text, the argument of Edwards upon it, and the answer as given by Hare.

"By the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For

as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous."

"Here in one verse we are told that we have justification by Christ's righteousness; and that there might be no room to understand the righteousness spoken of merely as Christ's atonement by his suffering the penalty, in the next verse it is put in other terms, and asserted that it is by Christ's obedience that we are made righteous. It is scarce possible that any thing should be more full and determined. The terms, taken singly, are such as do fix their own meaning; and taken together they fix the meaning of each other. The words show that we are justified by that righteousness of Christ that consists in his obedience, and that we are made righteous, or justified, by that obedience of his; that is, his righteousness, or moral goodness, before God." (Works, Vol. IV, p. 97.) To this I give Hare's answer: "As the apostle has unequivocally decided that we are justified by the blood of Christ, or, in other words, 'that we are justified through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth a propitiation through faith in his blood' (a thing which the doctrine under examination supposes to be impossible), there is reason to suspect that he speaks here of his

passive, rather than his active obedience. If, indeed, his willingness to suffer for our sins were never spoken of as an act of obedience, such an observation might have the appearance of a mere expedient to get rid of a difficulty; but if, on the contrary, this should prove to be the very spirit and letter of the Scriptures, the justness of it will be obvious. Hear, then, our Lord himself on this subject: 'Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life that I might take it again. This commandment have I received of my Father.' (John x, 17, 18.) This, then, was the commandment to which he rendered willing obedience when he said, 'O my Father, if this cup may not pass away from me except I drink it, thy will be done.' (Matt. xxvi, 42.) 'The cup which my Father hath given me, shall I not drink it?' (John xviii, 11.) In conformity with this, the apostle applies to him the following words: 'Wherefore when he cometh into the world he saith, Sacrifice and offering thou wouldst not, but a body hast thou prepared me. Then said I, Lo, I come to do thy will, O God.' By his performance of which will we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all. (Heb. x, 5, 10.) 'Being found in fashion as a man,' says St. Paul, 'he became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross.'

Such was his obedience — an obedience to the death of the cross; and by this obedience unto the death of the cross shall many be constituted righteous, or justified. Where, then, is the imputation of his active obedience for justification?" (Hare on Justification, pp. 96, 97.)

Edwards endeavors to avoid the force of these facts by suggesting that even if the "obedience" mentioned by Paul is the obedience of Christ's submission to suffering, nevertheless it is an obedience to law and obligation, and hence may be classed with Christ's active obedience to God's law, and as such be imputed to us. But this can not be sustained. If by the term "obedience" the apostle designated Christ's sufferings merely as an act of moral obedience to law, and that by this we are justified, then two difficulties arise:

1. Christ's obedience to a sacrificial death is a species of righteousness which is wholly inappropriate to us. We were never under a law which required at our hands an expiatory death as an act of obedience or righteousness. Nay, more, we had no legal right to die a vicarious death. The right to yield up life in expiation of the sins of others belongs only to one who is the author of his own life—that is to Christ alone. Such righteousness does not fit us, and can not be imputed to us.

2. By this notion, Christ's death as a sacrificial atonement is wholly excluded from any connection with our justification. This would be in direct conflict with the apostolic declaration, that we are "justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God hath set forth a propitiation through faith in his blood." (Rom. iii, 24, 25.) There is then no escape from the conclusion that the apostle by the term "obedience" designates Christ's sacrificial death, a matter which can not in any sense of the word be imputed to us. Edwards urges that the text puts the moral "disobedience" of Adam in contrast with the "obedience" of Christ, and thus shows that the obedience of Christ was obedience to moral law and as such might be imputed. All this falls to the ground in the face of the foregoing proof that the apostle did not refer to Christ's moral obedience, or obedience to moral law; but to the sacrificial death of the cross. And Paul does not contrast Adam's disobedience with Christ's pure morality, or perfect obedience to moral law, but with the expiation of our sins, effected by the death of Christ, and with the benefits flowing therefrom. Dr. Hodge says: "The Bible does teach that Christ obeyed the law in all its precepts, and that he endured

its penalty, and that this was done in such a sense for his people that they are said to have done it. They died in him. They were crucified with him." That Christ obeyed the law in all its precepts, and that he suffered for our sins is unquestionably true; but that we are said to have done these things, is without any proper Scripture foundation. The notion is based on a misinterpretation of Rom. vi, 6, 8: Gal. ii, 20. An examination of these texts will show that there is no reference to our being mystically united to Christ in his death, in any such manner as would warrant the statement that we died with him on the cross; but that in our change from sin to holiness we died unto sin, as certainly as he died for our sin. Barnes says, "The word '*with*' (συν) here is joined to the verb 'is crucified,' and means 'is crucified as he was.'" Again "If we be dead in a similar manner to what he was; if we are made dead to sin by his work, as he was dead in the grave." Although Olshausen is a believer in the dogma of "imputed righteousness," yet he does not believe that this text (Rom. v, 17–19), teaches it. "Now we must certainly allow that the doctrine of the *obedientia activa* can not be proved from this passage, for the nearest signification of ὑπακοὴ in contrast to παρακοὴ (Adam's eating of the fruit) must

be the obedient surrender of Christ to death, as the once done act of love, to which Phil. ii, 8, also has reference. Nevertheless the doctrine of *obedientia activa* has foundation in the Scripture, only it must be laid on other passages." (Com. on Rom. v, 17.)

"Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth." (Rom. x, 4.) This text is sometimes quoted in support of "imputed righteousness;" but the apostle could hardly have arranged his words so as to give less support to the dogma in question than the way in which he has arranged the text before us. Had he said "that the righteousness of Christ was the end of the law to every one that believeth," he would have said something savoring of the doctrine. But he has said nothing of this kind. His words set forth the glorious fact that his death was the perfect fulfillment of the sacrificial law, in order that pardon might be granted to all who believe in him. Dr. Clarke's comment on this text sets the whole matter in a clear and truthful light. "Where the law ends, Christ begins. The law ends with representative sacrifices; Christ begins with the real offering. The law is our schoolmaster to lead us to Christ; it can not save, but leaves us at his door, where alone salvation is to be found. Christ as an

atoning sacrifice for sin was the grand object of the whole sacrificial code of Moses: his passion and death were the fulfillment of its great object and design. Separate this sacrificial death of Christ from the law, and the law has no meaning, for it is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins: wherefore the Messiah is represented as saying, "Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire; burnt offering and sin offering hast thou not required. Then said I, Lo, I come to do thy will; a body hast thou prepared me." (Psalms xl, 6, 7; Heb. x, 4–10.) Which proves that God never designed that the sacrifices of the law should be considered the atonement for sin, but a type or representative of that atonement, and that the atonement was the sacrifice offered by Christ. Thus he was the end of the law, in respect to its sacrifices. And, as sacrifices were offered merely to procure the pardon of sin, righteousness, or justification, Christ is the end of the law for this justification to every one that believeth on him, as dying for their offenses, and rising again for their justification, having made peace through the blood of his cross."

We are sometimes asked, "Is not Christ 'made unto us righteousness?'" (1 Cor. i, 30.) Yes, just as he is made unto us "wisdom," and

"sanctification," and "redemption;" he is the author of each and all of these unto us. He gives us "wisdom" superior to that of man; he gives us "righteousness" or pardon out of his pure mercy; he sanctifies us through his Holy Spirit; to sum it all up he gives us complete "redemption" from all the work of sin.

"It should be no more assumed from this text that we became righteous by the imputation of Christ's righteousness, than it should be that we become wise by the imputation of his wisdom, and sanctified by the imputation of his holiness. If this passage would prove one of these points, it would prove all. But as it is absurd to say that we became wise by the imputation of the personal wisdom of Christ, so this passage should not be brought to prove that we become righteous by the imputation of his righteousness. Whatever may be the truth of that doctrine, this passage does not prove it." (Barnes *in loco.*)

"For he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him." (2 Cor. v, 21,) The term ἁμαρτία, "*sin*," in the sentence, "made him to be sin," is the term used in the Septuagint to designate a "sin offering." It is so used over one hundred times. It is not denied that it commonly means sin; but then it just as cer-

tainly means a "sin offering," and as Christ was without sin, and yet was the great sin offering, it ought in all reason to be rendered "sin offering" in the text. As examples of the manner in which the Septuagint uses it to designate a sin offering, witness the few following instances: "Offer every day a bullock for a sin offering." (Ex. xxix, 36.) "The fat of the bullock for the sin offering," "a sin offering for the congregation," "take of the blood of the sin offering," "slay the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering," "bring a lamb for a sin offering," "offer that which is for the sin offering first," "sprinkle of the blood of the sin offering," "it is most holy as is the sin offering." Christ was "most holy," he "knew no sin," and he is our great "sin offering." A reference to this fact is a sufficient answer to that horrible interpretation of the text which teaches that God imputed our sins to Christ. The text knows nothing of either the imputation of our sins to Christ, nor of his righteousness to us. He is the great atonement for sin, and we through it become the pardoned and purified of God. "And be found in him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith." (Phil. iii, 9.) Paul's "own righteous-

ness," was his obedience to the law of Moses. In his conversion he was forced to relinquish all thought of such a righteousness; his transgressions of the law made him obnoxious to its punishment, and his depraved nature rendered him incompetent to keep the law. In this difficulty the Holy Spirit leads him to "the righteousness of God," or pardon of sin by faith in Christ. Faith in Christ secured for him what he never was able to accomplish by his effort at obeying the law; it brought peace with God, and purified his heart. Now, he declares his choice, namely, not to be found relying on his moral conduct, but on justification, or the pardon of sin by faith in Christ. There is nothing in the text which warrants the notion that the personal righteousness of Christ was transferred to Paul and accounted his. Such a notion is crude, unphilosophical, and unscriptural. But it is of the very essence of the Gospel, that men condemned by the law should find the pardon of their sins, through faith in "the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world."

Psalm xxxii, 1. "'Blessed is he whose transgression is forgiven, whose sin is covered.' The covering of the sin here spoken of, is by some considered to be the investment of the sinner with the righteousness or obedience of Christ.

But this is entirely gratuitous, for the forgiveness of sin, even by the legal atonement, is called according to the Hebrew idiom (though another verb is used), to cover sin; and the latter part of the sentence is clearly a parallelism to the former. This is the interpretation of Luther and of Calvin himself. To forgive sin, to cover sin, and not to impute sin, are in this psalm all phrases obviously of the same import, and no other kind of imputation but the non-imputation of sin is mentioned in it. And, indeed, the passage will not serve the purpose of the advocates of the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's active righteousness, on their own principles, for sin can not be covered by the imputation of Christ's active righteousness, since they hold that it is taken away by the imputation of his death, and that the office of Christ's active righteousness is not to take away sin, but to render us personally and positively holy by imputation and the fiction of a transfer." (Watson's Inst., Vol. II, p. 226.)

Great stress is placed by Calvinistic writers on Romans iv, 4–6: "Now to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt. But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness. Even as David also describeth

the blessedness of the man unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works." The word λογίζομαι, here rendered "impute," means to reason, think, intend, reckon, attribute, or impute. In the sense of charge, reckon, attribute, or impute, its usage (both in the Septuagint and New Testament), is confined to but a few cases, and may easily be examined. Its first occurrence in the sense of reckon, or impute, is in Gen. xv, 6: "And he believed in the Lord, and he counted it to him for righteousness." Here the thing reckoned to Abraham is distinctly pointed out. It was no merit, righteousness, or faith of any third party, but his own personal faith, reckoned to him for righteousness. Again, in Lev. vii, 18: "And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings be eaten at all on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to him that offereth it." Here the imputation of the offering which is refused to the guilty party does not relate in any way to any third party, but solely to the party offering. This case is a very plain one. An Israelite brings an offering; on the third day he eats a part of it, and thus violates the law; because of this, God refuses to reckon or impute his offering to him. In mercantile phrase, he refuses to credit him with it. In Lev. xvii, 3, 4: "What man soever there be

of the house of Israel that killeth an ox, or lamb, or goat in the camp, or that killeth it out of the camp, and bringeth it not unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation to offer an offering unto the Lord before the tabernacle of the Lord; blood shall be imputed unto that man; he hath shed blood; and that man shall be cut off from among his people." Here, also, the imputation was to the guilty party, and to no other. It was to the man who had shed the blood and had failed to bring the slain animal as an offering to the door of the tabernacle. It was to this man that blood was to be imputed. 2 Sam. xix, 19: "Let not my Lord impute iniquity unto me, neither do thou remember that which thy servant did perversely." This is the language of Shimei to David. Shimei had cursed David when he was flying from Absalom, and he now asks that his crime may not be imputed to him, or charged to him, for the purpose of punishment.

Psalm cvi, 30, 31: "Then stood up Phinehas and executed judgment: and so the plague was stayed. And that was counted unto him for righteousness." This text sets forward so plainly the immediate directness of the imputation of righteousness to the person doing it, that it needs no comment. Sometimes Philemon, 18—"If he hath wronged thee, or oweth thee aught, put that

on mine account"—is referred to by Calvinists for a Biblical illustration of the imputation of the acts of one man to another. The word here is not λογίζομαι, but ἐλλογέω, a word coming, however, from the same root, and of nearly synonymous import. Paul here graciously offers to pay a debt to Philemon for Onesimus. The debt could only be reckoned or imputed to Paul by virtue of his promise to pay it. A person can assume the debt of another and thus make it his own; and he can agree to stand in the place of and suffer for another's transgressions, but he can not assume those transgressions as he does the debt, and make the transgressions his own. According to the ethics of slavery, there would be two charges against Onesimus: first, he owed money to Philemon; secondly, he, being a slave, had absconded and forsaken the service of his master. Now, Paul could assume the debt, either in the way of business exchange or as an act of pure generosity; but in no way could Paul assume the act of absconding, and say, Let his running away be imputed to me and be considered as my act. On the other hand, after a reconciliation had been effected, Onesimus could say, I owe Philemon nothing, for Paul has assumed my debt and paid it for me; but he could not say, My reputation as a servant is without blemish, for although I

once deserted my master, yet Paul has assumed my offense, and it is now his and not mine. He might truly say that Paul had induced his master to forgive the offense, but he could never say that the offense had ceased to be his and was now imputed to the apostle.

We have now examined every text in both the Old and New Testaments in which λογίζομαι is used in the sense of charge, reckon, or impute, and may safely say that there is no case in which it is used to designate the imputation of the deeds or character of one person to another. With this light on the usage of the word, we are now prepared to examine the stronghold of the Calvinistic doctrine of imputed righteousness already referred to. (Rom. iv, 4–6.) First, it is nowhere intimated in the text that the righteousness imputed to the believer is the righteousness of Christ. There is not even the most remote allusion in the text to the righteousness of Christ. The text itself defines the "imputation of righteousness" as being synonymous with the forgiveness of sins. This view of the text is sustained by Calvin: "But in the fourth chapter to the Romans he first mentions an imputation of righteousness and immediately represents it as consisting in the remission of sins. 'David,' says he, 'describeth the blessedness of the man unto

whom God imputeth righteousness without works, saying, Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven,' etc. He there indeed argues not concerning a branch, but the whole of justification. He also adduces the definition of it given by David when he pronounces them to be blessed who receive the free forgiveness of their sins; whence it appears that this righteousness of which he speaks is simply opposed to guilt." (Inst., Lib. 3, Chap. 11, Sec. 4.)

Barnes's note on this text is clear; we quote part of it: "Being thus pardoned, he is treated as a righteous man. And it is evidently in this sense that the apostle uses the expression 'imputeth righteousness;' that is, he does not impute or charge on the man his sins; he reckons and treats him as a pardoned and righteous man. (Psalm xxxii, 2.) He regards him as one who is forgiven and admitted to his favor, and who is to be treated henceforth as though he had not sinned; that is, he partakes of the benefits of Christ's atonement so as not henceforward to be treated as a sinner, but as a friend of God."

Dr. Hodge offers, in support of the Calvinistic notion of imputed righteousness, an argument founded on our union with Christ. He says our union with him "is mystical, supernatural, representative, and vital. We were in him

before the foundation of the world (Eph. i, 4); we are in him as we were in Adam (Rom. v, 12, 21; 1 Cor. xv, 22); we are in him as the members of the body are in the head (Eph. i, 23; iv, 16; 1 Cor. xii, 12, 27, and often); we are in him as the branches are in the vine (John xv, 1–12). We are in him in such a sense that his death is our death. We were crucified with him (Gal. ii, 20; Rom. vi, 1–8); we are so united with him that we rose with him and sit with him in heavenly places (Eph. ii, 1–6). In virtue of this union we are (in our measure) what he is. We are the sons of God in him, and what he did we did; his righteousness is our righteousness." (Theol., Vol. III, p. 127.)

I will review the separate clauses of this argument in their consecutive order. Thus: "We were in him before the foundation of the world." Can Dr. Hodge show that this implies any thing more than that we were foreknown as believers in Christ? "We are in him as we were in Adam." We were never so in Adam as to be charged with doing what he did; nor are we so in Christ as to make it true that we have done what he did. Adam's sin is imputed to us not immediately but mediately; not in itself, but in its consequences. The same holds true concerning Christ's righteousness. "We are so united with him that we

rose with him." Christ's resurrection makes that of his followers absolutely sure; and in this sense the apostle speaks of us rising with him. But to serve the purpose of Calvinian imputation it should read, "that his resurrection is imputed to us"—a proposition too absurd to need any answer. "In virtue of this union we are (in our measure) what he is." Not by imputation, but by an imparted spiritual life. We receive life and power from him as the branch does from the vine. "We are the sons of God in him." Not by imputation but by right and power given to those who believe. (John i, 12.) "And what he did we did." This statement is emasculated by its own absurdity.

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE IMPUTATION OF CHRIST'S RIGHTEOUSNESS.

In addition to the objections previously stated, the following are presented for consideraton: First. The doctrine destroys at one sweep all necessity for an atoning sacrifice, substituting an acceptance by a purely legal obedience in the place of it. The redemption of man from sin consists of two parts, deliverance from condemnation for past sin, and deliverance from the power of sin. This last is effected by the agency and work of the Holy Spirit. The removal of

the condemnation (on the Calvinistic theory) is by the imputation of Christ's righteousness; not by granting to the penitent the benefits of his sufferings and death; but by the imputation of his active obedience to the moral law of God. Now, if the perfect righteousness of Christ be imputed to the sinner, covering all his sins, then he needs no atonement for them. It is not necessary that they be completely hidden by the righteousness of Christ, and at the same time be atoned for by his blood. One or the other is a work of supererogation. As the system holds to the imputation of his righteousness, it must do it at the expense of his atoning death. It is in vain for them to say that they believe in both the atonement and the imputation of righteousness. Their doing so is simply inconsistency. Where the imputation of righteousness is held, there the atonement is superfluous; for by the terms of the doctrine, the imputation of Christ's righteousness to the believer invests him with an eternal righteousness, and declares him never to have been any thing else but righteous, thus rendering every thing like an atoning sacrifice entirely superfluous. Goodwin, in his "Treatise on Justification," states this objection in great strength: "If men be as righteous as Christ was in his life, there was no more necessity of his

death for them, than there was either for his own death or the death of any other for himself. If we were perfectly just or righteous in him or with him in his life, then the just would not have died for the unjust, but he would have died for the just, for whom there was no necessity he should die. This reason the apostle expressly delivers. (Gal. ii, 21.) 'If righteousness be by the law, then Christ died in vain.' I desire the impartial reader to observe narrowly the force of this inference made by the Holy Ghost. If righteousness or justification be by the law, then Christ died in vain. Men can not here betake themselves to their wonted refuge, to say that by the law is to be understood the works of the law as performed by man's self in person. For if by the word law in this place we understand the works of the law as performed by Christ, the consequence will rise up with greater strength against them. If righteousness were by the works of the law, as performed by Christ, that is, if the imputation of them were our complete righteousness, the death of Christ for us had been in vain, because the righteousness of his life imputed had been a sufficient and complete righteousness for us."

It is objected to the doctrine of imputed righteousness, that the Scriptures nowhere attrib-

ute our salvation to the active righteousness of Christ, but to his sufferings and death. This objection is so well stated by Hare, that I will give his statement of it at length: "By whatever appellation we distinguish that blessing of which we are now inquiring into the meritorious cause, our possession of it is attributed by the writers of the New Testament not to an imputation of the active obedience of Christ as distinguished from his vicarious sufferings, but to our having an interest in the virtue of his death. For instance: Do we call it the forgiveness of sins? 'We have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins.' (Eph. i, 7; Col. i, 14.) Is it remission of sins? 'Without shedding of blood there is no remission.' (Heb. ix, 22.) Must it be denominated the purgation of the conscience from sin? 'The blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, shall purge your conscience from dead works.' (Heb. ix, 14.) Will it be pertinent to know how we are delivered from the curse pronounced against every one who continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them? 'Christ hath delivered us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; as it is written, Cursed is he that hangeth on a tree.' (Gal. iii, 13.) Are we to inquire into

the means of reconciliation with God? 'When we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his son.' (Rom. v, 10.) Again, 'That he might reconcile both unto God in one body by the cross.' (Eph. ii, 16.) Once more, 'And you that were sometime alienated and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled in the body of his flesh through death.' (Col. i, 21, 22.) Does the question relate to the means of obtaining peace with God? 'He has made peace through the blood of the cross.' (Col. i, 20.) Is it asked, How is one who is separated from God by sin brought near to him again? 'Now, in Christ Jesus, ye who sometime were afar off are made nigh by the blood of Christ.' (Eph. ii, 13.) Will it be more pertinent to demand, How is a guilty sinner justified? 'Being now justified by his blood.' (Rom. v. 9); or, in other words, 'All have sinned and come short of the glory of God: being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ: whom God hath set forth a propitiation through faith in his blood.' Shall we come still nearer to the question if we ask, How are we accounted righteous before God? 'He hath made him to be sin [a sin offering] for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God

in him.' (2 Cor. v, 21.) Do we still need to ascertain how we are received into the paternal favor of our heavenly Father? 'When the fullness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons.' (Gal. iv, 4, 5.) And, finally, that nothing may be wanting, would we know also how our paternal and everlasting inheritance is secured to us? 'For this cause he is the mediator of the new testament, that by means of death, for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first testament, they which are called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance.' (Heb. ix, 15.) Thus, all that, in the Scriptural use of the term, is included in justification, even the title which it gives to eternal glory, is attributed to the vicarious sufferings of Christ, and not to a transfer of his active obedience, as distinguished from his atonement. And what can an unprejudiced inquirer infer from this obvious truth, but that the transfer of the active righteousness of Christ for our justification, superadded to the forgiveness of sins through his death, or to constitute our title to eternal life in addition to our deliverance from the wrath to come, is a mere human invention?"

IV.

IMPUTATION OF FAITH FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS.

HAVING examined and rejected the dogma of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, let us now consider that of the "imputation of faith for righteousness."

The proof of this is clearly set forth in the Epistle to the Romans, chap. iv, 3, 5, 9, 22–24: "Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness." "But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness." "For we say that faith was reckoned to Abraham for righteousness." "And therefore it was imputed to him for righteousness. Now it was not written for his sake alone that it was imputed to him, but for us also, to whom it shall be imputed, if we believe on him that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead."

We could well afford to risk the whole matter with the reader on the plain natural meaning of these words. In simple, unambiguous terms, they set forth the fact that Abraham's personal

faith in God was imputed to him for righteousness. It is objected by Calvinists that the word "faith" is here put for the object of faith; that is, for "the righteousness of Christ." The idea that "faith" here stands for any thing else than a personal trust is pure assumption, without any foundation whatever. Again, neither the active nor passive righteousness of Christ is the object of faith. Not his righteousness, but Christ himself, is the object of faith.

That which is imputed to Abraham is "his faith;" that is, it is "his" before the imputation is made. This could not possibly be true if it was the righteousness of Christ that was imputed. If, for the sake of the argument, we were to admit that the righteousness of Christ could become the property of man, still it could not belong to the man until after it had been imputed to him; so that we could not truthfully say that it was "his" righteousness that was imputed; but the apostle explicitly declares of Abraham that it was "his faith" that was imputed to him. In the very nature of the case, a person could and must have faith before it could be imputed to him, so that it would be proper to say, "his faith was imputed to him."

The faith which was imputed is spoken of as Abraham's personal act—his believing in God.

It is said "he believed God;" "believeth on him who justifieth the ungodly."

"As a sinner, Abraham's faith, being an entire self-surrender to God, pregnant with holy obedience, was accepted in the lieu of past and perfect righteousness, so that he was accepted and held just as if he had never sinned. And as of Abraham so of every man. Acceptance, justification, the being held righteous, can be attained never by the righteousness of any one work or many works of ours; for our works benefit not God, confer nothing upon him, buy nothing of him; but it comes most freely and gratuitously upon us when we perform the unreserved act of self-surrendering faith unto God, not for the merit of that self-surrender, but because that is the only proper position for a subject of God's mercy." (Whedon, *in loco.*)

I subjoin the following quotations from two Calvinistic writers: "*And it.* The word 'it' here evidently refers to the act of believing. It does not refer to the righteousness of another—of God, or of the Messiah—but the discussion is solely of the strong act of Abraham's faith, which in some sense was counted to him for righteousness. In what sense this was is explained directly after. All that is material to remark here is, that the act of Abraham, the strong

confidence of his mind in the promises of God, his unwavering assurance that what God had promised he would perform, was reckoned for righteousness." (Barnes, *in loco.*)

"That in him which is counted for righteousness is faith in Jehovah promising mercy. In the absence of righteousness this is the only thing in the sinner that can be counted for righteousness. First, it is not of the nature of righteousness. If it were actual righteousness, it could not be counted as such. But believing God who promises blessings to the undeserving is essentially different from obeying God who guarantees blessings to the deserving. Hence it has a negative fitness to be counted for what it is not. Secondly, it is trust in him who engages to bless in a holy and lawful way. Hence it is that in a sinner which brings him into conformity with the law through another who undertakes to satisfy its demands and secure its rewards for him. Thus it is the only thing in the sinner which, while it is not righteousness, has yet a claim to be counted for such, because it brings him into union with one who is just and having salvation." (Murphy on Gen. xv, 6.)

Dr. Hodge asks, "What right has any one to assume that Abraham's faith being imputed to him for righteousness means any thing more than

when it is said that the zeal of Phinehas was imputed for righteousness (Psalm cvi, 31); or when, in Deut. xxiv, 13, it is said that to return a poor man's pledge 'shall be righteousness unto thee before the Lord thy God?'" (Theol., Vol. III, p. 168.) I do not know that the imputation of faith to Abraham means any thing more than the imputation of zeal in the execution of judgment to Phinehas, or the imputation of an act of charity as specified in Deuteronomy. When our Savior taught us to pray "Forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors," he did not create a new condition of forgiveness, but pointed out a forgiving disposition as an evidence of that faith which is the only condition of pardon. On the same principle, the zeal of Phinehas and the charity specified by the law are evidences of the existence of faith and warrant its being imputed for righteousness. But I will let Dr. Murphy answer Dr. Hodge: "Righteousness is here imputed to Abraham; hence mercy and grace are extended to him—mercy taking effect in the pardon of his sin, and grace in bestowing the rewards of righteousness. That in him which is counted for righteousness is faith in Jehovah promising mercy. In the absence of righteousness this is the only thing in the sinner that can be counted for righteousness."

Dr. Hodge states another objection thus: "This doctrine is, moreover, dishonoring to the Gospel. It supposes the Gospel to be less holy than the law. The law required perfect obedience. And how imperfect and insufficient our best obedience is, the conscience of every believer certifies. It does not satisfy us; how can it satisfy God?" (Theol., Vol. III, 169, 170.)

The foregoing objection rests upon a total misconception of the doctrine he is opposing. It is not claimed by Arminians that faith in Christ is accepted by God in the place of obedience to moral law as a rule of spiritual life, but simply as the condition of justification. Dr. Hodge has confounded Antinomianism with Arminianism.

When a sinner seeks reconciliation with God, it will readily be admitted by both Calvinists and Arminians that he can not claim justification by the moral law, for he has broken it. The Gospel proposes to accept his penitential faith in Christ as a sufficient ground on which to grant him the pardon of his sins. Hodge objects that this dishonors the Gospel. But surely he does not mend the matter when he proposes to invest him with a proper moral character by imputing to him a righteousness which he never performed, which never was his, and which never can be his by any principle of logic or equity. The impu-

tation of faith for righteousness not only does not dishonor the Gospel, but on the contrary, covers that Gospel with glory. In the first place, the sinner's faith is itself a confession of his sinfulness, that he deserves to die, and that he is relying for his salvation simply and only on the atonement made for his sins by the blood of Christ. It is not possible for him at the time of his reconciliation to honor the law of God in a more decisive manner. Secondly, the very manner of his reconciliation with God gives him a purer and nobler conception of the divine law than he has ever had before. Trembling under the terrors of a broken law, he still is enabled to rejoice in deliverance; not by the spurious investiture with the righteousness of another, but by beholding the sinless Son of God dying in his stead. Thirdly, in the moment of his conversion he learns to love the law; he feels to re-echo the words of the Psalmist, "O how I love thy law!" "How sweet are thy words unto my taste; yea, sweeter than honey to my mouth." Fourth, by his faith he is so united to Christ as to be nourished by his life, and receives such moral and spiritual life-power as enables him to keep that law with a perfect heart. Thus the doctrine of the imputation of faith for righteousness, by causing the sinner to confess both his guilt and

his desert of punishment, by magnifying his conceptions of the purity and excellence of the law, by filling his heart with a love for that law, and by creating in him the ability to keep the law, glorifies the Gospel in the most positive manner.

But, according to Hodge, "the grand objection" to the doctrine of the imputation of faith for righteousness is, "that it is in direct contradiction to the plain and pervading teachings of the Word of God. The Bible teaches that we are not justified by works; this doctrine affirms that we are justified by works. The Bible teaches that we are justified by the blood of Christ—that it is for his obedience that the sentence of justification is passed on men; this doctrine affirms that God pronounces us righteous because of our own righteousness. The Bible, from first to last, teaches that the whole ground of our salvation, or of our justification, is objective—what Christ as our Redeemer, our Ransom, our Sacrifice, our Surety, has done for us; this doctrine teaches us to look within, to what we are and to what we do, as the ground of our acceptance with God." (Theol., Vol. III, p. 170.)

This objection is trite, and has been abundantly answered time and again. Watson's answer is good, and has never been refuted: "In this objection the term 'works' is equivocal.

If it mean works of obedience to the moral law, the objection is unfounded, for faith is not a work of this kind; and if it mean the merit of works of any kind, it is equally without foundation, for no merit is allowed to faith, and faith, in the sense of exclusive affiance, or trusting in the merits of another, shuts out, by its very nature, all assumption of merit to ourselves, or there would be no need of resorting to another's merit; but if it mean that faith, or believing, is the doing of something in order to our justification, it is, in this view, the performance of a condition—a *sine qua non*—which is not only not forbidden by Scripture, but required of us—'this is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent;' 'he that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned.' And so far is this considered by the Apostle Paul as prejudicing the free grace of God in our justification, that he makes our justification by faith the proof of its gratuitous nature—'for by grace are ye saved, through faith;' 'therefore it is by faith, that it might be by grace.'"

There is no small ambiguity in the language in which Dr. Hodge sets forth this objection. What does he mean by the words "our own righteousness" in the sentence, "This doctrine affirms that God pronounces us righteous because

of our own righteousness?" If he means a righteousness which owes its existence in us to the power and grace of God, then his objection is suicidal, for it falls with equal force on his own dogma of "imputed righteousness;" if he means a righteousness created by our own personal energy, without help from God, then he is controverting a position which no Arminian writer assumes, and it would be a severe reflection on Dr. Hodge's intelligence to say that he supposed such a position to be the one held by Arminian writers. Arminianism recognizes the act of believing as the act of the man, but at the same time teaches that the power by which man believes is the gift of God. Again, he says: "This doctrine teaches us to look within, to what we are and what we do, as the ground of our acceptance with God." If Dr. Hodge means that the doctrine of "imputed faith" teaches a man to regard his faith as a virtue or merit of his own, which by its excellence entitles him to the favor of God, then the objection is utterly untrue and without any particle of foundation. The very essence of the doctrine of "imputed faith" is the total renunciation of self and entire reliance upon Christ's sufferings and death for our redemption. "Yea, doubtless, and I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowl-

edge of Christ Jesus my Lord. . . . That I may win Christ, and be found in him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith." (Phil. iii, 8, 9.) "I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live: yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me." (Gal. ii, 20.)

V.

CONDITION OF JUSTIFICATION.

IT becomes our business now to inquire on what terms or condition a sinner is justified. Before discussing this question it is prudent to remark that in this treatise it is assumed that the death of Christ was a vicarious atonement for sin. It is furthermore assumed that the vicarious death of Christ is the only foundation on which the blessings of justification, sanctification, and adoption can be secured. Assuming the truth of these propositions, we ask the reader's attention to a consideration of the theories concerning the condition of justification. First of all, let us examine the theory of baptismal justifiation.

JUSTIFICATION BY BAPTISM; OR, "BAPTISMAL REMISSION."

Although the doctrine of baptismal remission is incorporated in the creeds of the Greek and Romish Churches, and is held by the High-church party in the Church of England, and

also by certain branches of the Lutheran Church: still it is best known to the people of the Western and some of the Eastern States through the writings and sermons of Alexander Campbell, of Virginia, and his followers. Campbell was the founder of a sect of Baptists who, from time time, have been known by the different names of "Reformers," "Disciples," "The Christian Church," "The Church of Christ," "Campbellites." This last name they repudiate, although it is the one by which they are most commonly known to, and easily designated by, the Christian world. In the following pages the term "Campbellism" will be used to designate the dogma of "baptismal remission," as taught by Alexander Campbell. It will not be used with any disrespectful or unkindly motive; but simply as a convenient and proper title for the doctrine referred to, one which is readily understood, and saves us from a tedious circumlocution; used on the same principle and in the same manner in which the terms "Arianism," "Socinianism," "Pelagianism," "Calvinism," and "Arminianism," are used by the majority of writers and speakers on theological subjects.

I will state the doctrines of Mr. Campbell on this subject, in his own words:

"He had that day declared the Gospel

facts, and proved the resurrection and ascension of Jesus to the conviction of thousands. They believed and repented—believed that Jesus was the Messiah, had died as a sin offering, was risen from the dead, and crowned Lord of all. Being full of this faith, they inquired of Peter and the other apostles what they ought to do to obtain remission. They were informed that, though they now believed and repented, they were not pardoned, but must 'reform and be immersed for the remission of sins.' Immersion for the forgiveness of sins was the command addressed to these believers, to these penitents, in answer to the most earnest question: and by one of the most sincere, candid, and honest speakers ever heard. This act of faith was presented as that act by which a change in their state could be effected; or, in other words, by which alone they could be pardoned." (Christian System, pp. 194, 195.) From the foregoing quotation we gather the following items of Campbell's system: 1. That the believing penitents at Pentecost were not pardoned until they were baptized. 2. That baptism was the "alone" act by which they could be pardoned. It would be difficult to tell how a writer pretending to state facts could wander farther from the truth than Mr. Campbell does in the foregoing quotation.

"All these testimonies concur with each other in presenting the act of faith—Christian immersion, frequently called conversion—as that act, inseparably connected with the remission of sins; or that change of state of which we have already spoken." (Christian System, p. 197.) Passing by, for the present, the reckless assertion that immersion is frequently called conversion, let us notice the statement that immersion is "inseparably connected with the remission of sins." If baptism and remission are inseparably connected, then it follows, 1. That baptism alone will procure the remission of sins. It is useless to answer that Campbell elsewhere demands faith and repentance (or, to state them in their Scriptural order, repentance and faith), as prerequisites to baptism; if baptism and remission are "inseparably connected," then whenever baptism is received remission is received with it, regardless of any repentance or faith. Or, if remission of sins is not received, unless the subject has repented and believed, then baptism and remission of sins are not "inseparably connected," unless Mr. Campbell's followers will undertake to say that none are baptized except those who have repented and believe. 2. If baptism and remission are thus "inseparably connected," it follows that without baptism there is no remission. No bap-

tism, no remission; no matter what the repentance or faith may be. Baptism is the Alpha and the Omega of his "law of pardon."

"The apostles in all their speeches and replies to interrogatories never commanded an inquirer to pray, read, or sing, as preliminary to his coming, but always commanded and proclaimed immersion as the first duty, or the first thing to be done after a belief of testimony. Hence, neither praying, singing, reading, repenting, sorrowing, resolving, nor waiting to be better, was the converting act. Immersion alone was the act of turning to God." (Christ. Syst. p. 209.) "But one thing we do know, that none can rationally and with certainty enjoy the peace of God, and the hope of heaven, but they who intelligently and in full faith are born of water, or immersed for the remission of their sins." (Christ. Syst. p. 234.) Let me call the reader's close attention to the next quotation. Campbellism has often been charged with making baptism the only condition of pardon. This charge it has stoutly denied. Notwithstanding their denial, the popular voice of the Christian public still holds it guilty of making baptism the only condition of justification. The following quotation sheds a clear light upon this subject, and fully sustains the charge. I quote from Benjamin

Franklin (the editor of the *Christian Review*), in his debate with Rev. S. M. (now Bishop) Merrill. Next to Mr. Campbell, few men have exercised a more powerful influence in creating and shaping the theology of the sect than Mr. Franklin. On page 994 of the published debate, he says: "It is a positive divine enactment—a visible line that must be crossed—to come to the promise. It changes or purifies no man's heart; it prepares no man's heart, nor does it change any man's character; but for him whose heart is changed by faith, and whose character is changed by repentance, it is the consummating act. For one thus prepared in heart by faith, and in life by repentance, it is the visible act of turning to God, the divine appointment in which God has promised pardon."

In the foregoing quotation Mr. Franklin has spoken plainly on three points:

1. The absolute necessity of baptism to the remission of sins. He calls it "a positive divine enactment—a visible line which must be crossed to come to the promise." This tersely sets forward baptism as all essential to remission of sins. There is no remission until the line of baptism is crossed.

2. He emphatically denies that baptism changes, prepares, or purifies any man's heart or

character. This is a flat contradiction of Mr. Campbell, who teaches that "when the baptized believer rises out of the water, is born of water, enters the world a second time, he enters it as innocent, as clean, as unspotted as an angel." (Campbell and Rice's Debate, pp. 444, 516.)

Leaving the followers of these men to settle their contradictions among themselves, let us pass on to notice the third point in the quotation. Mr. Franklin asserts that faith changes the heart, repentance changes the life, and baptism is the divine appointment in which God has promised pardon. According to Mr. Franklin neither faith nor repentance is the condition of pardon; but baptism is the only condition. To bring this feature of the quotation out clearly, let attention be given to the following questions: 1. What, according to Franklin, does faith do for the sinner? Does it procure the pardon of sin. No. Does it procure the change of his life? No. It simply changes his heart. 2. What does repentance do for the sinner? Does it procure pardon? No. Does it change the heart? No. It simply changes the life. 3. What does baptism do for the sinner? Does it change his heart? No. Faith does that. Does it change his life? No. Repentance does that. What, then, does baptism do for the sinner? It procures pardon for him;

this is all that it does. And baptism is the only thing that does procure pardon. Faith does not do it, repentance does not do it, baptism alone does it. If it is replied that "faith purifies the heart and that purity of heart is necessary in order to pardon," I answer, it will be shown hereafter that purity of heart does not precede pardon; but in its proper order is subsequent to it, hence can not be a condition of pardon.

The quotation from Franklin just as it stands plainly and unequivocally teaches that baptism is the only condition of pardon. For further testimony on this point, I quote from Franklin's "Gospel Preacher," p. 95. "Baptism performs no such part as this at all, produces no change in the heart or life, but changes the relation, initiates the man previously changed in heart and life into a new state or relation, into the body of Christ. It transfers the man into the new state or relation. In this new state he comes to the blood of Christ, which performs another part of the work, without which he would be lost. It takes away his sin, cleanses or washes him from the guilt of sin." In the sermon from which this quotation is taken Mr. Franklin loudly protests against the idea that "baptism is the only condition of justification." Nevertheless, in spite of his disclaimer, the logic of his argument makes

it such. According to the quotation, baptism changes neither heart nor life; but it, and it alone, brings us to the blood of Christ by which we are saved. Franklin here fully agrees with Mr. Campbell that baptism is that act "by which alone they could be pardoned."

I will give one more quotation from Mr. Franklin: "A man can be changed in heart, be good in heart, and not be in the kingdom of God. He can be good in life, and not be in the kingdom of God. But no matter how good he is in heart and life, he is not in the kingdom or body of Christ unless immersed into the body. Immersion into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, on the part of a believing penitent, is the visible act, in which he is transferred from one kingdom to another. Before this act, though he may be prepared in heart and life to enter, he is out of the body or kingdom; after this act he is in the body or kingdom." (Gospel Preacher, 146.) These quotations might be multiplied, but the foregoing are amply sufficient to place the teachings of Campbellism on the subject of justification clearly before the reader. These quotations clearly establish three items in the theology of the system, to wit:

1. That baptism is the divinely appointed condition of justification.

2. That baptism is the only condition of justification.

3. That baptism is so essential to the forgiveness of sin that without it there is, and can be, no forgiveness.

It is firmly believed by the Christian Churches (Friends excepted) that baptism is a duty enjoined by a positive command; that it should be attended to by all who are properly qualified, at the earliest opportunity; that the neglect of it is disobedience to the positive command of Christ. On these points there is no controversy between us and the followers of Mr. Campbell. The question at issue between us and this sect is, "Is baptism an indispensable prerequisite to pardon?" When God sees a sinner repenting and believing in Christ, does he withhold pardon until the sinner has been baptized? Campbellism affirms that he does; we deny. We will now examine the proof-texts and arguments offered in support of the dogma of "Baptismal Justification."

One of the texts mainly relied upon in sustaining the doctrine of baptismal justification is Acts ii, 37, 38: "Now when they heard this they were pricked in their heart, and said unto Peter and to the rest of the apostles, Men and brethren, what shall we do? Then Peter said unto them, Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the

name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." On this text the advocates of Campbellism teach that the preposition εἰς ("for"), in the words "for the remission of sins," should be rendered "in order to," making the clause read, "in order to the remission of sins." They assert that the construction of the text demands this rendering. To such a rendering we demur. There is precisely the same construction in Matt. iii, 11: "I indeed baptize you with water unto repentance." In this sentence the word εἰς is rendered "unto," and can not possibly mean "in order to." Mr. Campbell is not at all intimidated by this fact, but boldly affirms that John baptized his subjects in order that they might reform. Let him speak for himself: "John calls for fruits worthy of a professed repentance—fruits indicative of repentance. He therefore immersed them on profession of penitence, or while confessing their sins, that they might reform. Hence he baptized men in order to, or for the sake of, reformation." (C. and R. Deb., p. 460.)

With all due deference to the opinion of Mr. Campbell, we must believe that John did not baptize them in order that they might or should repent. Repentance would not be a necessary result of their baptism. So far from John's bap-

tizing the people in order that they might repent, he demanded of them the evidence that they had really and truly repented before he would consent to baptize them. "Bring forth fruits therefore meet for repentance," is the demand made of those seeking baptism. John taught repentance in order to baptism, not baptism in order to repentance. Campbell has already been quoted as declaring that John baptized the people in order that they might repent, or reform; we shall now see him contradict himself and declare that John demanded reformation before baptism. I quote from his "Christian Baptism" (1851), page 212: "John, in preparing the way for its annunciation, therefore, very appropriately calls for personal reformation before baptism. He refuses all who can not, or who will not, confess their sins and profess repentance before baptism." How Mr. Campbell and his followers explain these contradictions we have never been informed. It might be asked, Did not the baptism of John obligate the persons receiving it to all the duties of repentance? It unquestionably did. But to serve the purpose of Campbellism it should be made to appear that the people did not repent until they had been baptized; on the contrary, they were not baptized until they had given evidence that they were repenting of their sins. Repentance is

not completed in a moment, it is a work of time. When they brought forth fruit meet for repentance they were admitted to baptism, and it obligated them to all the duties of repentance. Thus at Pentecost men were required to repent, their repentance led to faith in Christ, their faith in Christ procured their justification. Coming with their repentance, faith, and pardon, they were admitted to baptism, and their baptism obligated them to the performance of all the duties which their repentance, faith, and justification had involved them in. The argument of Campbellism on Acts ii, 38, compared with its argument on Matt. iii, 11, involves the two speakers—Peter and John—in hopeless contradiction. According to Campbell's rendering, John baptized the people in order that they might reform; but Peter demanded reformation in order to their baptism. If he contends that εἰς means "in order to" in both these instances, he makes Peter and John contradict each other; if he admits that εἰς does not mean "in order to" in these texts, then he yields the argument for baptismal remission so far as Acts ii, 38 is concerned.

It is contended that in Acts ii, 38 the verbs "repent" and "be baptized" are connected by the conjunction *and* (καὶ), and that both of them refer to the same subject ("remission of

sins"), hence both of them must hold the same relation to the "remission of sins;" that if repentance is necessary to remission of sins, then baptism must be also. This conclusion does not necessarily follow. The mere fact that two verbs are connected by a conjunction and refer to the same subject is no proof that they hold the same relation to that subject. Thus, in the sentence, "I paid the price and took the deed for the land;" here paying the price and taking the deed both refer to the ownership of the land; but surely they do not hold the same relation to that ownership. Paying the price was necessary in order to have a legal right to the land, while taking the deed was only taking the legal acknowledgment of that right. Again: "I confessed my sins and praised God for pardon." That is, confessed in order to pardon, and praised God when the pardon was received. Thus repentance is necessary in order to having a Gospel right to pardon, while baptism is (with the adult) a formal acknowledgment of what he has received.

It is contended that εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν ("for the remission of sins") is a specific phrase, and that it always means "in order to the remission of sins." These words occur in four places in the New Testament, to wit: Mark i, 4; Luke iii, 3; Matt. xxvi, 28; and Acts ii, 38. The

first two of the above mentioned texts refer to the baptism of John, and read as follows: "Preach (*or*, preaching) the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins." The phrase "baptism of repentance" is susceptible of two widely distinct meanings: thus, it might mean "the baptism or washing administered to those who have repented" of their sins; or, it may mean "the baptism, purification, or cleansing of the soul accompanying repentance." If we give it the first definition, then we can not translate it "in order to the remission," etc. A few reflections will make this apparent. John and his followers regarded baptism with water as figurative of the purification of the heart, and refused it to those who had not repented. Baptism is never mentioned in connection with remission of sins unless it is connected with repentance. On the other hand, remission is connected directly with repentance, without any reference at all to baptism. "That repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations." (Luke xxiv, 47.) "To give repentance to Israel, and forgiveness of sins." (Acts v, 31.) "Then hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life." (Acts xi, 18.) "Godly sorrow worketh repentance to salvation." (2 Cor. vii, 10.) Now, as baptism was not administered before re-

pentance but afterward, and as repentance procured the remission of sins, it follows that baptism could not possibly be "in order to" the remission of sins, for the remission accompanied the repentance and preceded the baptism. If the phrase "baptism of repentance" be defined as meaning the purification or cleansing from sin which accompanies repentance, it can not possibly be "in order to" the remission of sins; for the forgiveness of sins, although in point of time it is coetaneous with the cleansing from sin, yet in its natural and logical order it is prior to the cleansing or purification. If it is the "ungodly" whom God justifies, then it follows as an irresistible conclusion that when the sinner or "ungodly" has been cleansed and become "godly," he must be already justified; for it was when he was in his "ungodly" state that God justified him. Hence his "baptism" or purification of repentance was not in order to remission, but because of remission. The third text in which the phrase *εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν* occurs (Matt. xxvi, 28) remains to be considered. "This is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins." It is cheerfully admitted that the phrase here means "in order to the remission of sins;" but it does not follow that it must have the same meaning in Acts ii, 38, for few words

have a wider range of meaning, and it has already been shown the phrase does not necessarily mean "in order to." Nay, more than that, it has been made evident that in the two preceding instances it could not have any such meaning. The shedding of Christ's blood was absolutely indispensable to the forgiveness of sins. No human being of any age, sex, or race, could be saved without Christ's blood. To make baptism as indispensably necessary to the pardon of sin as the shedding of the Redeemer's blood is, is to send to hell all of the unbaptized of every land, no matter what their opportunities, age, repentance, faith, or purity may be. The enormity of such a proposition stamps its falsity. On the other hand, if baptism (unlike the blood of Christ) is not indispensable to the forgiveness of sins, then the doctrine of baptismal justification falls to the ground. The language of Acts ii, 38, forms part of the first Gospel sermon to the Jews after Christ's death. Let us compare it with the first preaching of the Gospel by an apostle to the Gentiles. It took place in the house of Cornelius, the centurion, of Cesarea. The record of this sermon to Cornelius will be found in Acts x, 34–48; xi, 15–18; and xv, 7–11. I will give it in parallel columns, so that the reader may compare the several passages where it occurs.

Acts x, 34-48.

"34. Then Peter opened his mouth, and said, Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: 35. But in every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him. 36. The word which God sent unto the children of Israel, preaching peace by Jesus Christ: (he is Lord of all:) 37. That word, I say, ye know, which was published throughout all Judea, and began from Galilee, after the baptism which John preached; 38. How God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Ghost and with power: who went about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed of the devil; for God was with him. 39. And we are witnesses of all things which he did

Acts xi, 15-18.

Acts xv, 7-11.

Acts x, 34-48.

both in the land of the Jews, and in Jerusalem: whom they slew and hanged on a tree: 40. Him God raised up the third day, and shewed him openly; 41. Not to all the people, but unto witnesses chosen before of God, even to us, who did eat and drink with him after he rose from the dead. 42. And he commanded us to preach unto the people, and to testify that it is he which was ordained of God to be the Judge of quick and dead. 43. To him gave all the prophets witness, that through his name whosoever believeth in him shall receive remission of sins.

44. While Peter yet spake these words, the Holy Ghost fell on all them which heard the word. 45. And

Acts xi, 15-18.

"15. And as I began to speak, the Holy Ghost fell on them, as on us at the beginning. 16. Then remembered I

Acts xv, 7-11.

"7. Peter rose up and said unto them, Men and brethren, ye know how that a good while ago God made choice among us, that the Gentiles by my mouth should hear the word of the Gospel, and believe. 8. And God, which knoweth the hearts, bare them witness, giving them the Holy Ghost, even as he did unto us; 9. And put no difference between us and them, purifying their hearts by faith. 10. Now therefore why tempt ye God, to put a yoke upon the neck

Acts x, 34-48.	Acts xi, 15-18.	Acts xv, 7-11.
they of the circumcision which believed were astonished, as many as came with Peter, because that on the Gentiles also was poured out the gift of the Holy Ghost. 46. For they heard them speak with tongues, and magnify God. Then answered Peter, 47. Can any man forbid water, that these should not be baptized, which have received the Holy Ghost as well as we? 48. And he commanded them to be baptized in the name of the Lord."	the word of the Lord, how that he said, John indeed baptized with water; but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost. 17. Forasmuch then as God gave them the like gift as he did unto us, who believed on the Lord Jesus Christ, what was I, that I could withstand God? 18. When they heard these things, they held their peace, and glorified God, saying, Then hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life."	of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we were able to bear? 11. But we believe that through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ we shall be saved, even as they."

In comparing the justification of Cornelius with that of the Jews at Pentecost, let us first settle the religious status of Cornelius at the time he sends for Peter. He is evidently not an impenitent sinner, or he had never sent for Peter to show him the way of salvation. More than this, he is described as being not a Jew, but a man of another nation. As "devout," "one that feared God." One who "gave much alms,"

"and prayed to God always." One whose prayer was heard by God. (Acts x, 2, 31.) On the other hand, it is equally evident that he had not yet obtained the pardon of sin, and been adopted as a child of God. This is evident from the fact that Peter calls his attention to the obtaining of remission of sins through faith. It was not until after Peter had unfolded the plan of salvation by faith in Christ that Cornelius received the Holy Ghost (in witness to his pardon and adoption.) (Acts x, 43, 44, 45.) It was not until Peter had preached to him, that his repentance was crowned with everlasting life. The purification of his heart also accompanied the gift of the Holy Ghost. (Acts x, 18; xv, 9.) From the foregoing it is evident that at the time Peter was sent for, Cornelius was neither an impenitent sinner, nor a pardoned believer, but a mourner (Matt. v, 4; James iv, 8–10; Psalm cxvi, 3, 4; 2 Cor. vii, 9–11), seeking comfort of pardon and adoption.

In the foregoing narrative note the following points: 1. Peter preaches. 2. While he preaches Cornelius and company receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. 3. Peter orders them to be baptized with water because they have received the baptism of the Holy Ghost. "Can any forbid the water to these which have received the

Spirit?" Campbellism asserts that Cornelius was not pardoned until after he had been baptized with water. This assertion is a mere assumption without even a shadow of proof. It involves the absurdity of supposing "that the Holy Ghost came upon them, and they were recommended by the apostle for Church communion in consequence thereof, while they were in a state of guilt and condemnation; and moreover, that Peter commanded them to be baptized [although as Gentiles they of all persons the most needed full instruction], without one word, so far as the narrative shows, on the subject of the 'remission of sins,' as connected with that baptism. If we say that they received 'remission of sins,' previous to baptism, then the point in controversy is fairly surrendered." (Ralston's Elements of Divinity, p. 330.) It is urged that the gift of the Holy Ghost to Cornelius was not the witness of the Spirit to his pardon, but the miraculous gift of tongues, etc. And we are referred to the case of Caiaphas, the high-priest, prophesying concerning Christ (John xi, 49–52), as proof that miraculous powers were granted to unconverted men. But there is no analogy between the two cases. Cornelius was an honest seeker after truth, Caiaphas was not. Cornelius had put himself under divine instruction,

Caiaphas had not. Cornelius praises God, Caiaphas shows no disposition to do so. Cornelius speaks intelligently, Caiaphas utters words, the full import of which he does not know. His speech was only one of those instances in which God causes the wrath of man to praise him. Cornelius receives the Holy Spirit because of his faith in Christ. Caiaphas has no faith in Christ but rejects him. Surely the undesigned and unconscious prophecy of Caiaphas can be no proof that God gives the intelligent use of the miraculous powers of the Holy Spirit to unconverted men. In order to prove that the gift of miraculous powers does not imply either pardon or purity of heart, the case of the Corinthian Church is sometimes referred to. We are told that that Church abounded in miraculous gifts more than any other Church, and at the same time there was a lower state of spiritual life in it than in any other Church. But the reference proves nothing to the point. The question is not whether miraculous gifts may remain with men who once were pardoned and regenerated and have gone partially astray; but whether they are granted to persons who are unpardoned and unpurified. That the members of the Corinthian Church had been justified and were still regarded as justified persons at the time Paul

wrote his Epistles to them, is evident from the following quotations from his two Epistles to them. The first Epistle is dedicated to "The Church of God which is at Corinth, to them that are sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints." In Chapter i, verse 9, they are designated as those that "are called unto the fellowship of his Son Jesus Christ our Lord." In Chapter iii, verse 16, Paul assures them that they "are the temple of God, and that the spirit of God" dwelt in them. He uses similar language to them in the Second Epistle, vi, 16. In the First Epistle, vi, 11, they are called "washed," "sanctified," and "justified;" in the Second Epistle, viii, 7, he speaks of them as abounding in faith, thus clearly settling the fact that the apostle regarded them as "believers in Christ," and "children of God," and that their miraculous gifts and powers were in harmony with their religious life. That the miraculous gifts of the Holy Spirit were not given to unjustified men will be farther evident from an examination of Mark ix, 39. "There is no man which shall do a miracle in my name that can lightly speak evil of me." The apostles had found a man casting out demons in the name of Christ, and they forbid him because he followed not with them. Christ reproved them for hindering

the man, assigning as a reason, that no man doing a miracle in his name could easily speak evil of him. Now, few things are more common than for unjustified persons to speak evil of Christ. Such conduct is the natural fruit of the unregenerate heart. Two conclusions naturally follow Christ's words: 1. That no unregenerate person can work a miracle. 2. That the working of miracles in the name of Christ is to be taken as proof that the person performing them has been pardoned and purified. The same doctrine is taught in John ix, 31–33: "Now we know that God heareth not sinners: but if any man be a worshiper of God, and doeth his will, him he heareth. Since the world began was it not heard that any man opened the eyes of one that was born blind. If this man were not of God, he could do nothing." The power to work miracles was refused to Simon Magus, because his heart was "not right in the sight of God." (Acts viii, 21.) It matters not so far as the argument is concerned whether Simon's sins had once been remitted or not. It is sufficient for the present instance that he was then "in the gall of bitterness and the bond of iniquity." Miraculous gifts were refused him because his "heart was not right in the sight of God." Thus decisively settling the fact, that miraculous

powers were not given to unconverted men. Hence, the use of these powers by Cornelius and his company before their baptism with water proves them to have been converted men at that time. Let us now look at some further evidence that Cornelius did receive in the gift of the Holy Spirit both the pardon of sin and the purification of heart. Let it be noted that Peter had just told Cornelius that "whosoever believeth in him [Christ] shall receive remission of sins." Immediately when they heard this, the Holy Spirit was given to them. (Verse 44.) That the Holy Spirit was given them because of their faith. (Chapter xi, 17; xv, 9.) That the Holy Spirit was given them in testimony of their pardon, is evident from Acts xi, 15–18, where the gift of the Holy Spirit is taken as full proof that God had given them "repentance unto life;" but there is no life to men under condemnation. When God gives repentance unto life then condemnation is taken away, the man is pardoned. Cornelius and his company showed before they were baptized with water that they had the evidence that they were pardoned, and accepted of God. They not only spoke with tongues, but they "magnified God." This is not the work of sinners under condemnation, but of believers rejoicing in pardon. Corneilus and friends were

pardoned before baptism, hence the baptism with water was not a condition of their pardon. Now God dealt with Cornelius and his company in the same manner he did with the Jews at Pentecost. The testimony of Peter on this point is explicit: "The Holy Ghost fell on them, as on us at the beginning." "God gave them the like gift as he did unto us who believed on the Lord Jesus Christ." God gave "them the Holy Ghost, even as he did unto us." "Put no difference between us and them, purifying their hearts by faith." Note the following items: 1. Cornelius received the Holy Ghost just as the Jews did at Pentecost. 2. Both parties had the same faith, and received the same gift. 3. Both parties repented and received "life." 4. God put no difference between the Jews and Cornelius, but purified all their hearts alike by faith. This settles the fact that at Pentecost the Jews repented and received the remission of sins before they were baptized. Mark the fact, both Cornelius and the Jews at Pentecost repented and were baptized for the remission of sins. They repented in order to pardon, and were baptized when they had received pardon. This utterly destroys the notion that baptism is a condition of pardon.

It is contended by the advocates of Campbell-

ism that "conversion" and "baptism" are synonymous and convertible terms. "All these testimonies concur with each other in presenting the act of faith—Christian immersion, frequently called conversion—as that act inseparably connected with the remission of sins." (Christian System, page 197.) Campbell also urges that when Peter said "Repent ye therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out" (Acts iii, 19), he made precisely the same proposition that he made at Pentecost when he said, "Repent and be baptized." This assertion is wholly unwarrantable. It is true that baptized persons are spoken of as converted ones; not because baptism means conversion, for it means nothing of the kind, but from the fact that (as a general thing in orthodox Churches) adults are not baptized until they have been converted. No two words are more radically different in meaning than "baptize" and "convert." No Lexicon makes them synonymous. The terms "convert" and "conversion" are never mentioned in the Bible in connection with baptism, either as leading to it, or as accompanying or as resulting from it.

The advocates of Campbellism quote the following texts to prove that by baptism we are brought into a new state or relation to Christ,

and thereby come to the remission of sins: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father," etc. (Matt. xxviii, 19); "Baptized into Christ," (Rom. vi, 3); and "Baptized into one body" (1 Cor. xii, 13). The quotations from Romans and 1 Corinthians refer to the baptism of the heart by the Holy Ghost, and the one from the apostolic commission is the command for water baptism, which is the symbolical and formal acknowledgment of our baptism by the Holy Spirit. And it is by this spiritual baptism that we are really brought into the body of Christ. "For by one Spirit we are all baptized into one body." But it is denied that this text refers to baptism by the Holy Spirit; and for this denial the following reasons are assigned: The baptism of the Holy Spirit never occurred but in two instances—Pentecost, and in the house of Cornelius. This is a mere unproven assertion. Moreover, the promise is made by Joel (ii, 28, 29) in the name of God, "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh." This is quoted by Peter at Pentecost and applied to the baptism of the disciples by the Holy Spirit on that occasion, and thus settles the fact that God had promised the baptism of the Holy Spirit to "all flesh." It is no argument against this view of the subject that "all flesh," or all men, do not receive this baptism in its

cleansing power. This promise, like many other promises of God, is conditional. All men receive a measure of its awakening and convicting influence, and to those who properly improve this, the fuller baptism of its purifying grace is given. It is in accordance with this that Christ offered the baptism of the Holy Spirit to all who would come and receive it. (John vii, 37–39.) And in the same strain Isaiah had predicted that it would be given to "the thirsty;" that is, to those who were thirsting for it. A reference to 1 Cor. xii, 4–12, will show that the words "by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body" have reference to that work of the Holy Spirit on individuals by which it communicated to them (not miraculous gifts, but) the purely spiritual gifts of "faith," "the word of wisdom," and the "word of knowledge." Just such gifts and graces as Isaiah, Ezekiel, and Joel had foretold would be poured out "upon all flesh;" just such gifts and graces as the one hundred and twenty disciples and three thousand converts received at Pentecost; and just such as were also received by Cornelius and his company. (Acts ii, x, and xi.)

It is asserted that when Paul wrote his Epistle to the Ephesians there was no baptism of the Holy Spirit; yet he said to them, there is "one baptism." Hence that "one baptism" must

have been water baptism, and by it they had been baptized into the "one body of Christ." If the advocates of baptismal remission mean to say that the Church at Ephesus did not share in the miraculous and purifying gifts of the Holy Spirit, they are refuted by Acts xix, 1–6; Eph. i, 13, 14; iv, 30, where it is said that the believers at Ephesus received the "gift of the Holy Ghost," which enabled them to "speak with tongues," "prophesy," and by which they were "sealed unto the day of redemption." We have already seen that Spirit baptism is not to be confounded with the miraculous gifts which sometimes accompanied it, but that its fruits were to be found in heart purification, with its attendant blessings. In these blessings of Spirit baptism the Church at Ephesus shared freely. They had been blessed "with all spiritual blessings;" they had been "made nigh by the blood of Christ;" God, through his Spirit, dwelt in them; they were "light in the Lord." (Eph. i, 3; ii, 13, 19, 22; v, 8.)

Baptism with water does not create a new relation between the believer and Christ, but acknowledges the relation which has already been created by other means. Thus, the baptism of the Israelites unto Moses was not the creation of a new relation between them and him, but the

confirmation of the relation which had already been created in Egypt. The baptism of Cornelius and company with water was a visible confirmation of the relation to Christ into which they had been brought by the baptism of the Holy Ghost. Their bodies were "washed with pure water" because their hearts had been "sprinkled from an evil conscience." And these Corinthians were baptized into the one body of Christ by the Holy Spirit, and they received water baptism as a visible confirmation of that fact.

Ephesians v, 25, 26: "Christ also loved the Church, and gave himself for it; that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word." This text is often quoted in support of baptismal remission. The text is only another instance in which the symbol, "water," is put for the reality, the Holy Spirit. The sacred writers often attribute to the symbol what properly belongs to the spiritual substance. Thus, in Ezekiel xxxvi, 25, the cleansing of the heart is attributed to the water, the symbol of the cleansing agency. In Psalm li, 7, the same thing is symbolized by, and attributed to, the purifying with "hyssop." In the same manner Paul is commanded to submit to a formal washing away of his sins in baptism as a public acknowledgment of the cleansing he had already received from the

Holy Ghost. Thus the Church is formally cleansed with the baptism of water, while the real cleansing is through the baptism of the Holy Spirit poured out upon it. I close this answer with the following pertinent reflections from Calvin's Inst., Lib. IV, Cap. 15, Sec. 2: "Baptism promises us no other purification than by the sprinkling of the blood of Christ, which is emblematically represented by water, on account of its resemblance to washing and cleansing. Who, then, can pretend that we are cleansed by that water which clearly testifies the blood of Christ to be our true and only ablution? So that to refute the error of those who refer all to the virtue of the water, no better argument could be found than in the signification of baptism itself, which abstracts us as well from that visible element which is placed before our eyes as from all other means of salvation, that it may fix our minds on Christ alone."

Romans vi, 17, 18, is also quoted in favor of baptismal remission. It reads thus: "But God be thanked, that ye were the servants of sin, but ye have obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine which was delivered you. Being then made free from sin, ye became the servants of righteousness." It is claimed that "the form of doctrine" means baptism, and that obeying this from the

heart means submitting to baptism. But all this is pure assumption. Before this text can sustain the doctrine of baptismal remission it must be made to appear that the Romans were pardoned in or by baptism; that the "old man" is crucified only in baptism; and that obeying "from the heart" means being baptized. It is sometimes claimed that the comments of Macknight and Wesley sustain the idea that this "form of doctrine" means baptism. To dissipate this error I will give Macknight's Commentary on the text, also his foot-note: "By thus speaking I do not insinuate that ye have made yourselves slaves to sin; on the contrary, I thank God, that although formerly ye were the slaves of sin, ye have willingly obeyed the mold of doctrine into which ye were cast at your baptism. And that being set free from the slavery of sin by your faith, ye have voluntarily become the slaves of righteousness, whom therefore ye ought to obey." FOOT-NOTE.—"Yet ye have obeyed from the heart the mold of doctrine into which ye were delivered. The original words must be supplied and construed in the following manner: *ὑπηκούσατε ἐκ καρδίας τύπον διδαχῆς, εἰς ὃν τύπον διδαχῆς παραδόθητε*: 'Ye have obeyed from the heart the mold of doctrine, into which mold of doctrine ye were delivered.' The original word *τύπος*, among other

things, signified a mold into which melted metals were poured to receive the form of the mold. The apostle represents the Gospel doctrine as a mold into which the Romans were put by their baptism in order to their being fashioned anew. And he thanks God that 'from the heart,' that is, most willingly and sincerely, they had yielded to the forming efficacy of that mold of doctrine, and were made new men both in principle and practice."

In the foregoing quotation notice the following items: 1st. It was "the form of doctrine" which these Romans had obeyed. 2d. It was their obedience to this "form of doctrine" which set them free from the slavery of sin and made them the servants of righteousness. 3d. This "form of doctrine" was not their baptism, but the mold of doctrine which they received, or into which they were cast, at the time of their baptism. 4th. It was their obedience (not to baptism, but) to this doctrine, that freed them from the slavery of sin and made them servants of righteousness. Wesley's views are briefly stated thus: "Intimating that our minds, all pliant and ductile, should be conformed to the Gospel precepts as liquid metals take the figure of the mold into which they are cast." (Notes, *in loco.*)

An argument in behalf of baptismal remis-

sion has been founded on the language of Ananias to Paul: "And now why tarriest thou? arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins, calling on the name of the Lord." (Acts xxii, 16.) It is contended that Paul's sins were washed away in and by baptism. Concerning the words "be baptized and wash away thy sins," see the remarks upon Ephesians v, 26. Also the following note from Dr. Lindsay, one of the translators of Olshausen's Commentary: "The utmost that can be inferred from the words of Ananias is that baptism and the pardon of sin are in some way connected, but not that the mere act of baptism of itself in any case cleanses from the guilt of sin. If Paul had received baptism in hypocrisy, without any conviction in his mind respecting the power of Christ, or any trust in Christ, not only would the water of baptism not have cleansed him from sin, but it would greatly have aggravated his guilt. On the other hand, if, while truly believing in Christ, he had been placed in circumstances where it was not possible for him to be baptized—confined, for example, as a prisoner, and cut off from all intercourse with the Church—he would, notwithstanding the want of baptism, have enjoyed the pardon of his sins. The blessing would not have tarried till the opportunity of receiving baptism occurred.

Being justified by faith, he would have had peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ."

Campbell has presented to the world the following grammatical rule: "The active participle in connection with an imperative either declares the manner in which the imperative shall be obeyed, or explains the meaning of the command." Apply Campbell's rule to Paul's case, and it effectually removes every thought of baptismal remission. In the text we have two verbs which are in the imperative mood middle voice—"be baptized," this is followed by the verb "wash away." This latter verb is followed by the active participle "calling." Thus the sins were not actually washed away by the baptism, but by the "calling on the name of the Lord." His prayers were an expression of the faith which he had in Christ and tended to increase that faith. The instruction to wash away his sins by prayer was in perfect harmony with the general tenor of Scripture promise and precept. Thus, "And it shall come to pass, that whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be delivered." (Joel ii, 32.) "Whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved." (Acts ii, 21; Rom. x. 13.) "Pray God, if perhaps the thought of thine heart may be forgiven thee." (Acts viii, 22.) "I said I will

confess my transgressions unto the Lord; and thou forgavest the iniquity of my sin." (Psalm xxxii, 5.) "He that covereth his sins shall not prosper: but whoso confesseth and forsaketh them shall have mercy. (Prov. xxviii, 13.) "Forgive us our sins." (Luke xi, 4.) "If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." (1 John, i, 9.) This mass of Biblical testimony on the efficacy of prayer (as an instrument) to cleanse from sin is sustained by the experience of the entire Christian world in all ages, and in all places; and effectually settles the fact that it was prayer and not baptism that procured the remission of Paul's sins. It has been objected that "calling on the name of the Lord" must mean something more than prayer, for Christ says, "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven." (Matt. vii, 21.) A sufficient answer to this objection is, that Christ was not denying the efficacy of prayer in the forgiveness of sin; but simply refusing that prayer which was not accompanied by the right state of the heart.

Another evidence that Paul was converted before his baptism by Ananias is found in the

fact that he received the gift of sight and was filled with the Holy Ghost before he was baptized with water. "And Ananias went his way, and entered into the house; and putting his hands on him said, Brother Saul, the Lord, even Jesus, that appeared unto thee in the way as thou camest, hast sent me, that thou mightest receive thy sight, and be filled with the Holy Ghost. And immediately there fell from his eyes as it had been scales: and he received sight forthwith, and arose, and was baptized." (Acts ix, 17, 18.) The gift of the Holy Ghost is not made to the unjustified. I add, as worthy of special attention, Dr. Whedon's notes on these verses: "There fell—Ananias had put his hand upon him (verse 12), Saul received the Holy Ghost (verse 17), and what followed? The regenerate and Spirit-filled Saul burst away the bondage produced upon his external sense. Very probably during the three days the humors had dried upon his eye-balls, and, as the abounding of his spirit quickened the whole man, the the scale-like particles fell from his eyes, thus forming a striking emblem of his renewed spiritual eyesight. . . . The baptism in this case was preceded by faith, justification, regeneration by the Holy Spirit, and even the special bestowment of the Holy Ghost. It follows the

regenerating affusion of the Spirit as the physical picture of a spiritual operation—the water outpouring imaging the Spirit outpouring."

As it is not uncommon for the advocates of baptismal remission to quote the note of John Wesley on Acts xxii, 16, as being in their favor, I will give the note entire for the purpose of making some reflections upon it. It reads thus: "Be baptized and wash away thy sins. Baptism administered to real penitents is both a means and seal of pardon. Nor did God ordinarily in the primitive Church bestow this on any unless through this means." In considering this note, it should be kept in mind constantly that Mr. Wesley was a firm believer of the doctrine of "justification by faith only;" and that this doctrine excludes all idea of baptism as a condition of pardon. Furthermore, in his note just quoted, he does not call baptism a condition of pardon, but a "means." What are we to understand by this word "means?" Let Mr. Wesley explain hmiself: "There are means of grace, that is, outward ordinances whereby the inward grace of God is ordinarily conveyed to man; whereby the faith that brings salvation is conveyed to them who before had it not." (Works, Vol. III, 168.) Hence Mr. Wesley's view is, that baptism, besides being an external and visible seal of pardon, may

also be used by penitent seekers as a means of receiving that faith by which they can be justified. The only point in Mr. Wesley's note which is open to criticism is the statement that, in the primitive Church, God did not ordinarily bestow pardon except through this means. The correctness of this position may be doubted.

Another passage used in behalf of "baptismal remission" is John iii, 5: "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he can not enter into the kingdom of God." In order that the subject may be presented in its clearest light, I will give the text in its connection (verse 3): "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, except a man be born again, he can not see the kingdom of God. 4. Nicodemus saith unto him, How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter the second time into his mother's womb, and be born? 5. Jesus answered, Verily, Verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he can not enter into the kingdom of God. 6. That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the spirit is spirit. 7. Marvel not that I said unto thee, Ye must be born again. 8. The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit."

Since the days of Calvin there has been more or less controversy about the meaning of the phrase "born of water." Calvin departed from the ancient and universal interpretation (that it meant baptism), and interpreted it of the sanctifying, refreshing, and sustaining influences of the Holy Spirit. (See his Inst. Vol. II, p. 515.) This interpretation has been taken up and defended by a number of divines; especially Rice in his debate with Campbell (pp. 448–451), and Dr. Hodge in his Theology. (Vol. III, 591–595.) With all due respect to the learning, ability, and integrity of these men, we feel constrained to dissent from this interpretation, as novel, unsound, and dangerous. We do not question the purity of their motives; on the other hand, we must remember that no truth of God can be sustained by the perversion of some other truth. Dr. Rice urges that Christian baptism is never called a birth. This objection is without force, unless it could be proved that there was something in baptism which forbid it being associated with the new birth. This will hardly be attempted. Dr. Rice urges that if this phrase referred to Christian baptism "Christ could not have blamed Nicodemus for not understanding it, for Christian baptism was not then instituted. But as Christ did reprove Nicodemus for not

understanding it, it follows that it did not refer to baptism." Although Christian baptism was not yet instituted, yet Nicodemus could not be ignorant of the numerous baptisms of the Mosaic ritual (Heb. ix, 10), nor of the baptism of John, nor of that practiced by the disciples of Christ. From these sources he had all the light necessary to an understanding of Christ's words. Nicodemus was not perplexed over Christ's allusion to baptism, but with the spiritual nature of the new birth. It is contended that "water" and its kindred terms are often used to designate the sanctifying influences of the Holy Ghost. But it does not follow that, because they are so used, this phrase "born of water" does not mean water baptism. On the contrary, such a usage in other parts of the Bible would only tend to make it an appropriate term, to designate that cleansing of the body which was emblematic of the spiritual cleansing of the soul. It is in harmony with this that John speaks of baptism with water, and baptism of the Holy Ghost. And that Paul speaks of the "washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost." It is claimed that the phrase "born of water" is of similar import with that of "baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire." This can not be maintained until it can

be shown that "fire" was applied to men by law and usage for the purpose of symbolical cleansing, just as water was. I know of but one instance of "fire" being applied to the body as a symbol of purification, namely, in the case of the prophet. (Isa. vi, 6, 7.)

Here the whole scene was extraordinary and out of God's usual course. And there is no proof of its ever having been made a standing symbol of personal purification; while water was the common symbol of purification, and that by divine appointment. "The kingdom of God" upon earth has its spiritual reality and its external form. The entrance into this spiritual form is through or by the birth of the spirit; the entrance into its external form is by baptism, or the birth of water. Hooker (v, 59, 3,) asserts that for the first fifteen centuries no one ever doubted its application to baptism. (M'Clintock and Strong, Vol. I, p. 643.) Wall, in his "History of Infant Baptism," Vol. II, p. 180, says "all the ancient Christians (without the exception of one man) understood it of baptism."

In this conversation the subject of Christ's discourse was the "new birth," "regeneration," or "change of heart," as essential to the entering of the kingdom of God. The conversation presents the following points: 1. The necessity

of the new birth stated. 2. The failure of Nicodemus to understand. He had been used to speaking of proselytes as being "born again;" but he could not understand in what sense he, a Jew, needed to be born again. 3. Christ answers by setting forth a birth of water as essential to his entering the visible Church, and makes it the symbol of that inward spiritual change needed in order to a man's entering the spiritual kingdom. That the birth of water is connected with the external kingdom, and was not essential to his entering the internal kingdom, is evident from the fact that while the spiritual birth is often referred to in the words "born again," and "born of the spirit" (see verses 3, 5, 6, 7, 8), and insisted upon, the birth of water is never more mentioned. 4. The new birth, or regeneration, is nowhere spoken of as the consequence of water baptism, and that man's impurity is never attributed to his not having been baptized. When Christ compares the impurity of the natural birth with the purity of the other, he does not contrast the natural birth with the birth of water, but with the birth of the spirit. 5. The mystery connected with the new birth (verses 7, 8) proves that it was not baptism. The new birth is hidden, while water baptism by any mode is open and plain.

Another text quoted by advocates of Campbellism is Mark xvi, 16: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, he that believeth not shall be damned." That this text does not teach baptismal remission is evident from several reasons: 1. In the text, faith precedes baptism, and those who believe are justified without waiting for baptism. Proof: "He that believeth is not condemned." (John, iii, 18.) "He that heareth my word, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life." (John v, 24.) These texts admit of no delay between faith and justification; but make them coetaneous. The believer has parted company with his unbelief and condemnation at once, and, casting himself on Christ in faith, enters at once into a state of justification. 2. The text does not threaten damnation to the failure to be baptized, as it does to the failure to believe; a thing that it surely would do if baptism were essential to pardon. It has been said in reply to this, that it was not necessary to say that those who were not baptized should be damned; for if they believed they would be baptized, and if they did not believe their baptism would not avail. But this is putting the issue in a false light. The question is not whether a believer

will or will not be baptized, but whether the pardon of a believing penitent is dependent upon his baptism, as it is upon his faith. If it is, then the unbaptized believer is damned just as certainly as though he were an unbeliever. A believer may, and probably would, be very willing to be baptized, and yet any one of a host of circumstances might put it out of his power to be baptized. His failure to be baptized might be no possible fault of his, and yet if baptism be as essential to his pardon as faith is, then he must die unforgiven; it is needless to say that the text does not teach any such doctrine. There is not a passage in the Word of God which threatens damnation to a failure to be baptized. The honest conclusion from such a condition of things is, that baptism is not a condition of pardon.

Another passage quoted in favor of baptismal remission is 1 Peter, iii, 21—"The like figure whereunto, even baptism, doth also now save us (not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience toward God), by the resurrection of Jesus Christ." That Peter does not mean to teach salvation from sin through the baptism of the body is evident from his explicit statement that it is not by "the putting away the filth of the flesh." These words stand

as an indestructible wall of separation between the doctrine of the apostle and the notion of baptismal remission. The apostle states that in a figure baptism saves us. He guards this by specifically stating that it is not the baptism of the body, "but the answer of a good conscience toward God." Concerning the meaning of these words, "the answer of a good conscience toward God," there has been, and still is, no small controversy. The meaning of them is confessedly obscure. They have been understood as referring to the answer returned by the candidates to questions propounded to them at their baptism, such as "Dost thou renounce the devil and all his works?" But to this view there are two objections: 1st. It is by no means certain that the custom of questioning the candidates for baptism was in vogue in the apostle's day. 2d. Even if such a custom existed in that day, the reference of these words to that custom will not agree with the other portion of the text. Thus, it is by this "answer of a good conscience" that we are saved; but surely we are not saved by the answers made by us at our baptism. The word ἐπερώτημα does not occur elsewhere in the New Testament, and only once in the Septuagint (Dan. iv, 14), where Trommius defines it by *petitio*, petition or prayer. This sense would well

suit the context. Define ἐπερώτημα by petition or prayer, and the text would read, "The like figure whereunto even baptism doth also now save us (not the putting away the filth of the flesh, but the prayer of a good conscience toward God) by the resurrection of Jesus Christ." (See M'Clintock and Strong's Cyclopædia, Vol. I, page 244, and Calvin's Institutes, Book 3, Chap. 19, Sec. 15.) This accords with the declaration of both prophet and apostle, "Whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved." It is in harmony with the instruction given by Ananias to Paul at his baptism, "to wash away his sins, calling on the name of the Lord." Prayer, then, and not the baptism of the flesh, was the means of salvation set forth by Peter.

Titus iii, 5: "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration and the renewing of the Holy Ghost." This text is quoted in support of the dogma of baptismal remission. The phrase, "washing of regeneration," is figurative, and is borrowed from the custom of washing the new-born infant. As this washing could not precede the birth but must follow it, so baptism is not an antecedent of the new birth, but follows it. In the text our salvation is denied being the consequence of any work of

ours;—"not by works of righteousness which we have done." But baptism of the body (in whatever form it may be administered) is a work of ours, hence can not be the condition of our salvation. It is sometimes attempted to evade this by saying that in baptism we are passive, and that the work belongs to the administrator. To this it is a sufficient reply, that while our bodies are the passive recipients in the mere mechanical act of baptism, still, the question whether we will be baptized or not is settled by an act of our own will, and in that sense our baptism is a "work of righteousness which we have done," and as such the apostle denies that it saves us. Being baptized is an act of obedience on our part, while our being regenerated is not our act, but the work of the Holy Spirit.

I will close this argument by a quotation from the notes of Albert Barnes on this text, which, though lengthy, will amply repay an attentive reading:

"'*By the washing of regeneration.*' In order to a correct understanding of this important passage, it is necessary to ascertain whether the phrase here used refers to baptism, and whether any thing different is intended by it from what is meant by the succeeding phrase, 'renewing of the Holy Ghost.' The word rendered washing

(*λουτρὸν—loutron*) occurs in the New Testament only in this place and in Eph. v, 26, where also it is rendered washing—'That he might sanctify and cleanse it [the Church] with the washing of water by the word.' The word properly means a bath; then water for bathing; then the act of bathing, washing, ablution. (Passow and Robinson.) It is used by Homer to denote a warm or cold bath, then a washing away, and is thus applied to the drink-offerings in sacrifice which were supposed to purify or wash away sin. (Passow.) The word here does not mean laver, or the vessel for washing in, which would be expressed by *λουτῆρ—louter*, and this word can not be properly applied to the baptismal font. The word in itself would naturally be understood as referring to baptism (comp. Notes on Acts xxii, 16), which was regarded as the emblem of washing away sins, or of cleansing from them. I say it was the emblem, not the means, of purifying the soul from sin. If this be the allusion—and it seems probable—then the phrase 'washing of regeneration' would mean 'that outward washing or baptism which is the emblem of regeneration,' and which is appointed as one of the ordinances connected with salvation. See Notes, Mark xvi, 16, 'He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved.' It is not affirmed in this phrase that

baptism is the means of regeneration, or that grace is necessarily conveyed by it, and still less that baptism is regeneration, for no one of these is a necessary interpretation of the passage, and should not be assumed to be the true one. The full force of the language will be met by the supposition that it means that baptism is the emblem or symbol of regeneration, and if this is the case, no one has a right to assume that the other is certainly the meaning. And that this is the meaning is further clear because it is nowhere taught in the New Testament that baptism is regeneration, or that it is the means of regeneration. The word rendered regeneration (*παλίγγενεσία*—*palingenesia*) occurs in the New Testament only here and in Matt. xix, 28—'In the regeneration when the Son of man,' etc. It means, properly, a new birth, reproduction, or renewal. It would properly be applied to one who should be begotten again in this sense, that a new life was commenced in him in some way corresponding to his being made to live at first. To the proper idea of the word, it is essential that there should be connected the notion of the commencement of life in the man, so that he may be said to live anew; and as religion is in the Scriptures represented as life, it is properly applied to the beginning of that kind of life by which man may be

said to live anew. This word, occurring only here and in Matt. xix, 28, and there indubitably not referring to baptism, should not be here understood as referring to that, or be applied to that, for (1) that is not the proper meaning of the word; (2) there is no Scripture usage to sanction it; (3) the connection here does not demand it; (4) the correlatives of the word (see John iii, 3, 5, 6, 8; 1 Peter i, 3) are applied only to that great moral change which is produced by the Holy Ghost; and (5) it is a dangerous use of the word. Its use in this sense leaves the impression that the only change needful for man is that which is produced by being regularly baptized. On almost no point has so much injury been done in the Church as by the application of the word regeneration to baptism. It affects the beginning of religion in the soul, and if a mistake is made there it is one which must pervade all the views of piety.

"'*And renewing of the Holy Ghost.*' This is an important clause, added by Paul apparently to save from the possibility of falling into error. If the former expression, 'the washing of regeneration,' had been left to stand by itself, it might have been supposed, possibly, that all the regeneration which would be needed would be that which would accompany baptism. But he

avoids the possibility of this error by saying that the 'renewing of the Holy Ghost' is an indispensable part of that by which we are saved. It is necessary that this should exist in addition to that which is the mere emblem of it—the washing of regeneration—for without this the former would be unmeaning and unavailing. It is important to observe that the apostle by no means says that this always follows from the former, nor does he affirm that it ever follows from it, whatever may be the truth on that point, but he asserts that this is that on which our salvation depends."

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOGMA OF BAPTISMAL REMISSION.

I will close this review of the dogma of baptismal remission by presenting some objections:

1. If baptism is a condition of pardon, then the apostles never received the remission of their sins. Offensive as this thought is, nevertheless it is unavoidable if the notion of baptismal remission be true. According to Campbellism there was no Christian Church before Pentecost. The advocates of the system are divided among themselves on the question whether there was any Church of any kind before Pentecost. But they are a unit in asserting

that the Jewish institution (as they call it) was utterly dissimilar to, and distinct from, the Christian Church. On this theory, such a thing as Christian baptism before Pentecost was utterly impossible. The case stands thus: According to the system, John's baptism brought no man to Christ, or into his Church. Christ did not administer water baptism to his apostles. "Though Jesus himself baptized not, but his disciples." (John iv, 2.) The apostles (Paul excepted) never received water baptism, neither before or after Pentecost. Hence, if Campbellism be true, the apostles never received the remission of sins. A doctrine necessitating such a conclusion can not be true.

2. Another objection to this dogma is founded on 1 Cor. i, 13–15: "Is Christ divided? was Paul crucified for you? or were ye baptized in the name of Paul? I thank God that I baptized none of you, but Crispus and Gaius; lest any should say that I had baptized in mine own name." It is cheerfully acknowledged that when Paul wrote these words he was not discussing the design of baptism, nor the condition of pardon; but was endeavoring to correct the disposition or tendency to division, which existed in the Corinthian Church. The bearing of these words upon the question at issue is not direct but inci-

dental, nevertheless it is strong. It is not possible that the apostle could have rejoiced and have given thanks that he had not administered to them an ordinance which was a condition of pardon, or which was essential to the obtaining of pardon; but he does give thanks that he had not baptized them; hence, baptism could not have been a condition of pardon. No thoughts concerning men ever filled the apostle's heart so completely, or so constantly, as those of the necessity of their reconciliation with God and the means by which this was to be accomplished. He said of himself and fellow apostles, "we are embassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us; we pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God." (2 Cor. v, 20.) He made himself all things to all men, and became the servant of all in the single hope that he might save some. (1 Cor. ix, 19–22.) It was his constant effort that he might please all men, in all things, that they might be saved. (1 Cor. x, 33.) His heart's desire and prayer to God for Israel was, that they might be saved. The thought of man's enmity to God, made him weep (Phil. iii, 18); and so intense was his desire for their salvation, that if it was necessary in order to its accomplishment, he was willing to suffer under the curse as Christ did. Nor was

this a mere temporary excitement with the apostle. From the hour of his conversion until that of his glorious martyrdom, the salvation of souls was with him a ruling passion. Can it be possible that an apostle governed by such thoughts during the whole of his Christian life could have thanked God that he had not administered to men an ordinance, the reception of which by them was necessary in order to their salvation? In order to place this still more certainly in its proper light, let us substitute either repentance or faith, in the place of baptism, in the apostle's language, and mark the effect. Repentance and faith are both recognized as necessary in order to pardon. Now could we conceive of a Christian apostle as thanking God that he had never led any person to repentance, or to faith? Such a thought is wholly inadmissible. Why? Because these things are necessary in order to the salvation of the sinner; and it is the sole work of such an apostle to do any thing and every thing that is necessary in order to lead men to Christ. But the apostle did thank God that he did not baptize these Corinthians (save the few named), and the conclusion is irresistible that baptism is not necessary in order to pardon.

3. A third objection to the theory of baptismal remission is found in the fact that it intro-

duces confusion in the operation of the plan of redemption. According to the theory, faith purifies the heart, repentance reforms the life, and baptism procures the pardon of sin. Now, thousands of persons repent of their sins, and believe in Christ, but die without the privilege of being baptized. Dying in this condition what becomes of them? With purified hearts, and reformed lives, are they sent to hell? Hell is no place for pure hearts. Christ says pure hearts "shall see God." Are they admitted to heaven condemned and unpardoned? This can not be. Neither the Bible nor the system of Campbellism makes any provision for the pardon of their sins after death; hence (if the dogma of baptismal remission be true), the plan of redemption is involved in hopeless confusion. "God is not the author of confusion," and a system so pregnant with confusion can not be the work of God.

4. A fourth objection to the notion of baptismal remission is found in the fact that it demands a condition of pardon, with which a large host of believing penitents can not possibly comply. Thousands die yearly, on the ocean, on desert plains, in hospitals, in jails and prisons, and on the field of battle, where either (often both) the water or the administrator is not to be had. If baptism be a condition of pardon,

then all such persons must be lost, no matter how genuine their repentance, or how strong their faith. It can not be possible that God has made a condition of salvation which would render the salvation of so many utterly impossible. In Heb. vii, 25, Jesus is said to be "able also to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him." This passage teaches the ability and willingness of Jesus to save with a perfect salvation all who come to God by him, and this at any time, at any place, and under any circumstances. This text preaches the Gospel of a full salvation to dying sinners in any and every emergency of time, place, or condition. It is salvation to each and every one who will plead the name of Jesus with God for mercy. But such glorious offers could not be true if salvation was dependent upon baptism by human hands. A dogma which contravenes such important and blessed promises of the Gospel can not be true.

5. A fifth objection to the dogma of baptismal remission is found in the fact that it makes the salvation of the soul dependent upon the will of man, and thus subverts the foundations of both civil and religious liberty. If my pardon is conditional upon my baptism with water, then it is also dependent upon the will of the human administrator; for without his consent I can not

have baptism, hence can not have pardon. But God has not put my salvation at the disposal of any human agency. Our birth into the kingdom is "not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." (John i, 13.) Now, as our water baptism is indisputably dependent upon the will of man, it can not be a condition of our salvation, for that is wholly independent of any will but that of God and ourselves.

VI.

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF "JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY."

HAVING examined and rejected the notion of baptismal justification, let us now turn our attention to the proposition that "faith is the only condition of justification." But before entering on the examination of the direct proof of this doctrine we will spend some time in answering various objections that are made to it.

1. I will state an objection as it is quoted by Dwight: "Faith is so far from being of a moral nature as to be necessary and unavoidable, man being absolutely passive in believing, and under a physical impossibility of doing otherwise than he actually does, whether in believing or disbelieving. Of course, an attribute governed wholly by physical necessity can never recommend us to God, much less become the ground of so important a blessing as justification." (Theol., Vol. II, p. 312.) In answer to this objection we submit the following thoughts:

The Bible demands our faith in two particu-

lars. First, it demands that we believe the testimony of God concerning the plan of salvation; second, it demands that we trust in Christ as our personal Savior. Let us examine each of these separately.

First. It demands that we believe the testimony of God concerning the plan of salvation. Now, it is cheerfully admitted that when the truth of a proposition is clearly presented to the mind the mind can not do otherwise than assent to it. Thus, when it is proven to the mind that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles, the mind can not do otherwise than assent to it. In the same manner, when an object is so placed within the range of vision that an image of it falls upon the retina, a person can not help seeing it. Still, it does not follow from either of these truths that a man is entirely passive in regard to what he sees or believes. A student is told to turn his eyes in a certain direction and he will see a book; now, if he turn his eyes so that the image of the book comes in contact with the retina, he can not help seeing the book; but if he closes his eyes, or refuses to turn them in the proper direction, then he can not see the book. It must be evident in either case that the student is not a mere passive subject. If he sees the book it is because he chose to look in the direc-

tion prescribed; his eye was a passive recipient of the reflected image, but he was a free and active agent in the act of turning his eye toward the book. If he did not see it it was because he chose to do otherwise than he was directed to. It is the same with the mind concerning the belief of a proposition or doctrine. Thus, the attention of a pupil is directed to the proof of the proposition that $\sqrt[3]{64}=4$. If he attend to the elaboration of the proof he can not help believing the proposition. If he does not attend to the proof he may be left in doubt concerning the truth of the proposition. In this case, while the mind of the pupil may be a passive recipient of the proof and of the conviction which follows, it nevertheless is free and active in attending, or refusing to attend, to the proof of the proposition, and his failure to believe the proposition would be reprehensible. The truths of revelation, along with the evidences of their credibility, are spread before men, and they are urgently invited to examine them. An impartial examination of them can not fail of resulting in deep conviction of their credibility. But men fail to examine, hence fail to believe, and their failure to believe is censurable. Mark the fact, their failure to believe arises, not from the insufficiency of evidence, but from their inattention to the

evidence existing. The examination of this objection has proceeded so far upon the supposition that the belief or unbelief of the person was a purely mental process, entirely disconnected with either inclinations or prejudices; but this will not hold good in the question of the belief or unbelief of the Bible. In the cases before alluded to, the existence of the book, or the fact that the $\sqrt[3]{64}=4$, would not be likely to affect the peace or happiness of the student. But if he was credibly assured that when it was proven to him that 4 was the cube root of 64 he would suffer some great misfortune, he would likely be very unwilling to enter into or attend to the examination of the proof. Concerning the belief of men in the Bible, if the Bible be true, then all men stand condemned. It convicts them of wrong and they deserve to die. They are holding their lives at the mere mercy of God. They can have no hopes for the future without being pardoned and purified. These propositions are not acceptable to unconverted men, and they are not inclined to investigate their truth. They feel that if the Bible is true, then they are wrong, and their future is dark. Under the influence of this feeling men do not investigate the truthfulness of the Bible; they do not wish to believe it; they would rather that it was not true; their want of

faith in it is governed by their inclination and will, and their unbelief is a just cause of punishment.

This becomes plainer when we come to consider the second particular in which the Bible demands our faith, namely, our trust in Christ as our personal Savior. Men do not wish to be convinced that Christ is their only Savior. They feel that the sinlessness of his life is a reproach to them. They do not wish to contrast their impurity with his purity. They are not willing to submit themselves to him as their sovereign ruler. They are humiliated by the thought that they are dependent upon him for the pardon of their sins. Their unbelief concerning Christ is not a mental impossibility for the want of evidence, but a voluntary rejection of him because of hatred, and is a just ground for their punishment.

The fact that man is a voluntary agent in the work of believing does not conflict with the proposition that in the work of believing he needs and receives divine aid; this will be discussed hereafter.

2. A second objection I quote from Alexander Campbell: "In examining the New Testament we find that a man is said to be 'Justified by faith' (Rom. v, 1; Gal. ii, 16; iii, 24); 'Jus-

tified freely by his grace' (Rom. iii, 24; Titus iii, 7);' 'Justified by his blood' (Rom. v, 9); 'Justified by works' (James ii, 21, 24, 25); 'Justified in or by the name of the Lord Jesus' (1 Cor. vi, 11); 'Justified by Christ' (Gal. ii, 16); 'Justified by knowledge' (Isa. liii, 11); 'It is God that justifies' (Rom. iii, 33); namely, by these seven means, by Christ, his name, his blood, by knowledge, grace, faith, and by works. Are these all literal? Is there no room for interpretation here? He that selects faith out of the seven must either act arbitrarily or show his reason; but the reason does not appear in the text. He must reason it out; he must infer it. Why then assume that faith alone is the reason of our justification?" (Christian System, p. 247.)

In the proposition that "faith is the only condition of justification," there is no reference to any part that God has to do in our justification, the reference is wholly to the condition to be complied with on the part of man; hence any reference to texts referring to God's share in our justification is wholly foreign to the question. Of the seven causes of our justification quoted by Campbell from the New Testament, one, faith, is the condition insisted upon by the orthodox Churches as the only condition, hence needs no notice at present. Another cause, "works"

(James ii, 24), will be made the subject of special consideration. The remaining five causes all refer to the part which God takes in our justification, and are therefore foreign to the point in debate. Thus: "Justified freely by his grace." Reference is here made to the grace of God as the originating cause of our justification, and it has no reference to any condition on our part whatever. Again, the "blood" refers to no condition on our part but to the blood or sufferings of Christ as the instrumental cause. The "knowledge" is Christ's own personal knowledge fitting him for the work of redemption, and as such has no reference to the condition to be complied with by us. "The name of the Lord Jesus" is the authoritative cause of our pardon, but expresses no obligation of ours. "Justified by Christ" points to no duty of ours, but points to Christ as the author of our forgiveness. Campbell strenuously contends that baptism is a condition of justification; but is it not significant that baptism is not mentioned as one of the conditions of justification, he himself being judge?

3. It is objected that the doctrine of justification by faith only cuts off or separates from faith all the virtues or graces of repentance and obedience, and encourages men to hope for

pardon on the condition of faith alone, without any reference to either repentance or obedience. This objection is answered by Wesley: "It would be so if we spake, as some do, of a faith which was separate from these: but we speak of a faith which is not so, but necessarily productive of all good works, and all holiness."

"The proper answer to the objection that justification by faith alone leads to licentiousness, is that 'though we are justified by faith alone,' the faith by which we are justified is not alone in the heart which exercises it. In receiving Christ, as the writers of the Reformation often say, 'faith is *sola*, yet not *solitaria*.' It is not the trust of a man asleep and secure, but the trust of one awakened and aware of the peril of eternal death as the wages of sin; it is not the trust of a man ignorant of the spiritual meaning of God's holy law, but of one who is convinced and 'slain' by it; not the trust of an impenitent, but of a penitent man; the trust of one, in a word, who feels, through the convincing power of the Word and Spirit of God, that he is justly exposed to wrath, and in whom this conviction produced a genuine sorrow for sin, and an intense and supreme desire to be delivered from its penalty and dominion." The truthfulness of this answer will be more apparent when we come to consider the nature of

the faith which justifies. If justifying faith should be found to be not merely the simple belief of testimony, but, on the contrary, a penitent and affectionate trust in Christ, and attended by humility, hatred of sin, and a desire of purity, then this objection falls to the ground." (See Nature of Justifying Faith.

I will close this answer with the following extract from the "Homilies of the Church of England," pages 19 and 21: "And therefore St. Paul declareth here nothing upon the behalf of man concerning his justification but only a true and lively faith, which, nevertheless, is the gift of God, and not man's only work without God. And yet, that faith doth not shut out repentance, hope, love, dread, and the fear of God, to be joined with faith in every man that is justified, but it shutteth them out from the office of justifying; so that, although they be all present in him that is justified, yet they justify not altogether."

Another objection to the doctrine of "justification by faith only" is founded upon the statement of James that "a man is justified by works and not by faith only." In order that the reader may have the case fairly before him, I will quote the whole of the passage upon which the objection is founded. It is found in James ii,

17–24: "Even so faith, if it hath not works, is dead, being alone. Yea, a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works: shew me thy faith without thy works, and I will shew thee my faith by my works. Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well: the devils also believe, and tremble. But wilt thou know, O vain man, that faith without works is dead? Was not Abraham our father justified by works, when he had offered Isaac his son upon the altar? Seest thou how faith wrought with his works, and by works was faith made perfect? And the Scripture was fulfilled which saith, Abraham believed God, and it was imputed unto him for righteousness: and he was called the Friend of God. Ye see then how that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only."

In answer to this objection we submit the suggestion, that even if it were impossible to harmonize the text with the doctrine of justification by faith as taught by Paul, still we would not be warranted in rejecting that doctrine because of the text. We call attention to the following canon of interpretation: "A passage in which a doctrine is slightly treated must be explained by one where the subject is more largely discussed; and one single passage is not to be explained in contradiction to many others, but consistently

with them." (Horne's Introduction, Vol. I, p. 407.) The same canon, substantially, is given by Dr. Angus in his "Bible Hand-book," p. 204. Paul, in his Epistles to the Romans and Galatians, discusses the question of justification at length, and unanswerably proves that faith is its only condition. James makes but an incidental reference to it; hence we are not to interpret Paul by James, but *vice versa*, we must interpret James by Paul. The single declaration of James that "by works a man is justified, and not by faith only," must not be allowed to set aside the oft repeated declarations of Paul, to wit, that "by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified;" "We are justified freely by his grace;" that God is the "justifier of him which believeth in Jesus;" "That a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law;" that "Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness;" that "to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness;" that justification "is of faith, that it might be by grace;" that "being justified by faith we have peace with God;" "Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and

not by the works of the law; for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified;" "But that no man is justified by the law in the sight of God it is evident, for the just shall live by faith;" "But the Scripture hath concluded all under sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe." (Rom. iii, 20, 24, 26, 28; iv, 3, 5, 16; v, 1; Gal. ii, 16; iii, 11, 22.) It is cheerfully granted that James and Paul are both inspired apostles, of coequal authority, and on this very ground we submit it that the solitary text in James can not cancel this overwhelming testimony of Paul to the fact that we are justified by faith.

But we are not under the necessity of ignoring the statement of either apostle. James and Paul do not conflict with each other in the slightest degree. On an impartial examination of the text in James, it will be found to harmonize freely and fully with the doctrine of justification by faith only as taught by Paul. In order to point out the perfection of this harmony, we call attention to the following particulars:

1. "The two apostles do not engage in the same argument, and for this reason, that they are not addressing themselves to persons in the same circumstances. St. Paul addresses the unbelieving Jews, who sought justification by obedience

to the law of Moses, moral and ceremonial; proves that all men are guilty, and that neither Jew nor Gentile can be justified by works of obedience to any law, and that therefore justification must be by faith alone. On the other hand, St. James, having to do in his Epistle with such as professed the Christian faith and justification by it, but erring dangerously about the nature of faith, affirming that faith, in the sense of opinion or mere belief of doctrine, would save them though they should remain destitute of a real change in the moral frame and constitution of their minds, and give no evidence of this in a holy life, it became necessary for him to plead the renovation of man's nature and evangelical obedience as the necessary fruits of real or living faith. The question discussed by St. Paul is whether works would justify; that by St. James is whether a dead faith—the mere faith of assent—would save." (Watson.)

2. James speaks of the justification of Abraham by the offering of Isaac. This is a totally different matter from that justification of Abraham in which his faith was imputed to him for righteousness, and upon which Paul builds his argument in proof of justification by faith only. The two justifications, different from each other both in substance and meaning, were also nearly

thirty years apart in time. As the apostles were writing about subjects so widely different from each other, it seems impossible for them to contradict each other.

3. The two apostles do not use the word "faith" in the same sense. The Pauline doctrine of the faith which justifies is, that it is not a simple decision of the intellect, but it is the work of the heart. (Rom. x, 10.) It is also "the fruit of the Spirit" (Gal. v, 22); it is not a mere idle notion, but it is a working force (1 Thess. i, 3; 2 Thess. i, 11); it works by love (Gal. v, 6); it is a hearty trust in Christ as a personal Savior (Acts xvi, 31); by it "Christ dwells in the heart" (Eph. iii, 17); in the words of Peter, accepted by Paul, it purifies the heart (Acts xv, 9–12); it fills the heart with "all joy and peace" (Rom. xv, 13); it is imputed to us by God for righteousness (Rom. iv, 3–12); it obtains the "seal," or "witness," of the Spirit (Eph. i, 13). In broad contrast with this is the faith spoken of by James when he says that "by works a man is justified, and not by faith only." James speaks of this "faith" as being "without works" (verse 18), as being "dead" (verses 17, 20, 26), and as being down on an equality with the faith of demons (verse 19). He distinguises very clearly between the faith which "is dead" and which does not

justify, and the faith which does justify. In broad contrast with this dead, inoperative faith, he introduces the faith of Abraham, which was not without works, but which produced resignation and obedience to the divine will as its fruits.

The two apostles do not use the word "justify" in the same sense. "The justification of which St. Paul treats, and which he says is 'not of works' but 'by faith,' is the forgiveness of sins granted to 'the ungodly' who, as yet, worketh not any thing acceptable to God, and who therefore can not, in any sense or degree, be justified by works. But that of which St. James treats, and which he says is 'not by faith only' but 'by works also,' is, as we have seen, subsequent to the forgiveness of sins, and implies not the pardoning of a sinner, but the approval of a faithful servant of God in a day of severe trial." (Hare.) James speaks of Abraham being justified by the offering of Isaac; but Abraham was justified (pardoned) long before this time. Before Isaac was born, it is said in Gen. xv, 6, that Abraham "believed in the Lord, and he counted it to him for righteousness." Here we have Abraham's faith, God's acceptance of it, and Abraham's justification. After a lapse of thirty years God commanded Abraham to offer up Isaac as a sacrifice, and Abraham's ready compliance with the

command "justified" him in his profession of righteousness.

It proved or demonstrated him to be righteous. There are two or three other instances in Scripture, in which the word "justify" is used in this sense. Thus, in Isa. xliii, 9: "Let them bring forth their witnesses, that they may be justified." That is, let them prove their righteousness by witnesses. Matt. xi, 19: "But wisdom is justified of her children." Wisdom is here personified, and her claims to excellence are proven true and right by the conduct of her children. 1 Tim. iii, 16: "Justified in the Spirit." This is spoken of Christ. When he was upon earth he promised to send the Holy Spirit to convince the world, etc. (John xv, 26, xvi, 7–11; Acts i, 4, 5, 8.) In making this promise, Christ claims the authority and power of the supreme God; for no being but God could speak in this manner of his relation to the Holy Spirit. When the Holy Spirit came in its convicting and sanctifying power at Pentecost and since, it justified Christ, or demonstrated him to be righteous in claiming the power to send it. In the same sense, Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac in obedience to the divine command justified him, or demonstrated his righteousness.

"The works by which St. Paul maintains that

a man is not justified are the faithless works of an unbeliever, who, not submitting to the righteousness of God, goes about to establish his own righteousness. But the works by which St. James insists that a man is, in his sense, justified, are the works which spring from that faith by which he is previously, in St. Paul's sense, justified. 'I will show thee my faith,' says he, by my works.' (James ii, 18.) And having introduced the case of Abraham, he adds, "Seest thou how faith wrought with his works, and by works was faith (which he already possessed, 'made perfect,' James ii, 22." (Hare.)

Although James makes only an incidental reference to the forgiveness of Abraham, that reference proves his forgiveness to have been by faith only. As has already been pointed out, the purpose of James was to show that a mere dead faith could not save men: and that the faith which was imputed to us for righteousness was one productive of good works. He does this by first pointing out the barren nature of a "dead" faith. (Verses 14–17, 19, 20, 26.) In contrast with this, he sets forth the fruitful nature of the faith of Abraham. It was necessary for James to prove: 1. That Abraham had faith. 2. That his faith was acceptable to God, and that because of it Abraham was justified. 3.

That Abraham's faith was not "dead" or "idle," but bore evidence of its vitality in a life of resignation and obedience. That he gave special evidence of its power in his willingness to offer up Isaac. 4. That Abraham's offering Isaac "justified" him, or proved that his profession of faith in the Lord was a righteous profession. From the foregoing analysis of the subject, it becomes evident that the argument of James rests upon two pillars: 1. That Abraham's faith was accepted by God, and because of it he was justified or forgiven. 2. That Abraham proved the character of his faith by his works. Now it is evident that if we take away from this argument of James the proof that Abraham's faith procured the forgiveness of his sins, then the whole argument falls to the ground. This point is vital to the apostle's argument; and he proves it by quoting Gen. xv, 6, from the Septuagint, "Abraham believed God, and it was imputed unto him for righteousness." (Verse 23.) So that instead of James contradicting the doctrine of "Justification by faith only," he establishes it by evidence which can not be gainsaid, or refuted. At the same time, by his criticism on the nature of faith, he effectually guards it against all antinomian and licentious perversion. This also proves the harmony of Paul and James.

To the notion of justification by works, Dr. Ralston makes the following plain and forcible answer. "As justification means pardon, then, as the Scriptures declare, 'God justifieth the ungodly,' for none others can need pardon. Hence, we must be pardoned before we become righteous by personal obedience or inherent holiness; therefore, we can not be justified by those works of obedience which none but the righteous can perform. This would be to require us to do, in order to justification, what can only be done by such as are already justified, which is absurd.

If we are justified by works at all, these works must either embrace perfect obedience to the law of God, or they must not; if they do, then the law can demand no more, and we have no need for the death of Christ; if they do not, then we can not be justified by them; for the law saith, 'Cursed is every one who continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them.'

"If we are justified by faith and works taken together, then these works must be either performed before or after justification. If they are performed before justification, then they must be performed while we are in unbelief, 'for all that believe are justified;' and if in unbelief, they must be sinful, for 'whatsoever is not of faith is

sin,' and if so, it would follow that we are justified by sin, which is absurd."

Another objection to the doctrine of justification by faith only is founded on those Scriptures which represent repentance as being necessary in order to justification; namely, "Repent and be baptized . . . for the remission of sins;" "Repent ye therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out." (Acts ii, 38; iii, 19.) It is urged that these texts, and others of similar import, make repentance essential to justification; hence justification can not be by faith only. To this objection I submit an answer in the following propositions:

1. Repentance does not justify unless it produces fruit—"bring forth therefore fruits meet for repentance." (Matt. iii, 18.) If the repentance of these men was sufficient for their pardon without "fruits," then John was asking for something superfluous; if their repentance without fruit was not sufficient, then the fruit was necessary.

2. The fruit of repentance which causes it to justify is faith. The followers of Mr. Campbell are strenuous in their assertion that faith must precede repentance; but this is not the Biblical order. It is cheerfully conceded that some belief in the existence of God and in the plan of salva-

tion generally, perhaps always, precedes repentance; still, the faith which unites the soul to Christ and secures its justification is the "fruit" of repentance. Justifying faith is the hearty trust of the soul in Christ, and can not possibly exist previous to the person having repented of his sins. The Bible invariably represents faith as flowing from repentance. Witness the following texts: "Ye, when ye had seen it, repented not afterward, that ye might believe him." (Matt. xxi, 32.) Here faith is conditioned on a prevening repentance. "Repent ye, and believe the Gospel;" "John verily baptized with the baptism of repentance, saying unto the people that they should believe on him which should come after;" "Repentance toward God and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ;" "Repentance from dead works, and faith toward God." It is scarcely conceivable that the Bible would observe so closely this order in the statement of repentance and faith unless repentance was necessary in order to faith, and hence, in the nature of things, must precede it. And it is only as necessary to the existence of faith that repentance is necessary to justification. I subjoin the following from Mr. Wesley:

"Though it be allowed that both this repentance and its fruits are necessary to full salvation,

yet they are not necessary either in the same sense with faith or in the same degree. Not in the same degree, for these fruits are necessarily conditional, if there be time and opportunity for them, otherwise a man may be sanctified without them; but he can not be sanctified without faith. Likewise, let a man have ever so much of this repentance, or ever so many good works, yet all this does not at all avail, he is not sanctified till he believes; but the moment he believes, with or without these fruits, yea, with more or less of this repentance, he is sanctified. Not in the same sense, for this repentance and these fruits are only remotely necessary—necessary in order to the continuance of his faith as well as the increase of it—whereas faith is immediately and directly necessary to sanctification. It remains that faith is the only condition which is immediately and proximately necessary to sanctification." (Sermons, Vol. I, p. 390.) The points made in this quotation from Wesley concerning the relation of repentance and faith to sanctification will apply with full force to their relation to justification, which precedes sanctification in the order of events.

VII.

ARGUMENTS IN PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE OF "JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY."

1. FAITH is the only possible condition of recovery from the fall caused by the unbelief of Eve. God said to Adam, concerning "the tree of the knowledge of good and evil," "in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." In direct contradiction of this, the serpent said, "Ye shall not surely die." Had Eve maintained her confidence and trust in God, she would not have heeded the falsehoods of the devil. Had she kept her faith in God, she would not have eaten of the forbidden fruit. Her first act of disobedience was clearly the result of her unbelief. "Here sin began; namely, unbelief. 'The woman was deceived,' says the apostle. She believed a lie: she gave more credit to the word of the devil than to the word of God. And unbelief brought forth actual sin." (Wesley's Works, Vol II, 32.) "Did not Eve stand in Paradise so long as she forbore eating of the forbidden fruit? Did she not forbear eating so

long as she believed the truth, that is, so long as she believed she should die if she ate of that fruit? Would she have sinned if she had not first believed a lie, yea, swallowed down a cluster of lies? 'That she should not die; the fruit was as good as it was fair; it was to be desired to make one wise; she would be as God,' etc.; were not these untruths, freely entertained in her heart, the causes of her committing the direful deed?" (Fletcher's Works, Vol. I, 545.) Eve fell through unbelief; and unbelief is to-day the cause of sin. It is impossible that there should be any reconciliation with God, until unbelief is gone, and the soul has faith in God. This disbelief of God brings man into a state of condemnation. "He that believeth not shall be damned." "He that believeth not God hath made him a liar." A general principle, applicable to the conduct of men toward God in all ages. "He that believeth not is condemned already." (Mark xvi, 16; 1 John v, 10; John iii, 18.) Now the opposite of condemnation is justification; the opposite of unbelief is faith; hence, if unbelief brought man into condemnation, faith is the appropriate means of removing that condemnation, and of securing his justification. Unbelief is sin and merits death; on the other hand, faith is not a virtue or excellence which merits

eternal life. But as unbelief separated between man and God, and thus shut man off from the fountain of life; so, God has graciously appointed faith in Christ as the bond which shall reunite man to God, and thus restore man to life. It is idle to talk about reconciling man to God, so long as he has no faith in God. On the other hand, the moment man regains his faith in God, that moment he and God are reconciled, he is at peace with God, and the divine love is shed abroad in his heart. "He that believeth on him is not condemned;" "he hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life." (John iii, 18; v, 24.) Mark the fact, these texts promise man a freedom from condemnation the moment he believes in God. Their language is explicit. The believer "is not condemned," but "hath passed from death unto life." In order to evade the force of this decisive testimony, it has been objected that believers do not have eternal life in possession, but only in anticipation. The objection is based upon a misinterpretation of two texts: Rom. ii, 7, and Matt. xxv, 46, where believers are exhorted to seek for "eternal life," and at the day of judgment are said to "go away into eternal life." But it is useless to quote texts which promise eternal life to the be-

liever in the future. The promise of life in the future can not neutralize the equally positive promise of a present possession. Christ has affirmed that the believer "hath eternal life." Furthermore, the eternal life into which the believer enters at the judgment day is the perfection of that eternal life which begins with him the moment he believes on Christ. The instant a penitent believes in Christ the sense of condemnation is taken away, God's love is shed abroad in his heart, his heart is purified, he has peace with God. All these things are the work of the Spirit in the heart, they are the "earnest of the Spirit." Eternal life on earth is the rising of the Sun of righteousness in the heart; eternal life in heaven is the light and blessedness of the Sun of righteousness in its meridian glory. But Campbell answers his own objection (although in doing so, he contradicts himself), Christian System, p. 186. "While Christians are taught to expect and hope for a future salvation—a salvation from the power of death and the grave, a salvation to be revealed in the last time—they receive the first fruit of the Spirit, the salvation of the soul from guilt, pollution, and the dominion of sin, and come under the dominion of righteousness, peace, and joy." I add another extract from page 185: "And here

it ought to be clearly and distinctly stated that there is a *present* and a *future* salvation, of which all Christians are to be partakers. The former is properly the *salvation of the soul*, and the latter is the *salvation of the body*, at the resurrection of the just. There are few professing Christianity, perhaps none, who do not expect a future salvation—the glory of salvation to be revealed in us at the last time. Peter, who uses this expression in the beginning of his first epistle, and who invites the saints to look forward to the salvation yet future, in the same connection reminds them that they have *now* received the salvation of the soul."

It is sometimes objected that something more than faith is required, in order to justification, and the case of certain Jews is cited (John xii, 42) who believed on Christ, but did not confess him, hence could not be justified. The case cited is not apposite to the argument. In the forty-third verse, these persons are said to have "loved the praise of men more than the praise of God." This conclusively shows that the faith of these persons belonged to the intellect alone, and did not come from the heart. It was not the fruit of repentance, hence did not entitle the owner to pass from death unto life, as all personal faith in Christ does.

2. The depravity of man renders any condition of justification other than faith impossible. "Now we know that what thing soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law: that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God. Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight: for by the law is the knowledge of sin. But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets; even the righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe; for there is no difference: for all have sinned and come short of the glory of God." (Rom. iii, 19–23.) From this passage the following points are legitimately deduced: 1. Every man is guilty, condemned, and left without excuse before God. 2. Past disobedience and present depravity effectually prevent him being justified by deeds of moral law. 3. In this extremity God displays a way of pardon. 4. This pardon or justification is to all who believe in Jesus Christ. The testimony of the 22d verse is explicit. In this passage justification is denied to every thing except faith, and it is expressly promised to faith, hence it is by faith only. Campbellites sometimes try to show that justification by faith is not

incompatible with the idea of justification by works. To do this they quote John vi, 27–29, where Christ speaks of faith as a "work." The whole force of this objection lies in the equivocal meaning they put on the term "work." In the theological proposition that "works are not a condition of justification," the term "works" is used to designate moral duties or external actions as conditions of justification, whereas in the text, as spoken by Christ, the term "work" does not designate any external act, but that act of the soul by which it trusts in Christ. When Christ told them to labor for the meat that endureth unto everlasting life, they misunderstood him, and supposed that he was enjoining on them some of the external duties of the Mosaic law. Christ corrected this by telling them that "the work" of God was the believing in him. In saying this, he does not class faith with the external duties of the law, but speaks of it as that act or work of the mind which unites the mind to Christ. Olshausen's comment on this text is very fine: "From the many works to which the Jews, in accordance with their legal bias, referred, Jesus points them to the one thing needful, whereby alone all the works of man are hallowed, namely, faith in the Son of God. With a fine allusion to the ἔργα he terms it ἔργα τ. θ., faith being

not only pleasing to God, but also performed by means of his grace, and thus being a work of God in the soul of man. To this work the Jews did not attain through their inward restlessness and their efforts to perform works of many kinds." Our opponents, in their anxiety to classify faith with the external works of the law, are really arraying Christ and the Apostle Paul against each other. They insist that Christ classed faith with the works of the law, while Paul teaches that a man can not be justified by works because of his depravity, but that he is justified by faith.

That we are justified by faith only is proven by the fact that we are justified by grace, and not by works. In this argument note the following points: 1. We are justified by grace—"Being justified freely by his grace" (Rom. iii, 24); "Ye are saved by grace through faith" (Eph. ii, 8). 2. Justification by grace excludes works of every kind—"Now to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt" (Rom. iv, 4); "If by grace, then is it no more of works; otherwise work is no more work" (Rom. xi, 6). The foregoing settles the point that justification being by grace excludes works of every kind. The followers of Mr. Campbell contend that the term "faith" includes all the works of evangelical

obedience. They freely admit that it excludes the works of the Mosaic ritual and of the moral law, but think that such works as repentance and baptism are included under the idea of "faith." Others of the same sect, desirous of reaching the same end, assert that the term "faith" does not indicate the personal faith of the man, but simply the Gospel, and that it should be spoken of as "the faith." A sufficient answer to this last notion is found in the fact that in such texts as "ye are saved by grace through faith," and "being justified by faith," the term "faith" has always been understood by the Church as indicating a personal, heart-felt trust in the Redeemer. In the texts above cited, works of the old law, either ritualistic or moral, and the evangelical obedience of the New Testament, are all alike excluded from the office of justification, and this leaves faith as the only condition of pardon.

Faith apprehends and appropriates the blood of Christ. "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness, that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth

in Jesus. (Rom. iii, 24–26.) This text sets forth the blood of Christ, also called a "redemption," "propitiation," etc., as the ground of our justification. We receive the benefits of this sacrificial blood through faith. An appeal to sacrificial blood for pardon, to be received through our faith in that blood, cuts off every thing but faith as a condition of pardon. If it be said that we expect pardon through the purifying influence of faith upon our hearts, or through the obedience which will spring from it, then it is the excellence of heart or obedience of life, and not the sacrificial blood, in which we trust. But may we not trust in heart purity, evangelical obedience, and the blood altogether for pardon? No! When the appeal is made to the blood of a vicarious sacrifice for pardon, that very act is itself a confession not only of our guilt, but also of the absence of any excellence, either of heart or life, by which we could merit forgiveness. It is a confession that we deserve to die for our sins, and that our only hope of deliverance is in the expiatory sufferings of another; but the text suspends our pardon on our "faith in his blood," thus shutting off all idea of pardon by morality, heart purity, or evangelical obedience, and making faith the only condition of our justification.

ABRAHAM'S JUSTIFICATION THE PATTERN OF OURS.

Romans iv, 1–11, 20–25: "What shall we then say that Abraham, our father as pertaining to the flesh, hath found? For if Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God. For what saith the Scripture? Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness. Now to him that worketh, is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt; But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness. Even as David also describeth the blessedness of the man unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works, saying, Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin. Cometh this blessedness then upon the circumcision only, or upon the uncircumcision also? For we say that faith was reckoned to Abraham for righteousness. How was it then reckoned? when he was in circumcision, or in uncircumcision? Not in circumcision, but in uncircumcision. And he received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had yet being uncircumcised: that he might be the father of all them that believe, though they be not circumcised, that righteousness might be imputed unto them also. . . . He staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief; but was strong in faith, giving glory to God; And being fully persuaded that what he had promised he was able also to perform. And therefore it was imputed to him for righteousness. Now, it was not written for his sake alone, that it was imputed to him; but for us also, to whom it shall be imputed, if we believe on him that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead, who was delivered for our offenses, and was raised again for our justification."

Galatians iii, 6–9: "Even as Abraham believed God, and it was accounted to him for righteousness. Know ye therefore, that they which are of faith, the same are the children of Abraham. And the Scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith, preached before the Gospel unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall all nations be blessed. So then they which be of faith are blessed with faithful Abraham."

In examining the foregoing texts, let the question be asked, How was Abraham justified? 1. He was not justified by works. We have already considered the objections founded on the passage in James ii. Abraham was not justified by works, for the apostle does not mention "works" as having any thing to do with his justification; while on the contrary he positively denies that any man can be justified by works. (Acts xiii, 38, 39; Rom. iii, 20, 28; Gal. ii, 16; iii, 11.) The apostle classes Abraham before his justification with "the ungodly" (Rom, iv, 5), thus completely shutting out all thought of his justification by works. He was not justified by circumcision, for he was justified before he was circumcised. Justification was granted to Abraham on one of three conditions, namely, his works, his circumcision, or his faith. We have already seen that his justification was not conditioned on either his works or his circumcision; it follows, then, that faith was the only condition

of his justification. Dr. Murphy, in his Commentary on Genesis, states the case forcibly: "Abraham had no righteousness; and if he had not, no man had. We have seen enough of Abram to know this on other grounds. And here the universal fact of man's depravity comes out into incidental notice as a thing usually taken for granted in the words of God. Righteousness is here imputed to Abram, hence mercy and grace are extended to him—mercy taking effect in the pardon of his sin, and grace in bestowing the rewards of righteousness. That in him which is counted for righteousness is faith in Jehovah promising mercy. In the absence of righteousness this is the only thing in the sinner that can be counted for righteousness."

Abraham's justification is made the pattern of ours. (Rom. iv, 11, 22–25.) "Abraham was a representative person. What was true of him was true of all others who stood in the same relation to God. The method in which he was justified is the method in which other sinners must be justified. That he was justified by faith is recorded in the Scriptures to be a perpetual testimony as to the true method of justification before God." (Hodge, *in loco.*) It is the teaching of the New Testament that we are justified as he was. He was justified by "faith only;" hence

we are justified by "faith only." It has been objected "that those who would be justified as Abraham was 'must walk in the steps of the faith of Abraham,' and that these words show that neither Abraham nor we are justified by faith only, but by faith and works united; for the phrase 'walk in the steps,' indicates works." The phrase "walk in the steps" simply means to follow the example. It is so defined by Pickering—(see his Lexicon, sub., ἔχνος)—"An exemplar, model; a person in whose steps we desire or ought to tread, that we may not wander from the right path." Robinson defines it thus: "To walk or follow in one's footsteps—that is, to imitate his example." For the New Testament usage of the term see 2 Cor. xii, 18; 1 Peter ii, 21. Barnes renders the clause thus: "Who imitate his example; who imbibe his spirit; who have his faith." The apostle teaches us that we should imitate the example of Abraham in seeking justification. He sought it by "faith only," and the apostle instructs us to do the same thing.

Our next "argument is based upon such passages as present what are necessary and inseparable concomitants of justification as being by or through faith. There are presented in the Scriptures several blessings, which, though distinct in their nature from justification, invariably accom-

pany it, and never can exist but in connection with it. Now, it must be admitted that, if two or more things never exist except in connection with each other, whatever is indispensable to the existence of one must be indispensable to the existence of the others; whatever would lead to the existence of one would necessarily lead to the existence of the others; or, in other words, whatever is the grand indispensable condition to the existence of the one must sustain the same relation to the others. For illustration of this argument, we would refer to the familiar relation of husband and wife. These relations necessarily imply the existence of each other. They are inseparable concomitants. Although the two relations are not identical, the husband is not the wife, nor the wife the husband,—yet the relation of husband can not exist without the relation of wife, nor the relation of wife without that of husband. Now, is it not clear from this that whatever would necessarily lead to the existence of the one relation would also lead to the existence of the other, and whatever would prevent the existence of the one relation would necessarily prevent the existence of the other? Apply this principle of reasoning to the subject in hand. Regeneration, adoption, and salvation, in a certain sense, are inseparable con-

comitants of justification; the one can not exist without the others. Whoever is justified is born of God, or regenerated, adopted, and, in a certain sense, saved; and none can be regenerated, adopted or saved, in that sense, but the justified. From this it will follow that whatever leads to the one of these concomitant blessings must lead to the others, and whatever would prevent the one must prevent the others. Or, in other words, whatever is the grand condition to the existence of the one sustains the same relation to the others. Now, if we can show from the Scriptures that we are regenerated, adopted, and saved through or by faith, it will necessarily follow that we are justified through or by faith. This we think will be evident from the following Scriptures: Rom. i, 16: 'For I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ: for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; to the Jew first and also to the Greek.' Eph. ii, 8: 'For by grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God.' Luke vii, 50: 'And he said to the woman, Thy faith hath saved thee: go in peace.' John xx, 31: 'But these are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name.' Mark xvi, 16: 'He that believeth and is

baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned.' Acts xvi, 31: 'Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved.' 2 Tim. iii, 15: 'And that from a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus.' John i, 12, 13: 'But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name: which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.' Acts xv, 9: 'And put no difference between us and them, purifying their hearts by faith.' Acts xxvi, 18: 'That they may receive forgiveness of sins, and inheritance among them which are sanctified by faith that is in me.' Gal. iii, 26: 'For ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus.' 1 John v, 1: 'Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God.' 1 John v, 10: 'He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself.' From the above Scriptures it is undeniable that faith is the necessary condition of regeneration, adoption, and salvation; but as these are inseparable concomitants of justification, it follows that faith is the necessary condition of justification." (Ralston's Elements of Divinity, pp. 319–321.) It is sometimes

objected that although these texts do not name any other thing except faith as a condition of the various blessings spoken of, yet that is no proof that faith is the only condition of these blessings; that in other Scriptures other conditions may be named. But this is not a fair statement of the case. Several of these texts not only mention faith as a condition of these blessings, but they positively promise these blessings to every one having faith. Thus, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved." "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God." "He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself." These texts certainly make faith the only condition of obtaining the blessings named. No other condition is named or referred to. On the contrary, it is plainly asserted that whosoever has faith is born of God, has the witness of it, and shall be saved. Now, if these blessings depended upon any other condition besides faith, then it would not be absolutely true that every believer had the blessing. A man might believe and be perfectly willing to do any thing and every thing else that God wanted him to do; and yet any one of a thousand obstacles might hinder him from complying with any other conditions, and thus prevent his obtaining the

blessing. But Christ has said that the believer is not condemned, that he has passed from death unto life, that he is born of God, that he has eternal life, and that he has the witness in himself. Hence faith is its only condition. But as these blessings exist only in conjunction with justification, it follows that faith is the only condition of justification.

VIII.

NATURE OF THE FAITH THAT JUSTIFIES.

JUSTIFYING faith can not be defined perfectly by any one word or sentence. "The difficulty in giving a definition of faith is that we have no word that clearly and adequately expresses the whole act of acceptance or closing of the soul or heart with Christ." (Edwards.) It comprehends several items, and can be understood only by a consideration of these items. It comprises, 1st. An assent of the mind to the facts and doctrines of the Gospel, so far as these are known to the person. 2d. A consent of the will to the terms of pardon and salvation as laid down in that Gospel. 3d. A penitent and hearty trust in Christ as a personal Savior. We not unfrequently meet with persons who collect together Bible texts which call for our faith in some one Bible fact or doctrine, and they make that fact or doctrine the Alpha and Omega of our faith. Thus, we are not unfrequently told that the belief of one fact, namely, that "Jesus Christ is the Son of God," is all that is requisite, as far as faith

goes, to salvation. Such persons are apt to ignore every other quality of justifying faith except the simple assent of the understanding to the fact that "Jesus Christ is the Son of God." To such persons we would suggest that the duty of believing in the divine Sonship does not supersede the necessity of a hearty personal trust in Christ. The duty of exercising such trust in Christ is plainly and forcibly taught in the Bible, and does not clash with faith in his Sonship, but on the contrary, fairly includes it. Furthermore, in those New Testament cases where men (not demoniacs) professed their faith in Christ's divine Sonship, their faith in that Sonship grew out of, and was associated with, a personal trust in him. Thus in Matt. viii, 33, the disciples had seen Christ walking on the waves in the midst of the storm. His kind words, "It is I, be not afraid," had quieted their fears. They had seen him save Peter from sinking; when he came on the ship the storm ceased. These incidents were surely sufficient to call out their confidence, their worship, and their confession, "Of a truth thou art the Son of God." Again, in Matt. xxvii, 54, the unnatural darkness and the earthquake at the death of Christ, gave the centurion confidence in Christ as "the Son of God." Again, we have similar evidence of a personal trust in Christ by

Nathanael when he calls Christ "the Son of God." (John i, 45–49; vi, 66–69; xi, 21–27; i, 29–34; ix, 35–38.) In Acts viii, 37, the eunuch's confession, "I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God," was given by him after he had read and listened to the story of Christ's sufferings, death, and resurrection—matters well calculated to fill his soul with confidence in Christ. Furthermore, the eunuch's confession of his faith in the Sonship of the Savior was given in answer to Philip's inquiry as to whether he believed with all the heart.

On the nature of faith Watson speaks as follows: "It is not, surely, that we may merely believe that the death of Christ is a sacrifice for sin that he is 'set forth as a propitiation,' but that we may trust in its efficacy; it is not that we may merely believe that God has made promises to us that his merciful engagements in our favor are recorded, but that we may have confidence in them, and thus be supported by them. This was the faith of the saints of the Old Testament. 'By faith Abraham, when he was called to go out into a place which he should after receive for an inheritance, obeyed, and he went out, not knowing whither he went.' His faith was confidence. 'Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him.' 'Who is among you that feareth the Lord?

let him trust in the name of the Lord, and stay upon his God.' 'Blessed is the man that trusteth in the Lord, and whose hope the Lord is.' It is under this notion of trust that faith is continually represented to us also in the New Testament. 'In his name shall the Gentiles trust.' 'For therefore we both labor and suffer reproach, because we trust in the living God, who is the Savior of all men, and especially of them that believe.' 'For I know whom I have believed (trusted), and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that day.' 'If we hold the beginning of our confidence steadfast to the end.'"

That justifying faith is a hearty trust in Christ is abundantly illustrated by the New Testament. In John iii, 14–16, it is the trust of those who have been bitten by the old serpent and are looking to and believing in the uplifted Son of man, confident that he both can and will save them from eternal death. In John x, 26–28, it is symbolized by the confidence sheep have in a loving shepherd. In John vi, 35, it is the confidence of the thirsty traveler coming to Jesus for the water of life. In John xx, 26–31, it is the confidence of the once doubting Thomas when he has seen Jesus and has thrust his hand into his side and has put his finger in the print of the nails, and

who feels himself both reproved and cheered by the kind word of Jesus. In 2 Tim. i, 12, it is the trust and persuasion of one who has committed the keeping of his soul to the Captain of his salvation. It is the unwavering confidence of Abraham, who, in his old age, believed that God was able to raise Isaac from the dead. (Heb. xi, 17–19.) It is the confidence of those who, like Peter, feel that there is no one besides Christ to whom they can go for eternal life. (John vi, 68.) It is the confidence of those who, like Paul, feel that faith in Christ is the very life of their souls. (Gal. iii, 20.) It is a confidence in Christ so strong that the possessor is willing to die for Christ's sake. (Phil. i, 29.) It is the trust in Christ of one who realizes that he can not be saved by any thing else other than the mercy of the Son of God. (1 Tim. i, 16.)

IX.

FAITH, THE GIFT OF GOD.

WE have already shown that, in believing, man is not merely a passive recipient; but that he is also a voluntary and responsible actor. Yet it is also true that in believing he needs and receives help direct from God. Because of this, faith is often spoken of as "the gift of God." We will now endeavor to determine in what sense faith is the gift of God. "According to the Antinomian theory, faith is the gift of God in the same sense in which the manna from heaven was such. That is, Antinomians understand that faith is a grace, or a something possessing an abstract existence, as separate and distinct from the existence and operations of the believer as the manna in question was from the existence and operations of the people who gathered and used it. According to the above notion of faith, to call upon men to believe and to hold them responsible for their unbelief, would be just as consistent with reason and Scripture, as to call upon them to

stop the planets in their course, and to hold them responsible for the rotation of the seasons. Such view of the subject is not only inconsistent with the whole tenor of Scripture, which enjoins upon man the exercise of faith as a duty, but it is irreconcilable with the very nature of faith. What is faith? It is no abstract entity which God has treasured up in the magazines of heaven to be conveyed down to man without any agency of his, as the olive leaf was borne to the window of the ark by Noah's dove. Faith has no existence in the abstract. We might as well suppose that there can be thought without an intelligent being to think, as that faith can exist separate from the agent who believes. Faith is the act of believing; it is an exercise of the mind, and, in the very nature of things, must be dependent on the agency of the believer for its existence. There is, however, a sense in which we think faith may with propriety be called the gift of God. Whatsoever is the result of a merciful arrangement of God, although our own agency may be requisite to our enjoyment of the blessing, is, in an important sense, the gift of God. For example, the sight of external objects results from a merciful arrangement of God, by which the surrounding rays of light are adapted to the organization of the human eye.

Thus sight may be called the gift of God, but not so as to exclude human agency; for we may either open or close our eyes at pleasure; we may look upward to the stars or downward to the earth; we may turn to the right or left at will. Even so faith results from a merciful arrangement of God, not independent of, but in connection with, the free moral agency of man, It is of God's merciful arrangement that we are presented with a Saviour, the proper object of faith, that we have access to his Word and Gospel, unfolding the plan of salvation, and exhibiting the subject matter of faith; that we are presented with the proper evidences of the truth of our holy religion, serving as the ground or reason of our faith; that we have minds and hearts susceptible of divine illumination and gracious influence, enabling us to engage in the exercise of faith, and, lastly, that the gracious influence through the agency of the Holy Spirit is vouchsafed unto us by which we may, in the exercise of the ability which God giveth, in connection with all these privileges, 'believe to the salvation of our souls.' In reference to all these particulars, so far as they are connected with, or enter into, the composition of faith, it is properly the gift of God." (Condensed from Ralston's Elements of Divinity.)

In support of the proposition that man needs and receives divine help in believing let the following evidence be considered. When the father brought his son (who was a demoniac) to Christ, to have him healed, he evidently did not have a perfect faith in Christ, for he said to Christ, "if thou canst do any thing," etc. His language implied a doubting condition of mind. Jesus answered him, "if thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth." (Mark ix, 17–27.) The father feels the reproof, he is conscious of the weakness of his faith, yet he is struggling to believe; he needs help to believe; in his agony he turns to Christ with the cry, "help thou mine unbelief." Christ has suspended the child's cure on the father's faith, the father needs help to believe, he asks that help of Christ, and the child is cured. The only logical conclusion is, that the father's prayer for help to believe was a proper prayer, and Christ answered it by giving the desired help. In Acts iii, 16, the faith which healed the lame man is said to have been "*by*" (διὰ) Christ, thus making Christ the author of that faith. The following texts will show the usage of διὰ with the genitive: "with persons, the agent or instrument; 'by whom [through whom, as an instrument] He made the world.' Heb. i, 2, Matt. i, 22:

'Spoken of the Lord by the prophet' [as an instrument.] Heb. iii, 16, 'that came out of Egypt by Moses' [the agent in their exodus]. So 'by Jesus Christ,' as the instrument of salvation. Rom. v, 5: 'by the Holy Ghost.' 2 Tim. ii, 2: 'among [or by] many witnesses.' See, also, Gal. i, 1." (Condensed from Jelf's Greek Grammar, Vol. II, p. 302.) The apostle's expression represents the man's faith as being brought into existence by the gracious help of Christ. In Eph. vi, 23, the apostle in his prayer for the brethren, asks that peace, love, and faith, may all be given them by God the Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ. In Col. ii, 12, our faith is said to be of (or by) the operation of God: "Through the faith of the operation of God;" ἐνεργείας τοῦ θεοῦ, *the energy, force,* or *power of God*; that is, faith created by the will of the man aided by the power of God. God creates faith in a man by revealing Christ to him through the Gospel; giving him a conception of Christ as a Savior, and enabling him to trust in Christ. The voluntary act of faith belongs to the man; the gracious power by which he is enabled to believe comes from God. Conybeare and Howson translate this clause thus: "Through the faith wrought in you by God." Olshausen: "Faith which the operation

of God calls forth." Dr. Clarke says: "Believing is the act of the soul; but the grace or power to believe comes from God himself." Phil. i, 29: "For unto you it is given in the behalf of Christ, not only to believe on him, but also to suffer for his sake." It will not be questioned that the power to endure sufferings for Christ is a gift from God, but in the text the power to believe and the power to endure sufferings are both classed together as gifts from God. 1 Tim. i, 14: "And the grace of our Lord was exceeding abundant with faith and love which is in Christ Jesus." Here, pardoning mercy, the power to believe, and the power to love are all ascribed to Christ, as his gifts to the apostle.

An effort is frequently made to evade the force of the preceding evidence by quoting Rom. x, 17: "Faith cometh by hearing," etc., and then pleading that the only help God gives man in order to his believing is to give him the Gospel and the evidence of its credibility. In answering this evasion, we call attention to the following points: First. The soul of man has been so besotted with sin, that a simple presentation to him of the truth, with the evidence on which it rests, is not sufficient. There is needed a special work of God to arouse his attention to

the Gospel. "Open thou mine eyes, that I may behold wondrous things out of thy law." (Psalm cxix, 18.) There are two things concerning the author of these words which will not be questioned: 1. That he had the Word of God in his possession. 2. That he had at least average mental abilities. Notwithstanding these facts, he still feels the need of divine help, and prays for it that he may be able to understand the divine Word. The word here rendered "open" is the same word rendered "opened" in the sentence, "The Lord opened the eyes of Balaam, and he saw." The angel had been standing in the way before this, but Balaam did not see him until God opened his eyes. The wondrous things were all in the law, but the Psalmist needed that God open his spiritual eyesight before he could see them. Dr. Clarke's note on this text is very fine: "Illuminate my understanding, take away the veil that is on my heart, and then shall I see wonders in thy law. The Holy Scriptures are plain enough: but the heart of man is darkened by sin. The Bible does not so much need a comment, as the soul does the light of the Holy Spirit." See, also, Luke xxiv, 45; Acts xvi, 14; Eph. i, 17, 18. Second. It is not faith in a dogma which justifies, but faith in a person, and that person the Son of God. This feature is

heightened by a consideration of the time when the man is called upon to believe in Christ. When the Holy Spirit is sending his arrows of conviction deepest into the soul, when conviction of sin and its consequent distress are taking their strongest hold of him, then it is he is called upon to trust his every hope for time and eternity on Christ. The man feels himself to be nothing but sin; and he sees Christ to be altogether righteous, Christ is all merciful; but it is against that very mercy that he has sinned. He has heard the Gospel, but it is a Gospel which in times past he has rejected. Still he must believe in Christ, or be eternally lost. At this point, if left to himself he would sink in despair; here he needs help, in order that he may believe; and, blessed be God, he receives it. It is through the aid of the Holy Spirit that he is able to look upon Christ, and praise him as "the author and perfecter" of his faith. (Heb. xii, 2.)

X.

WITNESS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT TO THE FACT OF THE BELIEVER'S JUSTIFICATION AND ADOPTION.

WE will state the doctrine of "the witness of the Spirit" as it is taught in the sermons of John Wesley. "But perhaps one might say (desiring any who are taught of God to correct, to soften, or to strengthen the expression), the testimony of the Spirit is an inward impression on the soul, whereby the Spirit of God directly witnesses to my spirit, that I am a child of God; that Jesus Christ hath loved me, and given himself for me; and that all my sins are blotted out, and I, even I, am reconciled to God." "The testimony now under consideration is given by the Spirit of God to and with our spirit; he is the person testifying. What he testifies to us is 'that we are the children of God.' The immediate result of this testimony is 'the fruit of the Spirit,' namely, 'love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness;' and without these the testimony itself can not continue." Again, "Mean-

time let it be observed, I do not mean hereby that the Spirit of God testifies this by any outward voice, no, nor always by an inward voice, although he may do this sometimes; neither do I suppose that he always applies to the heart (though he often may) one or more texts of Scripture; but he so works upon the soul by his immediate influence, and by a strong though inexplicable operation, that the stormy wind and troubled waves subside and there is a sweet calm, the heart resting as in the arms of Jesus, and the sinner being clearly satisfied that God is reconciled, that all his 'iniquities are forgiven, and his sins covered.'" (Wesley's Sermons, Vol. I, pp. 87, 94.)

To the foregoing statement of the doctrine, Jonathan Edwards objects. "It requires no higher sort of idea or sensation for a man to have the apprehension of his own conversion impressed upon him than to have the apprehension of his neighbor's conversion in like manner impressed; but God, if he pleased, might impress the knowledge of this fact that he had forgiven his neighbor's sins and given him a title to heaven, as well as any other fact, without any communication of his holiness. The excellency and importance of the fact do not at all hinder a natural man's mind being susceptible of an immediate suggestion and

impression of it." (Works, Vol. III, p. 86.) In answer to this objection it is sufficient to state that the question is not about the sort or quality of the impression, nor whether it is attended by any impartation of holiness. It is not disputed that God can and may make revelations concerning specific matter to unconverted men—as in the cases of Abimelech; Laban, and Balaam. These matters do not concern the question at issue, which is, "Will the Holy Spirit bear an immediate and direct testimony to a believing penitent that his sins are pardoned and that he is adopted into the family of God?" But to relieve the doctrine entirely from the objection of Edwards, it will be shown hereafter that the witness of the Spirit is not a mere mental conviction—as in the case of Laban and Balaam—but, on the contrary, it is a rich spiritual gift, filling the heart with love, joy, and peace.

Edwards states another objection thus: "What has misled many in their notion of that influence of the Spirit of God we are speaking of is the word *witness*, its being called the witness of the Spirit. Hence they have taken it not to be any effect or work of the Spirit upon the heart, giving evidence from whence men may argue that they are the children of God, but an inward immediate suggestion, as though God inwardly spoke to the

man and testified to him, and told him that he was his child by a kind of secret voice or impression; not observing the manner in which the word witness, or testimony, is often used in the New Testament, where such terms often signify not only a mere declaring and asserting a thing to be true, but holding forth evidence from whence a thing may be argued and proved to be true." Edwards proceeds to illustrate and prove this objection by a reference to several texts of Scripture, which we will call up and examine hereafter. To this objection as it stands we answer, 1st. That the work of the Spirit in the heart consists in shedding God's love abroad in it—filling it with joy and faith. Now, love, joy, and faith have no abstract existence apart from a conscious active agent who exercises the love, who rejoices, and who believes. In the case before us the love, joy, and faith exist as the action of the heart in which the Spirit is working. Hence they are the witness of the believer's own spirit to the efficiency of the Holy Spirit's work. So far from these graces precluding the direct witness of the Holy Spirit, they can not even exist until the Holy Spirit has first given its witness to the fact of pardon and adoption. 2d. Edwards's effort to prove that God sometimes bears a mediate testimony to his truth by means of signs,

works, and miracles, is wholly foreign to the issue. The question is not whether God sometimes bears witness mediately through his works, but whether the Holy Spirit bears direct witness to the fact of pardon. Edwards makes some Scriptural references in support of his objection, but when they are examined they prove to be rather unfortunate ones for his theory. No one of the texts refers to the doctrine under examination. The first two—Heb. ii, 4; Acts xiv, 3—refer to the manner in which God witnessed to the calling and ministry of the apostles. These texts set forth the fact that God testified to their ministry by signs and wonders. But this did not preclude the fact of God giving a direct personal testimony to the same fact. Thus God gave to Ananias a direct witness concerning the calling of Paul. He also gave to Cornelius a direct witness concerning the ministry of Peter. It was also in a direct manner that the Holy Spirit witnessed to the Church at Antioch concerning the ministry of Paul and Barnabas. (Acts ix, 10–16; x, 1–6; xiii, 1, 2.) The next two texts—John v, 36; x, 25—refer to the testimony borne to Christ by the Father through the instrumentality of the works wrought by Christ. But so far from this witness of works precluding a direct witness from the Father, the first named of these texts (John

v, 36) is followed, in the very next verse, by an explicit statement of it. Turn to the passage, and in the 36th verse you read, "The same works that I do bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me." In the next verse you read, "And the Father himself which hath sent me hath borne witness of me." He did it by direct witness both at his baptism and at his transfiguration. (Matt. iii, 17; xvii, 5.) How could Edwards overlook so plain a fact? Edwards not only overlooked Bible facts, but he seems also to have overlooked the facts of his own experience. We quote the following from the account of his religious experience as written by himself. (See his Works, Vol. I, p. 16.) "The first instance that I remember of that sort of inward sweet delight in God and divine things that I have lived much in since, was on reading those words—1 Tim. i, 17—'Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honor and glory for ever and ever. Amen.' As I read the words there came into my soul, and was as it were diffused through it, a sense of the glory of the Divine Being, a new sense, quite different from any thing I ever experienced before." Had Edwards forgotten this blessed experience when he wrote his objections to the direct witness of the Holy Spirit?

It is often objected to the direct witness of the

Holy Spirit that "it has been often claimed by those who evidently did not have it, but were enthusiasts, fanatics, or hypocrites." The mere fact that many profess this witness who do not possess it is no proof that others do not possess it. The existence of counterfeit gold, or of the parhelion, is no proof against the existence of genuine gold, or of a real sun. If there were no such things as real kings, then it would never have entered the heads of lunatics and wicked pretenders to claim the titles and rights of royalty. The existence of the counterfeit and the spurious is strong presumptive evidence of the existence of the genuine. If there were no such thing as the direct witness of the Spirit, it would be difficult to conceive how hypocrites would originate the claim.

Three other objections are thus stated and answered by Wesley (Works, Vol. I, p. 97): "'But I lay it down as an undoubted truth, the fruit of the Spirit is the witness of the Spirit.' Not undoubted! thousands doubt of, yea, flatly deny it; but let that pass. 'If this witness be sufficient there is no need of any other. But it is sufficient unless in one of these cases, 1. The total absence of the fruit of the Spirit.' And this is the case when the direct witness is first given. 2. 'The not perceiving it. But to contend for it

in this case is to contend for being in the favor of God and not knowing it.' True, not knowing it at that time any otherwise than by the testimony which is given for that end. And this we do contend for: we contend that the direct witness may shine clear even while the indirect one is under a cloud."

PROOF OF THE DIRECT WITNESS OF THE SPIRIT.

1. The existence of a direct witness of the Holy Spirit to the fact of the believer's pardon is implied in the work of the conviction of sin by the Holy Spirit. In the conviction of a sinner his mind is deeply impressed with the thought of his exceeding sinfulness; he is made to feel that God has just cause to be angry with him; that he deserves to be punised. This condition of things is brought about by the Holy Ghost because God is justly displeased with the sinner's conduct and desires to lead him to repentance and to a reconciliation with God. All this fairly implies that when the sinner has repented and believed God will remove the sense of guilt and condemnation and grant him an evidence of his restoration to the divine favor. As God's displeasure was aroused by the impenitence and unbelief of the sinner, it would seem natural that it should pass away when the sinner has repented

and complied with the terms of pardon. As God fills the sinner's mind with the sense of guilt and condemnation because of his impenitence, it would seem reasonable when the sinner repented that God should remove this sense of guilt and condemnation and substitute for it in the penitent's mind a sense of the divine love—a witness or testimony of reconciliation.

2. The force of the foregoing argument is strengthened by the reflection that the pardon of our sins is an act of the divine mind, and can not be known to us at all, unless God chooses to reveal it to us. It may be replied to this, that the fact of forgiveness may be implied from the fact of our having complied with the terms of pardon; namely, repentance and faith. But this would leave us to the mercy of doubts, and most tormenting fears — doubts and fears concerning both the quantity and the quality of our repentance and of our faith. "Faith, both as assent and confidence, has every possible degree; it is capable of mixture with doubt and self dependence; nor without some definite and particular characters being assigned to justifying faith, could we ever, with any confidence, conclude as to our own. But we have no such particular description of faith, nor are we authorized anywhere to make ourselves the judges of the fact,

whether the act of pardon as to us has passed the mind of God. The apostle, in the passages quoted above, has assigned that office to the Holy Spirit; but it is in no part of Scripture appointed to us." (Watson's Inst., Vol. II, p. 277.) Furthermore, we were not left to determine our condemned condition by a logical process; we were made painfully conscious of it by a direct reproof from God; and it is but reasonable to suppose that God having pardoned us, he would make us conscious of that pardon by a direct testimony to that effect. Neither will it be of any avail to say that we can argue the fact of our pardon from the fact that we have in our hearts "the fruit of the Spirit," which is love. For this fruit of the Spirit, "love," depends for its very existence on the previous witness of the Spirit. "We love him, because he first loved us." (1 John iv, 19.) Here our love to God is predicated upon the fact that he first loved us. But how could this be true unless we were made aware that he loved us? And how could we be made aware of this fact unless God gave us a direct witness of it? This consciousness of God's love must precede all the fruit of the Spirit. It will not do to say that we can collect the evidence of God's love for us from the history of his providence, and his general dealings with us.

It is not God's love in providence, but his love in redemption, as shown in his merciful acts of pardon and adoption, that begets our love. And we can have no knowledge of these facts, and can not love him until he makes his love known to us by a direct witness. "If we 'love God,' it is because we know him as God reconciled; if we have 'joy in God,' it is because 'we have received the reconciliation;' if we have peace, it is because, 'being justified by faith, we have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ.'

"God, conceived of as angry, can not be the object of filial love; pardon unfelt, supposes guilt and fear still to burden the mind, and 'love' and 'joy' and 'peace' can not exist. But by the argument of those who make these the *media* of ascertaining the fact of our pardon and adoption, we must be supposed to love God, while yet we feel him to be angry with us; to rejoice and have peace, while the fearful apprehensions of the consequences of unremitted sin are not removed; and if this is impossible, then the ground of our love and joy and peace is pardon revealed and witnessed directly and immediately by the spirit of adoption." (Watson's Inst., Vol. II, pp. 278, 279.) "That this testimony of the Spirit of God must needs, in the very nature of things, be antecedent to the testimony of our

own spirit may appear from this single consideration: we must be holy of heart and holy in life before we can be conscious that we are so, before we can have the testimony of our spirit that we are inwardly and outwardly holy. But we must love God before we can be holy at all; this being the root of all holiness. Now we can not love God till we know he loves us. 'We love him, because he first loved us.' And we can not know his pardoning love to us till his Spirit witnesses it to our spirit." (Wesley's Works, Vol. I, p. 88.)

3. We ask the reader's attention to the following texts: "The secret of the Lord is with them that fear him." "His secret is with the righteous." (Psalm xxv, 14; Prov. iii, 32.) Whatever the term "secret" may mean in these texts, it evidently designates a blessing which is known only to God, and to those to whom he choses to reveal it. It is also evident that it is in the possession of all the righteous; having been communicated to them by God. Now, it can not be supposed that God communicates to every righteous person the secrets belonging to the creation, government, or future history of earth. He made a partial communication of these secrets to the inspired writers; the matters thus communicated were spread upon the pages of

revelation, and were secrets no longer. The "secret" mentioned in the foregoing texts is a private communication from God to the believer, something which the ungodly world knows nothing of, and can not participate in. We can not conceive of any thing which is known only to God which is communicated by him to all believers, and which can not be understood or appreciated by the world, save only the testimony of the pardon of the believer's sins by God. The pardon of sin is an act taking place in the divine mind. At the moment of its taking place it is known only to God its author. This is true also of the act of adoption. Hence, the fact of a believer's pardon and adoption is a "secret" with God our Father. Now there is no secret in the divine mind which so concerns a believing penitent as the answers to the questions, "Has God forgiven me?" "Am I a child of God?" There can be neither peace nor joy nor any of the fruits of the divine Spirit until God testifies to him the secret of his pardon and adoption. "Communion with himself, peace, joy, assurance, teaching, confidence, an enlightened apprehension of Providence; yea, all the blessings of his covenant,—this is the secret between God and the soul—an inclosed portion,

hidden from the world, sealed to his beloved people." (Bridge on Proverbs.)

4. "And hope maketh not ashamed, because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us." (Rom. v, 5.) What do the words "love of God" here mean? They do not mean our love to God, for our love to God would be a very unsatisfactory foundation on which to rest our hope. If we had no other basis of our hope than the fact that we loved God, we might seriously fear that our hope would yet bring us to shame. On the other hand, we could not have a better foundation for our hope than the consciousness that God loved us. God's love is a passion belonging to God, and can have no existence separate from its Divine Author. We can not take cognizance of it by our senses, but we can be made conscious of its influence; we can be made to feel that we are the subjects on which it exerts its gracious power. In short, the Holy Spirit can make us feel that God loves us, and on this consciousness of the divine love we can build a "hope which maketh not ashamed." "The love of God," says Philippi, "does not descend upon us as dew, in drops, but as a stream which spreads itself abroad through the whole soul, filling it with the consciousness

of his presence and favor. And this inward persuasion that we are the objects of the love of God is not the mere result of the examination of evidence, nor is it a vain delusion, but it is produced by the Holy Ghost." (Quoted from Hodge on Romans.)

5. A direct testimony to the fact of their acceptance with God has been the blessing of God's people in all ages. "By faith Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain, by which he obtained witness that he was righteous, God testifying of his gifts." Of Enoch it is said, "Before his translation he had this testimony, that he pleased God." (Heb. xi, 4, 5.) The terms of this text can not be interpreted of any thing else than a direct witness from God to the fact of his acceptance with him. To Isaiah the seraph said, "Thine iniquity is taken away, and thy sin purged" (Isa. vi, 7), a testimony as direct and explicit as it is gracious. To the sick of the palsy Christ said, "Thy sins be forgiven thee" (Matt. ix, 2); to the woman "which was a sinner" he said, "Thy sins are forgiven" (Luke vii, 48). These persons were not left to infer their pardon from his works, or from any change in their hearts or lives; they had the knowledge of it by his direct testimony to the fact. It will not

do to say that these are exceptional cases; that when Jesus was on earth he healed some sick people but that he does not do so now; and that neither does he now testify to people that their sins are forgiven. The healing of bodily or mental infirmities was only an incidental matter in the great mission of Christ, but the pardoning of sin on proper terms was and is and ever will be, Christ's great work. As God is no respecter of persons, are we not warranted in the belief that this direct witness to the pardon of sin is the common heritage of all believers?

6. Rom. viii, 15, 16: "For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear, but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God." In this text notice the following points: 1st. The explicit declaration of the direct witness of the Holy Spirit—"The Spirit itself beareth witness." This "witness" is not secondary or mediate, it is borne by "the Spirit itself." 2d. The witness of the Holy Spirit is not isolated or alone; it is a joint or co-witness; it bears witness "with our spirit;" that is, it unites its witness with the witness of our spirit. "Not only do our own filial feelings toward God

prove that we are his children, but the Holy Spirit itself conveys to our souls the assurance of this delightful fact. The Spirit itself (*αὐτὸ τό πνεῦμα*, and not *τό αὐτὸ πνεῦμα*, which would mean *the same spirit*) is, of course, the Holy Spirit, (1) because of the obvious distinction between it and our spirit; (2) because of the use of the word throughout the passage; (3) because of the analogy to other texts which can not be otherwise explained. Gal. iv, 6: 'God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father.' Rom. v, 5: 'The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost given unto us,' etc." (Hodge, *in loco.*)

7. Rom. viii, 9: "But ye are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his." It will not do to interpret the word "Spirit" in this text as meaning "mind," or "disposition," for the text expressly limits the term to the Spirit of Christ dwelling in the man as the great author and agent of sanctification. "It is obvious that the Spirit of Christ is identical with the Spirit of God. The one expression is interchanged with the other. If the Spirit of God dwell in you you are true Christians, for if the Spirit of Christ be

not in you you are none of his. This is the reasoning of the apostle. 'Spirit of Christ,' therefore, can no more mean the temper or disposition of Christ than 'Spirit of God' can mean the disposition of God; both expressions designate the Holy Ghost, the third person in the adorable Trinity." (Hodge, *in loco.*)

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